A displaced girl in Jérémie, Haiti, living in a temporary shelter next to a church, sells biscuits as she had been doing since before Hurricane Matthew struck.

Photo: ©UNICEF/UN035682/LeMoyne, October 2016
As in previous years, high levels of new displacement by conflict and disaster in 2016 added to already existing high numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs). A total of 31.1 million new displacements were recorded in 125 countries and territories in 2016 – roughly the equivalent of one person forced to flee every second.

Disasters continue to bring about the highest numbers of new displacements each year, while conflict-related displacement has been on an overall upward trend over the last decade (figure 1.1). As the main triggers of forced displacement currently recorded, armed conflicts and disasters brought on by sudden onset natural hazards show few if any signs of abating. Nor do their many underlying drivers, which include poverty and inequality, fragile and weak governance, rapid urbanisation, climate change and environmental degradation.

High risk and low capacity

The majority of new displacements in 2016 took place in environments characterised by a high exposure to natural and human-made hazards, high levels of socioeconomic vulnerability, and low coping capacity of both institutions and infrastructure. Of the 6.9 million new displacements by conflict, 6.6 million – more than 95 per cent – took place in countries that rank high or very high on INFORM’s risk index (see figure 1.2). This implies that many of the new caseloads are likely to become protracted as governments with weak coping capacity struggle to respond to the multiple, varied and complex needs of IDPs. As a result, IDPs’ vulnerability could persist and worsen over time. This is a strong reminder of how the failure to address underlying risk drivers will continue to generate cyclical crises, and to take a heavy toll on affected communities and national economies. Unresolved displacement and a failure to address the drivers of displacement risk will, in turn, result in more displacement in the future.

Figure 1.1: Total annual new displacements since 2008

Source: IDMC
KEY FINDINGS

In 2016, 31.1 million new cases of internal displacement by conflict, violence and disasters were recorded. This represents an increase of 3.3 million from 2015, and is the equivalent of one person displaced every second.

With 24.2 new displacements in 2016, disasters triggered by sudden onset hazard events continue to bring about the highest numbers of new displacements each year. A majority of these occur in low and lower-middle income countries and as a result of large-scale weather events, and predominantly in South and East Asia. While China, the Philippines and India have the highest absolute numbers, small island states suffer disproportionately once population size is taken into account. Slow-onset disasters, existing vulnerabilities and conflict also continue to converge into explosive tipping points for displacement.

Of the 6.9 million new displacements by conflict in 2016, 6.6 million – more than 95 per cent – took place in high-risk contexts. Most conflict displacement occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) overtaking Syria in the top ranking. Ongoing levels of violence in Syria meant that more than 800,000 new displacements were recorded there during the year. In Iraq, almost 680,000 new displacements occurred as a result of nine military campaigns. In Yemen, at least 478,000 new displacements took place against the backdrop of a persistently dynamic and volatile security situation.

Although the phenomenon of displacement by generalised violence is still inconsistently monitored across the world, in El Salvador significant numbers of people were displaced by criminal and gang violence in 2016, placing the country second in the ranking of highest new displacements relative to population size.

By the end of 2016, there were 40.3 million people internally displaced by conflict and violence across the world. An unknown number remain displaced as a result of disasters that occurred in and prior to 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What are we counting?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The GRID presents two types of headline figures: new displacements caused by conflict and disasters during the course of the year and the total number of people displaced by conflict at year’s end. We commonly refer to “new displacements” or “incidents” and “cases” of displacement as this may include individuals who have been displaced more than once. Where we refer to the total number of people displaced, this is to mean single incidents or cases affecting one person. This can be the case in the context of specific disaster events and is also used to present the total number of people displaced by conflict at year’s end.</td>
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New research into displacement risk suggests that displacements associated with disasters will continue at a similar scale to current trends. However, the impacts of climate change on the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and environmental degradation will increase displacement risk further.

Increasing complexity

In several contexts a clear-cut distinction between conflict and disasters as the immediate causes of displacement is becoming increasingly difficult to uphold. Separating the many underlying and interlinked drivers of the conflict and disasters that result in forced displacement is even more problematic. These complexities have been recognised before, but current data collection and analysis does not reflect them, and quantitative research remains limited.

Data from the Horn of Africa suggests that recurring droughts, poor access to basic services and infrastructure, lack of livelihood options and ongoing conflict and insecurity converge in a toxic mix that leaves highly vulnerable and exposed people with no other option but to move. In Ethiopia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Somalia and South Sudan, the confluence of different drivers and causes of new displacement in 2016 was complex enough that distinguishing between final triggers was impossible. Consideration should be given to reporting displacement in such contexts across multiple drivers and causes.

Figure 1.2: New displacements by conflict and disasters in 2016, disaggregated by INFORM risk levels in the countries concerned

Source: IDMC, with INFORM data
CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE
New displacement in 2016

There were 6.9 million new internal displacements associated with conflict and violence in 2016, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East (see figure 1.3). This represents a 20 per cent decrease from 2015 estimates, due largely to fewer reported new displacements in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

That said, figures for new displacement by conflict still indicate an overall rising trend (see figure 1.4), with an annual average of 5.3 million new displacements a year since 2003, roughly 15,000 people forced to flee their homes every day. This correlates with findings that although the number of active conflicts has declined over the same period, those being fought became steadily more lethal from 2010 to 2014 and then slightly less so in 2015.5

The downturn over the last two years should not mask significant new internal displacement not only in the Middle East, but also in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Yemen, as well as that associated with violence perpetrated by drug gangs and other criminal groups in Central America (see figure 1.5).6

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Figure 1.3: New displacements by conflict and violence by World Bank-defined region in 2016

Source: IDMC, with World Bank data

Figure 1.4: New displacements by conflict and violence, 2003 to 2016

Source: IDMC
Sub-Saharan Africa: overtaking the Middle East

With a decline in the number of people fleeing violence in the Middle East and a spike in DRC, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for the highest number of new internal displacements associated with conflict and violence in 2016.

The majority occurred in DRC, where ongoing conflict in North and South Kivu and an increase in inter-communal clashes in southern and central regions such as Tanganyika, Kasai, Kasai-Oriental, Ituri and Uele, caused more than 922,000 new displacements in total during the year. Some people were forced to flee more than once. This was an increase of nearly 50 per cent on figures for 2015 (see spotlight, p.14).

More than 500,000 new displacements were reported in Nigeria during the year, as violence committed by Boko Haram and military operations against the group continued to plague the economically deprived Lake Chad basin. Borno, Adamawa and Yobe were worst affected, and protection needs in all three states were acute, particularly for vulnerable groups such as women, children and older people. The insecurity also impeded access to IDPs and other people in need of urgent life-saving assistance, leaving many trapped by the conflict and reporting famine-like conditions.

Against the backdrop of new displacement, around a million IDPs and refugees started to return toward their areas of origin in north-east Nigeria in 2016. Given, however, that many towns have been destroyed and insecurity persists across large areas of Borno, many communities are likely to continue living in internal displacement – around 80 per cent of them with host communities – and to be dependent on humanitarian support.

South Sudan’s humanitarian crisis deepened in 2016, with more than 281,000 new displacements, some in areas previously considered stable. Armed conflict spread beyond the Greater Upper Nile region to new locations, particularly following July 2016 clashes in the capital city of Juba. These sparked an escalation of the conflict in many other areas in the latter half of the year, including the Greater Equatoria region and Unity.

By December, one in four people in South Sudan had been forced to flee their homes since the conflict broke out in 2013. This included almost 1.9 million IDPs still internally displaced by end-2016, the majority of whom were children, and 1.3 million people who fled to neighbouring countries as refugees. Some found themselves caught up in circular displacement back and forth across borders (see spotlight, p.57). Around 212,000 IDPs had sought refuge in UN protection of civilian (PoC) sites by the end of the year, the highest number since the conflict began.

The food security situation in South Sudan in 2016 was also at its most severe level since the crisis broke out. The combination of conflict, economic crisis and inadequate access to food has eroded vulnerable households’ ability to cope and added to the already complex and multiple drivers of population movements.

![Figure 1.5: Countries with most new displacements by conflict and violence in 2016](https://example.com/image)

Source: IDMC

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ON THE GRID: Global internal displacement in 2016
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
An overlooked displacement crisis tops the global figures

Political insecurity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) aggravated long-standing ethnic tensions and clashes between armed groups in 2016, particularly in the provinces of North and South Kivu in the east of the country. There were more than 920,000 new displacements over the course of the year, the highest number associated with conflict recorded globally. Ninety-three per cent of IDPs cited violence as the main driver of their displacement.13

Of the 2.2 million IDPs currently in DRC, 837,000 are in North Kivu and 378,000 in South Kivu.14 Together they account for 55 per cent of the country’s displaced population. The humanitarian situation is increasingly dire, but little seems to have been done to stem the violence, respect IDPs’ human rights or address their protection needs.

People in North Kivu, who have already endured years of war and disasters, have been left with acute needs. Raids and inter-ethnic and communal clashes between armed groups in Walikale and Lubero territories forced nearly 373,000 people to flee their homes, making up 42 per cent of the province’s displaced population as of the end of 2016. Some IDPs have been persuaded to return to their home villages, but many in Lubero remain displaced because of continued insecurity.15

The provincial government’s call for North Kivu’s displacement camps to be closed has complicated humanitarian efforts even further. Five camps were closed in 2016. The authorities justified the move by claiming that the camps harbour anti-government militias and foster violence among IDPs. It has also claimed that several areas of the province have stabilised and that IDPs can return to their homes.
The UN mission to DRC, MONUSCO, has also cited improved security as the basis for reducing its presence in some territories. Whether proper measures will be taken to ensure that IDPs are moved to areas where their protection needs are fully addressed as camps close remains to be seen.

Kasai province in central DRC had remained relatively calm until July 2016, when conflict broke out between a tribal group and the country’s armed forces. Brutal fighting affected around 36,000 households, uprooting residents and forcing them to flee to nearby villages and forests. Many parents who remained in the territory have taken their children out of school in an attempt to spare them the violence.

IDPs’ protection needs were at their most acute in Beni territory, where civilians have been kidnapped, maimed and executed. Nearly 200,000 people have been displaced by armed conflict between foreign militias and government forces that continues to uproot vulnerable men, women and children and shows no sign of easing.

Inter-communal violence also led to kidnappings, rape and killings in Rutshuru. At least 15,000 IDPs were seeking shelter in the territory and required emergency assistance following their displacement from Nyanzale town and nearby areas in mid-2016. Humanitarian agencies working in the area have said that the violence has hindered their ability to help.

Funding for the response to the crisis in DRC has become a major concern. Data shows a steady decline in donor governments’ commitments over the last four years, and only 60 per cent of pledged funding was provided in 2016. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has said that it needs at least $748 million to implement its 2017 action plan to meet the needs of more than 7.3 million people in need of aid.

DRC’s crisis is often overlooked by media and an international community focused on the latest disaster or conflict to capture their attention. This will have dire consequences for several million people in desperate need of assistance. The country has been in conflict for the best part of 20 years, but evidence shows that the situation for the most vulnerable has deteriorated severely in recent years.

Humanitarian agencies that bear the brunt of the protection burdens are having to work ever harder and longer in very dangerous conditions, and with ever fewer financial and human resources.
Middle East: less displacement, but unceasing conflict

The number of new displacements in the Middle East and North Africa decreased by almost 60 per cent in 2016. In a return to 2012 levels, 2.1 million incidents were reported, a downturn that supports a World Bank hypothesis that displacement flows tend to peak 4.1 years following the first large wave of displacement.21

Significantly lower figures were recorded in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, countries that accounted for more than half the global total in 2015.22 The sharp decline reflects a relative stabilisation of the front lines of the conflicts – along with two brief ceasefires in Syria – which translated into less dynamic population movements. Restrictions on freedom of movement also emerged as a common theme in 2016 with people trapped in besieged cities such as Aleppo and Mosul, which is likely to have meant that fewer people were able to flee to safety. The decline in the figures is also explained in part by actors on the ground adjusting the methodology used for data collection, as was the case in both Yemen and Syria.

Despite the decline, the three countries still featured among those with most new displacements by conflict in 2016 (see figure 1.6). In Syria, there were at least 824,000 displacements during the year, often with people fleeing at very short notice and leaving their assets and documentation behind. Multiple displacement there has become the norm,23 and persistent and extreme violence and family separation have created a high-risk protection environment for all civilians, with women and children particularly vulnerable (see spotlight, p.17).24

Almost 660,000 new internal displacements were reported in 2016 in neighbouring Iraq, where the pace of the phenomenon over the past three years has been “nearly without precedent”.25 There were nine major military campaigns during the year, including an offensive by United States (US)-backed Iraqi forces to retake Mosul from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Each resulted in people fleeing for safety. At the same time, more than a million Iraqis are thought to have returned to their homes during the year, some to areas contaminated by unexploded ordnance and many to places where public infrastructure and private housing have been damaged or destroyed (see spotlight, p.19).26

At least 478,000 new internal displacements were reported in Yemen during 2016, linked to two main waves of violence in March and May. The decrease in the number of new displacements compared to 2015 and the relatively stable number of IDPs reported throughout 2016 are potentially misleading and do not reflect the volatile displacement dynamics within Yemen. High return rates were reported during the year, and new displacement figures do not comprehensively capture multiple displacements and back-and-forth movements, which remain unquantified and unreported. If these movements were accounted for, the number of displacements in country may have exceeded 750,000.27 At the end of 2016 more than half of the IDPs in Yemen were sheltering in Hajjah, Taiz and Sana’a governorates, around 77 per cent of them living with host families or in rented accommodation.28

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Figure 1.6: New displacements by conflict and violence in the Middle East and North Africa, 2009 to 2016

![Graph showing new displacements by conflict and violence in the Middle East and North Africa, 2009 to 2016](image)

Source: IDMC
The sixth year of Syria’s civil war brought no respite for civilians, who continued to bear the brunt of extreme levels of violence committed by all parties to the conflict with unprecedented humanitarian consequences. People fled their homes across the country, many of them displaced more than once to areas of steadily diminishing safety. The hostilities were relentless throughout 2016 and included gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights law as all parties repeatedly targeted densely populated areas and civilian infrastructure.

Two cessation of hostilities agreements brokered by the US and Russia in February and August led to temporary lulls in the fighting and a drop in the rate of internal displacement, but hostilities and their impact on the civilian population flared again after each agreement. Intense fighting in and around eastern Aleppo in December caused the temporary displacement of at least 100,000 people from and within the city.

Offensives against ISIL took place on various fronts. Turkish forces crossed into Syria to launch an operation with allied local forces in August, and the opposition Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) went on the attack in Raqqa governorate in November. Both campaigns caused waves of displacements across northern Syria. Between 35,000 and 40,000 people were displaced in the north of Raqqa, most for short periods of time.32
As battle lines shift, people run the risk of being displaced repeatedly or prevented from fleeing at all. Syria’s international borders were effectively closed in 2016, with around 330,000 IDPs living in camps and informal settlements near the Turkish border in the north of the country.33

Against a backdrop of conflict, a deteriorating local economy and dwindling personal resources, both IDPs and host communities struggle to meet their basic needs. The destruction of property and infrastructure has left 1.1 million people living in makeshift housing and “last-resort settlements” such as collective centres, often set up in schools and other public buildings.34 Living conditions are poor. Fifty-seven per cent of collective centres are without enough water, 50 per cent have inadequate sanitation facilities and 54 per cent are overcrowded.35

Other IDPs are forced to settle on land to which they have no legal claim or to rent accommodation informally, leaving them vulnerable to eviction.36 Those living in informal settlements are also more likely to be exposed to security threats and the prospect of repeated displacement.

Access to education is a major concern. One in three schools are damaged, destroyed, used as collective centres or in inaccessible areas. Displacement also disrupts school attendance, hampering children’s ability to complete academic cycles and take exams. Children face serious protection risks, including underage recruitment, child labour, early marriage and gender-based violence.

Humanitarian access remains difficult, despite five UN Security Council resolutions demanding that all parties to the conflict allow “rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders.”37 As of December 2016, around 4.9 million people were living in “hard to reach” areas, of whom almost a million were besieged, often without access to food, water or medical services.38 The numbers of people living in besieged or hard-to-reach areas fluctuated over the year as the conflict unfolded.

The use of sieges as a weapon of war in eastern Aleppo and several areas of rural Damascus left civilians with no protection and little or no access to humanitarian assistance.39 Those in ISIL-controlled areas face a similar situation.

Returns are registered, but they are difficult to track. It is often unclear whether people return because the situation in their area of origin has improved, or because it was unsustainable in their place of refuge. As the conflict shifts, it will be of utmost importance to ensure that any returns are safe, voluntary, assisted and monitored. Returnees’ housing land and property rights and civil documentation issues will require particular attention. Without documents, people are less able to exercise their rights and may become legally invisible or stateless.

Returns to areas formerly controlled by ISIL raise protection concerns that require immediate and sustained attention, including the widespread presence of improvised explosive devices ISIL fighters left behind.40
As the campaign to reassert government control over territory held by ISIL gathered pace in 2016, so too did the deepening of Iraq’s humanitarian crisis. The widespread military offensives taking place against the group caused almost 660,000 new displacements. Around 3 million have fled their homes since 2014.41

How the security situation develops and the humanitarian and development sectors respond to this latest phase of Iraq’s crisis will go a long way to determining whether IDPs will be able to rebuild their lives in a sustainable way, or whether they will be exposed to a new phase of violence and secondary, potentially longer-term displacement.

Anbar and Salah Al Din governorates witnessed the greatest number of returns in 2016. The security environment in the newly retaken areas remains fragile, however, and government oversight and control is still limited. Other armed groups have filled the vacuum left in ISIL’s wake, and those trying to go back to their homes have faced numerous challenges and protection risks.

Efforts to re-screen returnees have tended to be irregular and rarely monitored, and there have been credible reports in both governorates of abductions, detentions and the torture of people suspected of affiliation with ISIL. Others have been barred from returning to their homes altogether or have had them demolished or appropriated to be used as forms of compensation. Returnees also face the danger posed by unexploded ordnance, an absence of basic services and a lack of livelihood and education opportunities.42

Qayyarah was retaken from ISIL by Iraqi forces on 2 August 2016 and was declared as the base for future operations to retake the city of Mosul. ISIL set fire to oil wells south of Mosul. Photo: NRC/Wolfgang Gessmann, September 2016
As in previous years, there are also serious concerns that many returns are not voluntary – or lasting. Three thousand displaced families in Tikrit were threatened with eviction in February in a case of collective punishment after some individuals were accused of being ISIL informers. In Kirkuk, more than 4,300 displaced families have been expelled since the International Organization for Migration (IOM) began tracking displacements from the governorate on 1 September 2016. Sixty-two per cent returned to their home areas, but the remainder were pushed into secondary displacement. Of those who returned, 995 families went back to Fallujah in Anbar and 994 to Al Shirqat in Salah Al Din.

Such displacements advance the need to develop a national framework for IDPs’ return in line with the IASC framework on durable solutions, which would guarantee their fundamental rights, establish operational principles and facilitate coordination and support.

The battle for Mosul began in late 2016, and by January 2017 the Iraqi government said it had driven ISIL from the eastern half of the city. Within weeks, 30,000 of the 180,000 or so people who were displaced by the offensive began returning to the city, but they have faced similar difficulties to those who have gone back to Anbar and Salah Al Din.  

State forces were pulled quickly out of east Mosul and deployed to the offensive to retake the west of the city, but a month after the east was declared to be in government hands, very few police units had returned. Other armed groups have filled the security vacuum, and in the lawless environment there have been widespread reports of arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extortion, the imposition of random curfews and movement restrictions, and assaults and threats against humanitarians.

Some families who tried to return have gone back to the camps where they were sheltering, and others have postponed their return to the city. By February, the number of people leaving because of insecurity and limited access to basic services and livelihood opportunities was higher than the number returning.

Should ISIL continue to cede territory there are fears that international attention and the will to continue supporting Iraq will wane. A decrease in funding for humanitarian work would be likely to form part of such a trend, hampering efforts to resolve the country’s crisis, including the many challenges associated with IDPs’ return to their homes.

It will also be important to ensure that stabilisation efforts, which currently focus on large infrastructure projects and the restoration of public services, are shaped by engagement with local communities to establish a parallel focus on needs at the household level.

The complex situation that people affected by the conflict face across Iraq means that 2017 could prove to be just as tumultuous for the country as previous years. The number of people fleeing military operations to retake western Mosul increased rapidly in the early months of the year, with critical needs reported among displaced families living both in and out of camps. As of April 2017, more than 450,000 people had been displaced during the six months since the launch of the campaign to retake Mosul. The real challenge for Baghdad and the international community of securing the safety and dignity of all civilians starts now.  

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Nearly two years of conflict and displacement have devastated Yemen, pushing the country toward social, economic and institutional collapse. Nearly 90 per cent of IDPs in Yemen have been displaced for more than 10 months, with scarce resources dwindling and humanitarian needs rising sharply in all sectors. At the same time, more than a million people provisionally returned to their areas of origin, but the sustainability of their return is highly questionable. Nearly 70 per cent of returnees are in Aden, Sana’a or Taiz, where more than 85 per cent were reported to be living in their original homes. Substantial numbers were living in damaged buildings and faced serious protection risks.

Under-reported: displacement by generalised violence

Disaggregating new displacements associated with conflict and violence recorded in 2016 reveals that 88 per cent were triggered by active armed conflicts, six per cent by criminal violence, five per cent by political violence and one per cent by communal violence (see figure 1.7). People fled generalised violence in a number of forms, from gang violence in central America (see spotlight, p.22) to post-electoral violence in Burundi and Burkina Faso. Their movements are not however systematically monitored worldwide.

This “unseen” flight has widespread repercussions for individuals and societies. Only the existence of an international or non-international armed conflict triggers the application of international humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict. In practical terms, IHL sets limits on how the parties may conduct hostilities and protects all persons affected by the conflict, including humanitarian agencies responding to its effects. This means that although the consequences of generalised violence can be as devastating and deadly to the civilian population as those of an armed conflict, there is no special protection provided by IHL.

There is far less information on people who flee criminal violence than on those displaced by conflict, and an even weaker response to their plight. Given the high rates of urban violence and homicide in some of the world’s major cities, many more people are probably displaced globally by this type of violence than the current data reflects.

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Figure 1.7: New displacement by conflict and violence in 2016, disaggregated by conflict type

Source: IDMC
El Salvador has consistently been one of the world’s most violent countries over the last decade. We estimate that nearly 220,000 people were forced to flee generalised violence in 2016. This puts the country second in terms of the number of new displacements relative to population size (see figure 1.8).

Despite the scale of displacement, however, there is no official recognition of the role violence plays in driving the problem. This means there is also no national strategy, legislative or policy framework in place to comprehensively monitor, address and respond to it.

Displacement in El Salvador is driven by organised criminal groups committing egregious acts of violence against civilians with impunity. The population’s perception is that the state is unable, and given the human rights violations committed in the “war on gangs”, in some cases unwilling to provide protection and assistance.

Efforts to document internal displacement and assist victims are further frustrated by the secrecy in which people flee and their reluctance to report crimes to the authorities. IDPs in El Salvador tend not to seek refuge in camps or shelters, but rather go into hiding, behaviour that local civil society organisations (CSOs) call “confinement.”48 IDPs feel forced to restrict their own basic freedoms and rights to avoid detection by criminal groups or the authorities. Of 193 cases documented by four CSOs in 2016, only 43 per cent reported crimes to authorities.49

The main reasons victims give for not reporting crimes related to their displacement are fear of reprisal by criminal groups, fear of infiltration and corruption in state institutions, and a belief that the state is unwilling or unable to help them.50

Eighty-four per cent of the people displaced in 2016 reported fleeing persecution and violence by gangs, which use many forms of violence including murder, torture, forced disappearances, rape, sexual exploitation and threats to exercise control over territories and populations.51

Victims describe a daily life in which they negotiate with, and acquiesce to criminal groups over basic aspects of their lives such as freedom of movement, and whether and where to attend school and work, access medical care and seek justice. They also balance their safety and security against coercion by succumbing to blackmail,
collaborating in criminal activity, submitting to sexual abuse and forced relationships and joining the ranks of criminal organisations themselves. Resistance can trigger threats and violence.

Victims of violence and displacement also face stigmatisation and discrimination based on their perceived association with criminal organisations. In the polarising and bellicose narrative of the “war on gangs,” public officials regularly associate them with “the enemy” rather than recognising them as citizens with a right to protection.

The implementation of extraordinary security measures has also contributed to the erosion of the human rights environment in communities most vulnerable to criminal violence. In pursuit of the legitimate goal of suppressing criminal groups, state security forces have allegedly perpetrated extrajudicial executions, physical abuse, sexual harassment and mass arrests. If the cases of displacement documented by civil society, the police and armed forces were directly responsible for eight per cent. Humanitarian organisations and donors increasingly recognise the need to develop new approaches and more robust interventions in the region. They acknowledge that addressing criminal violence challenges many of their precepts and traditional working practices and will require considerable time.
People internally displaced by conflict and violence
as of 31 December 2016
(Total: 40.3 million)

Country names and figures are shown only when the total value exceeds 20,000 people displaced.
The boundaries, names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.
There were around 40.3 million people displaced within the borders of 56 countries and territories as a result of armed conflict and generalised violence as of the end of 2016 (see map, p.24). The total number of IDPs has nearly doubled since 2000 and increased sharply over the last five years. The latter spike was due in large part to the conflict and violence that spread across the Middle East following the Arab spring uprisings in late 2010. Following a peak in 2015, which represented the highest figure IDMC has reported since it began its work in 1998, the total number of IDPs fell slightly in 2016 – but there is no sign of a downward trend.

The persistence of large numbers of IDPs across the world reflects the intractability of conflicts and crises, notably in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, where IDPs face all but insurmountable obstacles in re-establishing normal lives. It is also explained in part by the inconsistent monitoring of displacement over time and by the lack of updated data, particularly on protracted situations. Such information would allow us to track IDPs’ progress toward durable solutions and ultimately start to take them off the books.

Twice the number of refugees

Global displacement caused by conflict and violence has hit a record-high. As of the end of 2015, 65.3 million people were displaced within or across borders as a result of conflict, generalised violence, persecution and human rights violations. The vast majority of them, nearly two-thirds, had not crossed international borders and were internally displaced. The number of IDPs has been roughly twice that of refugees in recent years, and the gap between estimates for the two groups has been growing since 1997 (see figure 1.9).

Despite this, IDPs receive relatively little global attention, particularly when compared with the highly visible influx of refugees and migrants to Europe in recent years. People who flee conflict or persecution across an international border are eligible for globally recognised protection, as embodied in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol and supported by a dedicated UN agency. IDPs’ fate, meanwhile, lies in the hands of their own governments, some of whom are unwilling or unable to assist or protect them. Indeed, in some cases, they may have caused their displacement in the first place.

Figure 1.9: Refugees and IDPs displaced by conflict and violence, 1990 to 2016

Source: IDMC, with UNHCR and UNRWA for refugee data (2016 figures not yet available)
Intractable conflicts and poor capacity to cope

The total number of people internally displaced by conflict and violence has increased since 1998. The overall upward trend is a harsh reflection of the intractability of conflicts and the protracted nature of displacement in many parts of the world, fuelled and complicated by underdevelopment in countries with little capacity to cope with crises.

Some of the most persistently high numbers of IDPs have been in sub-Saharan Africa and, since 2012, the Middle East (see figure 1.10). Colombia has also had one of the highest numbers of IDPs over the last 20 years, though this is due in part to the fact that its official registry does not account for the end of displacement (see spotlight, p.29).

From Baghdad to Bogotá, the nature of internal displacement varies considerably. There may be more IDPs in Colombia than in Yemen or South Sudan, but those in the latter two countries tend to face greater deprivation and threats to their lives, safety and wellbeing. IDPs who fled violence in Azerbaijan two decades ago still struggle with precarious livelihoods and adequate housing, but their plight does not compare with that of those in Nigeria, who face many and sometimes daily threats, in some cases suffering attacks and airstrikes on the very camps they flee to in search of safety and life-saving assistance.

Disaggregating the global caseload of IDPs by the severity of their situation and highlighting which features require most attention – whether it be physical safety, access to food, water and basic services, standard of living or access to livelihoods – would paint a more realistic and three-dimensional picture and provide a much-needed metric by which to assess how to prioritise attention and resources when responding to their needs.

Of the total number of IDPs globally, over three-quarters, or more than 30 million people, live in just ten countries (see figure 1.11). Of these, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Sudan and South Sudan have been among the ten countries with the world’s largest populations of IDPs every year since 2003.

Most countries on this list are grappling with intractable and recurrent armed conflicts. Over the last ten years, the number of IDPs in sub-Saharan Africa has fluctuated by region but stagnated overall because of the failure to resolve conflicts such as those in DRC, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Sudan. In the Middle East, the latest waves of violence in Iraq and the relatively recent conflicts in Syria and Yemen have also stranded millions of people for whom there is no end to their displacement in sight. In Afghanistan, continuous conflict and insecurity mean that flight and mobility have become a familiar coping strategy for almost four decades.

Ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, a group of UN human rights experts called for a spotlight to be thrown on this “invisible majority”. They described IDPs as highly vulnerable, and argued that without measures to protect them, address the causes of their plight and prevent future displacement, they could easily become tomorrow’s refugees and migrants (see part 2).

Intractable conflicts and poor capacity to cope
People internally displaced amid ongoing conflict live in flux, and are likely to become displaced again, whether within or across borders. Multiple and chronic displacement is commonplace in DRC, while IDPs in Syria have been compelled to flee as many as 25 times because a single move has not protected them from constantly shifting frontlines and the breakdown of basic services. Each displacement chips away at IDPs’ resilience and self-reliance and increases their vulnerability and impoverishment.

Some conflicts and the displacement they cause may fall off the international radar and become overshadowed by “newer” crises. Because their underlying drivers go unaddressed, they resurface cyclically when a new wave of violence and displacement erupts. DRC is a striking case in point. There were more than 920,000 new displacements associated with conflict in 2016, the highest in the world, but its crisis received very little international media attention during the year.

The remaining 13.3 million IDPs live in upper middle and high income countries. The prevalence of conflict and internal displacement in these wealthier income brackets means that the development community’s perception of violence is no longer associated only with low-income countries, prompting new strategies for response by organisations such as the World Bank.

Much internal displacement takes place in low-income countries weakened by decades of war. Two-thirds of the world’s IDPs, or 27 million people, live in low and lower middle-income countries (see figure 1.12). Every sub-Saharan African country that hosts IDPs is in this income bracket, as are most of their counterparts in the Middle East. The governments of such countries have relatively little capacity to meet their IDPs’ protection and assistance needs, and displacement puts additional strain on already weak institutions.

As a result, IDPs have little chance of achieving durable solutions, and the protracted nature of their plight solidifies with each passing year.

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**Figure 1.11: Countries with most people internally displaced by conflict and violence as of the end of 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Displaced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>7,246,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>6,326,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3,035,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>2,230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1,974,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1,955,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>1,854,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,653,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,553,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDMC
Inconsistent monitoring

Beside the reality that more people are becoming internally displaced each year and remaining so for long periods of time, the generally upward trend in the total number of IDPs is also at least partly explained by inconsistent monitoring and accounting for caseloads over time. The tracking of IDPs’ trajectories and vulnerabilities tends to trail off after an initial period, because humanitarians, national governments and civil society lose or divert the resources, and often the interest, to continue monitoring and counting them. The lack of regular and updated information precludes us from measuring IDPs’ progress toward sustainable solutions, and continues to swell the global figures each year (see part 3).

Perhaps the most visible example of how an overly broad counting method can lead to ever-increasing figures is the case of Colombia. With more than 7.2 million IDPs as of the end of 2016, it hosts the highest number worldwide – more than in Afghanistan, Nigeria and South Sudan combined and surpassing Syria by a wide margin (see figure 1.11). As the country emerges from more than five decades of armed conflict, Colombia serves as a crucial litmus test for the new approach to protracted displacement called for at the World Humanitarian Summit (see spotlight, p.29).63

The country’s registry for IDPs, part of the national victims’ registry administered by the government’s victims unit, is primarily intended as a tool to facilitate the provision of reparations, in accordance with law 1448 of 2011. Widely known as the victims’ law, it establishes that a person only loses their recognition if they provide fraudulent information during their registration process. Victims are meant to be recognised as such forever, in some ways symbolically, but also to ensure continued access to assistance and reparations.

In other words, the number of IDPs in the country never decreases. Even if IDPs are able to progressively reduce the vulnerability, impoverishment and marginalisation they face, there is no system in place to monitor their progress toward achieving durable solutions. Anecdotal evidence, meantime, suggests that large numbers have resettled in urban areas and live in conditions comparable with those of their host communities.

Until there is a monitoring system in place that determines if and when IDPs have achieved durable solutions, their number will continue to increase. Should Colombia’s definition and approach be applied to the victims of conflict in other countries with persistently high numbers of IDPs, such as DRC, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria or Ukraine, one can only imagine the ever-growing global total reported annually and the repercussions for planning and prioritising responses.
COLOMBIA
Tackling protracted displacement post-conflict

After six years of negotiations between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country finally reached a peace deal in late 2016 to end more than 50 years of armed conflict that cost more than 260,000 lives and displaced more than seven million people. Violence has continued, however, with the assassination of 17 community leaders since the agreement was signed in November and thousands of people newly displaced.

With a cumulative figure of 7.2 million IDPs, Colombia has the largest displaced population in the world, but this is likely to be an overestimate. Another 340,000 Colombians are living as refugees or in a refugee-like situation abroad.

Around 78 per cent of all IDPs in Colombia live in 282 of the country’s 1,122 municipalities, with large numbers in major cities such as Bogotá and Cali and their surroundings. As many as 80 per cent live below the poverty line, including between 33 and 35 per cent who live in extreme poverty. Indigenous and African-Colombian communities have long been disproportionately affected. The two groups together made up 74 per cent of IDPs involved in mass displacement events – events in which at least 10 families or 50 people are displaced – between January 2014 and August 2016. They also accounted for 6.7 per cent and 14.5 per cent of all registered displacements in 2016, but represent only 3.4 per cent and 10.6 per cent of the total population.

Colombia’s IDPs continue to face substantial obstacles in their pursuit of durable solutions. A recent report notes the following reasons for the protracted nature of their displacement:
Prolonged conflict and insecurity in areas of origin are made worse by a lack of state presence, and levels of crime and violence are also high in areas of refuge. The latter not only triggers secondary displacement, but also adds to IDPs’ unaddressed trauma and other mental health issues.

Many IDPs, particularly those from rural backgrounds or indigenous and African-Colombian communities, do not have the skills to compete in urban labour markets. Nor do young IDPs have enough access to higher education, which is essential for moving out of poverty in Colombia.

Land restitution in areas of origin is difficult, tenure is insecure, and the illegal status of the settlements where many IDPs live prevents municipal authorities from providing services and infrastructure.

Local authorities’ capacity is weak and the central government does not allocate them enough funds, in part because its calculations are based on outdated census data.

IDPs are not integrated into regular state action, and coordination between line ministries is weak.

Donors have allocated only limited resources for durable solutions, because funding prioritises other aspects of the peace agreement, such as disaster risk reduction and transitional justice.

Colombia has an advanced legal framework for IDPs, and since 2004 the Constitutional Court has been demanding that the government guarantee victims’ rights. This led to the introduction of the 2011 victims’ law, a pioneering piece of legislation that entitles IDPs and other victims of the conflict to reparations. It also led to the creation of a dedicated government victim’s unit and a national plan for assistance and reparation.

The 2011 law envisages addressing IDPs’ needs on three levels. First, they receive immediate humanitarian assistance, vital given that 4.9 million people in Colombia are considered to be in need of it. This falls under the responsibility of the victim’s unit, with support from international organisations. The second level aims to overcome socioeconomic vulnerability, and focuses on seven components: food; education; identification documents; family reunion; health, including psychosocial attention; housing; and livelihoods, including vocational training and occupational orientation. The third level is reparation, involving compensation, rehabilitation, restitution and guarantees of non-repetition.

In less than four years, the programme has compensated more than 500,000 victims, but this represents less than 10 per cent of the total number who are supposed to receive compensation by 2021. According to an evaluation by Harvard University’s Carr Center, to do so would require a sevenfold increase in the victims’ unit capacity.

In support of the government, UNHCR and UNDP have also been running a “transitional solutions initiative” in 17 communities to help IDPs become less dependent on the authorities and more self-reliant. The programme aims to improve quality of life, strengthen organisations and institutions, and protect victims and their rights.

Most of the victims of Colombia’s conflict are IDPs. The fact that the government has included them among those entitled to compensation is a commendable and significant first step. The commitment, however, creates unprecedented challenges given that more than 12 per cent of the country’s population is eligible for reparation.

Given that implementing the many requirements of the peace agreement with FARC will require significant attention and resources, it will be vital to keep the country’s seven million IDPs at the top of the government’s agenda and to help them overcome the obstacles they still face in achieving durable solutions. This also means ensuring that the humanitarian and development sectors, local authorities and private enterprises work collectively to end aid dependency and promote IDPs’ self-reliance.
DISASTERS
New displacement in 2016

There were 24.2 million new displacements by disasters brought on by sudden-onset natural hazards in 118 countries and territories in 2016. They outnumbered new displacements associated with conflict and violence by more than three to one. In the nine years since 2008, 227.6 million such displacements have been recorded, or an average of 25.3 million per year.

The largest events determine much of the variation in global totals from year to year. IDMC recorded 31 disaster-related displacement events that each caused at least 100,000 displacements in 2016, accounting for 86 per cent of the total. They included five very large events that each displaced between one and three million people. Unlike most other years, however, there were no mega-scale events that triggered more than three million displacements (see figure 1.13). A significant percentage of total new displacements in the context of sudden-onset disasters are usually related to planned or spontaneous evacuations, many of which present only short-term displacement occurring in a relatively safe and orderly manner. However, in the absence of reliable reporting on returns, it is not currently possible to clearly determine the numbers, length and severity of displacement.

IDMC’s global estimates cover disasters triggered by sudden-onset hydro-meteorological and climatological hazards such as floods, storms, wildfires and extreme winter conditions; and geophysical hazards such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and landslides. They do not include displacements associated with slow-onset disasters such as drought and environmental degradation. Nor do they cover those associated with technological and biological hazards, such as industrial accidents and epidemics, except when they are triggered by a natural hazard. The displacement caused by radiation exposure in Fukushima following the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011 is one such example.

Figure 1.13: New displacements by disasters by scale of event

Source: IDMC
Extreme weather events drive up the numbers

Several new climate records were set in 2016. As data from previous years shows, climate and weather-related disasters regularly account for most of the global total (see figure 1.14). In 2016, they were responsible for 23.5 million displacements, or 97 per cent of all disaster-related displacements. All of the 10 largest disaster displacement events in absolute terms were weather-related.

Flood disasters tend to make up the majority of climate and weather-related displacements each year. In 2016, however, storms caused 12.9 million displacements worldwide – 55 per cent of all weather-related disasters – by triggering mass displacement of populations living in exposed and vulnerable coastal areas. Seven of the 10 largest displacement events of 2016 were storm-related, and nine out of 10 relative to population size (see figure 1.15).

The number of new climate and weather-related disaster displacements in 2016 was above the annual average since 2008 of 21.7 million, but displacements associated with geophysical hazards were well below average, with approximately 700,000 displacements recorded in 2016. Excluding 2008 as a highly unusual year because of the Sichuan earthquake disaster in China, disasters triggered by geophysical hazards have caused an average of around two million displacements a year.

Despite the lower than usual figure, there were still some significant earthquake disasters in 2016 that were followed by prolonged displacement and increasing vulnerability for those affected. A 7.8 magnitude earthquake and strong aftershocks struck the Manabi and Esmeraldas provinces of Ecuador on 16 April, killing more than 600 people, displacing at least 259,000 and leaving some towns needing to be permanently relocated.78

On the same day on the other side of the Pacific, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake displaced at least 196,000 people in and around Kumamoto in the southern Japanese prefecture of Kyushu.79 One year on, more than 47,000 people who lost their homes are still displaced.80 Health problems brought on or worsened by prolonged displacement, especially among older people, caused more deaths than the direct impacts of the earthquake, such as collapsing buildings. Out of 170 indirect deaths reported, 90 per cent were of people over the age of 60.81

Figure 1.14: New displacements by disasters by hazard category, 2008 to 2016

![Figure 1.14: New displacements by disasters by hazard category, 2008 to 2016](source: IDMC)
Figure 1.15: The ten largest disaster displacement events of 2016

**Absolute numbers**

- Philippines: Typhoon Nock-Ten (locally known as Nina)
- Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan
- China: Yangtze River floods (1st wave)
- India: Bihar floods
- Cuba: Hurricane Matthew
- Indonesia: Peak rainy season floods and landslides
- United States: Hurricane Matthew
- China: Typhoon Haiyan
- China: Typhoon Megi
- China: Typhoon Meranti

**Relative to population size**

- Cuba: Hurricane Matthew
- Fiji: Tropical cyclone Winston
- Philippines: Typhoon Nock-Ten (locally known as Nina)
- Sri Lanka: Tropical cyclone Roanu
- Tonga: Tropical cyclone Winston
- Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan
- Haiti: Hurricane Matthew
- Ecuador: Northwestern Ecuador earthquake (April)
- Fiji: Tropical Cyclone Zena
- Belize: Hurricane Earl

Source: IDMC, with UN Population Division data
Hurricane Matthew caused devastation across the eastern Caribbean and south-eastern US in October 2016 (see figure 1.16). It was the most powerful storm of the season, claiming hundreds of lives. Different levels of exposure, vulnerability and coping capacity in each country and area affected, and the storm’s path and changing intensity, meant that its impacts varied significantly from place to place. As the initial and evolving displacement figures show, understanding the severity of those impacts requires far more than a consideration of the number of people who fled.

As the storm developed in late September and early October, it prompted small-scale and short-lived evacuations in St Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia, Barbados, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Jamaica, though it did not make landfall in any of these small island countries. In Jamaica, 3,500 people moved to 193 shelters, of which 900 people were staying in the two shelters that remained open a couple of days after the storm passed. Indirect impacts of the storm also brought floods and landslides to the Dominican Republic where nineteen provinces were placed under red alert and almost 18,000 people evacuated to stay with friends and relatives while around 800 moved to official shelters. The Bahamas was hit more directly, and of around 5,000 people evacuated to safer places, 3,500 were still living in shelters or with their relatives ten days later.

Matthew made its first landfall in Haiti and its second in Cuba, each time as a very strong category four storm. In Cuba, the hurricane forced the evacuation of 1,079,000 people in six eastern provinces before it made landfall. It is a testament to the effectiveness of the evacuations that there appear to have been no casualties. Evacuations were followed however by continued displacement for thousands of people whose homes were destroyed or left uninhabitable.

In the worst-affected municipalities of Baracoa and Maisí in Guantánamo province, up to 94 per cent of homes were damaged or destroyed, with houses with lightweight roofs shown to be particularly vulnerable. Including figures for Imías and San Antonio del Sur in Guantánamo as well, the homes and possessions of 121,176 people, or more than 77 per cent of the province’s population, were lost or damaged. As of 31 October, the national civil defence authorities reported that more than 70,000 evacuees in Guantánamo province were still unable to return to their homes because of the hurricane’s impacts.

By the end of the year, around 54 per cent of damaged homes had been repaired or reconstructed. This reconstruction rate was remarkably quick. Nevertheless, thousands of families whose homes were completely destroyed were left facing longer delays and more time in displacement.

Mass evacuations also took place in southern and eastern states of the US, where Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina were worst affected by heavy rainfall and floods. Of more than 2.5 million people the authorities ordered to evacuate as the hurricane approached, between 875,000 and 1.25 million people – or 35 to 50 per cent – are estimated to have complied. Though the impacts in some areas were significant, the overall damage was less feared because the storm weakened and only made brief landfall in Georgia.

Overall loss and damage statistics were only publicly available online for North Carolina, where 28 lives were lost and 82,000 people registered for state or federal assistance in the storm’s aftermath, including displaced homeowners and low-income tenants. The last emergency shelter was closed on 14 November, but more than 1,400 households whose homes were left uninhabitable were put up in hotel rooms under the government’s transitional shelter assistance programme. Other reports point to particular communities where people were struggling to recover. In Nichols, South Carolina, for example, four out of five homes were still unoccupied five months later, with some displaced people unlikely to return.

Haiti, however, suffered the worst impacts and displacement. Matthew made landfall as a category four storm overnight on 3 October in the poor and largely rural south-west of the country. Around 550 people lost their lives and as many
as half a million displaced people sought refuge with friends and family or set up makeshift shelters, but the majority returned to their home areas within weeks of the hurricane. Many people moved out of the badly affected departments of Sud, Grand’Anse and Nippes toward urban areas including the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, Jeremie and Les Cayes and more than 175,500 displaced people took shelter in more than 220 evacuation sites.

An estimated 90 per cent of homes were destroyed in the worst-affected areas, and the pace of reconstruction has been slow. Most of the destruction was in rural areas where traditionally built homes of timber, thatch and mud were unable to withstand the strong winds and flooding. In the coastal town of Les Cayes in Sud department between 70 and 80 per cent of houses were rendered uninhabitable.

Six months after the hurricane, hundreds of thousands of people whose homes were damaged or destroyed were still living in makeshift shelters. Little assistance had reached the mountainous or island areas of Grand’Anse department, which were only accessible by motorcycle or boat or on foot, and whose populations were already extremely vulnerable before the hurricane hit. Matthew damaged or destroyed 98 per cent of homes in these areas, 85 per cent of which had yet to be repaired or rebuilt five months on. Few families had the means or materials to do so. This meant that most people displaced to shelter with friends or family or in evacuation sites elsewhere had returned to their former home areas to ongoing displacement near their original houses.

Widespread vulnerability has been heightened by the devastation of food production, loss of livelihoods and capital and rising food prices following Hurricane Matthew, resulting in a food and nutritional crisis. The fate of around 47,000 people still displaced almost seven years after the 2010 earthquake shows the potential for recent displacement to become further prolonged and protracted.
Uneven distribution across incomes and regions

The distribution of disaster displacement provides insights into the drivers of global disaster risk patterns. Climate change is affecting the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, but most of the change in disaster risk over the relatively short period of time covered by IDMC’s data is linked to exposure and vulnerability. Most striking is the strong correlation between displacement and populations’ exposure to natural hazards.¹⁰⁹

Human settlement patterns are closely linked to historical and recent processes of economic development and population growth, particularly in urban areas. Since 1970, population growth in urban areas has taken place at almost twice the global rate, and more than three times as fast in urban areas of low and middle-income countries.¹¹⁰

Thirty-eight per cent of displacement associated with disasters in 2016 occurred in upper middle-income countries (see figure 1.17). The figure of more than nine million people was more than double the previous year’s, and reflects the persistently high exposure of dense and growing urban populations. In many middle-income countries, urban growth has been poorly and governed, leading to both high exposure and vulnerability that affects the poorer and more marginalised segments of society disproportionately.

High-income countries also faced significant new displacement but at a similar level to 2015, with a figure of 2.3 million accounting for around nine per cent of the global total. These included the US and Japan, which are regularly among the countries with the highest figures worldwide, but also – more unusually – Israel, where wildfires displaced 75,000 people or almost one in 100 of the country’s population.

Low and lower middle-income countries such as DRC, Haiti, and Bangladesh accounted for 12.7 million displacements in 2016. Here disaster risk tends to go hand in hand with rapid and poorly planned urbanisation and the growth of informal settlements where building standards and land-use plans are not enforced.¹¹¹ This should be of particular concern because governments and affected populations in such countries generally have less capacity to minimise, respond to and recover from disasters or to mitigate the adverse impacts of displacement.

More than two-thirds of all new displacement associated with disasters in 2016 took place in East Asia and the Pacific, where 16.4 million incidents accounted for 68 per cent of the global total (see figure 1.18). Most took place in upper middle and lower middle-income countries. The figure is almost double the 8.4 million displacements in 2015.

China accounted for 45 per cent of the regional total, with 7.4 million new displacements. The country experienced its wettest year on record in 2016, with 16 per cent more rainfall than the long-term average. The Yangtze river basin flood season was the most significant since 1999.¹¹²

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Figure 1.17: New displacements by disasters by income group, 2016

Source: IDMC, with World Bank data
The Philippines experienced very high levels of displacement again, both in absolute terms and relative to population size. There were 5.9 million new displacements, including the two largest events of the year, brought on by typhoons Nock-Ten, known locally as Nina, which made landfall on 25 December, and Haima, known locally as Lawin, in October. The data is far from comprehensive, but most people appear to have been able to return home relatively quickly. That said, based on the number of people still sheltering in evacuation centres, around 31,000 were still displaced a month after Haima struck, and around 400 a month after Nock-Ten.113

The 3.6 million new displacements in South Asia in 2016 represented a drop of more than half from the 2015 figure of 7.9 million. Sixty-seven per cent, or 2.4 million, were in India, most of them associated with monsoon season floods in the state of Bihar that led to more than 1.6 million displacements between mid-July and October.

Cyclone Roanu brought Sri Lanka its heaviest rainfall in more than 25 years. Widespread flooding and landslides were reported in 22 out of 25 districts in May, killing 64 people, forcing around 500,000 to evacuate and leaving some 30,000 homes in need of repair or reconstruction.114 Six months on, thousands of people were still living in camps where they faced deteriorating health conditions as they awaited relocation to housing in safer areas.115

In absolute terms, the large and populous countries of China, the Philippines and India had the highest numbers of displacements. When considered relative to the population size, however, the exposure and vulnerability of small, low-lying coastal and island countries to tropical storms and flooding becomes clear. Fiji and Tonga in the Pacific and Haiti, Belize and Cuba in the Caribbean accounted for five of the 10 countries with the largest per capita disaster displacements (see figure 1.19).

Some events in these countries were also among the 10 largest events of the year in relation to population size (see figure 1.15). The mass evacuation of 1,079,000 people in six eastern provinces of Cuba ahead of Hurricane Matthew in October was the largest, with almost one in 10 inhabitants forced or obliged to leave their homes and shelter in safer locations (see spotlight, p.34).

Cyclone Winston, the strongest southern hemisphere storm on record, struck Fiji in February. In many of the hardest hit areas, people had been struggling before the storm with drought and water shortages exacerbated by El Niño. More than 62,000 people were displaced and took shelter in evacuation sites. Despite an emphasis on “building back safer” and increased attention to protection needs in the country, several thousand people in the worst-affected areas were still living in tents or temporary shelters a year later.116

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**Figure 1.18: New displacements by disasters by region, 2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
<td>16.4m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>1.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>3.6m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>1.0m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>1.2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.1m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.1m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.2m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDMC, with World Bank data
Figure 1.19: Countries with the most new displacements by disasters in 2016

Absolute numbers

Relative to population size

Source: IDMC, with UN Population Division data

There were no sub-Saharan African countries among the 10 to experience the largest-scale or relatively largest-scale displacement in 2016 (see figure 1.19). Significant sudden-onset disasters did occur, however, and the displacements they triggered compounded the impacts of other natural and man-made hazards, including drought, coastal erosion, land degradation and conflict.

In Ethiopia, heavy rains and exceptional floods displaced about 300,000 people in April and May after 18 months of severe drought and food insecurity. They also hampered the delivery of food aid and recovery assistance for pastoralist families. Floods across various areas of Sudan in August displaced 123,000 people, including around 22,000 households whose homes were destroyed and a further 1,700 whose long-term housing was also destroyed in displacement camps in Nierteti in central Darfur. DRC, which was the country with most new displacements associated with conflict in 2016, was also hit by floods that displaced around 127,000 people.

If displacement associated with slow-onset disasters were included in our estimates, particularly those related to drought conditions and food insecurity, the figures for Africa would be significantly higher.
Slow-onset disasters and multiple drivers

Given the drought conditions that affected hundreds of millions of people in Asia and Africa in 2016, IDMC made a concerted effort to collect quantitative data on the displacement associated with them. Some figures were obtained from Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Mozambique, Somalia and South Sudan, but they hardly paint a complete or coherent picture.

Instead, the data speaks to the variety of ways in which drought combines with other factors to result in displacement as well as other more voluntary forms of population movement or migration. In India, population movements associated with the impacts of drought are recorded as part of broader seasonal and labour migration. This makes it difficult to identify people in distress whose movements might be better described as displacement. In Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan, displacement was reported in areas where people’s vulnerability was strongly linked to conflict and violence as well as the impacts of drought.

While multiple interlocking factors make it difficult to isolate and estimate the number of people whose displacement is strongly associated with drought conditions, data collection rarely captures more than a single reason why people have had to leave their homes. Some displaced people coming from drought-affected areas may name drought as the primary cause in response to surveys, while others may refer to loss of livelihoods, hunger, or conflict as the more immediate reason why they were forced to leave.

In South Sudan, for example, crop yields and food insecurity are influenced both by agricultural drought and by farmers’ inability to access their crops because of conflict. At the same time, food insecurity is also one of several drivers of conflict and violence in the country. As people compete for dwindling resources, flashpoints include cattle rustling, the encroachment of livestock onto agricultural land and tensions between clans and communities over water points and pasture areas. In pastoral areas of Ethiopia affected by drought, displacement – including across borders – was brought about by a number of factors of which a lack of rainfall was just one, and not necessarily the most significant.

These situations challenge the artificial distinctions that have been made in the past when disaggregating displacement figures by “cause” whether it be conflict, disasters or development projects. Focusing on a single cause distorts and oversimplifies the context and, without further analysis, may hamper the identification of appropriate solutions. Complex combinations of both natural and human factors that intertwine to influence the risk of future displacement call for a more holistic interpretation that includes not only triggers, but also the latent and structural factors that determine how exposed and vulnerable people are to hazards in the first place.
Multi-causal displacement in the context of drought

A third consecutive year of drought across the Horn of Africa in 2016 compounded the fragility of countries and communities in the region by precipitating crop failure, livestock deaths, rising food insecurity and malnutrition. Community coping capacities were pushed to new limits as household resources and support networks already under stress were further eroded and the movement of displaced populations increasingly reported within and out of areas affected by drought.122

While the drivers of displacement in these contexts are clearly multiple and complex, the UNHCR-led Protection Monitoring and Reporting Network and IOM use a simple “drought” or “drought-related” category for the purpose of recording displacement data. This short-hand appears to be used to refer to people whose proximate reasons for leaving their homes are related to severe food and livelihood insecurity linked to pasture, water and food shortages, as opposed to those labelled as being displaced by conflict or violence, even where conflict may be an underlying or contributing factor. Some reports include “lack of livelihood” as an additional cause of displacement in Somalia as a whole.123 At the same time, displacement in the Bay region of Somalia in 2016 has been ascribed to “drought coupled with heavy ‘taxation’” by the non-state armed group al-Shabaab.124

In slow-onset disasters and gradually evolving crises, the difference between forced displacement and voluntary migration can be difficult to distinguish.125 In this case, however, extreme conditions and severe food insecurity in the home areas of thousands of people on the move, their dependence on external life-saving assistance and levels of distress and vulnerability reported in 2016 and early 2017 all strongly suggest displacement to be the more appropriate term.126 Around 12.8 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda as of the beginning of 2017.

In Somalia, against a backdrop of weak governance, protracted insecurity and chronic poverty similar to the pre-famine situation in 2010 and 2011, severe and persistent drought conditions have taken a heavy toll.127 In October and November, the federal government and the authorities in Jubaland, Puntland and Somalia appealed to all Somalis and the international community for support. In February 2017, the UN issued a warning of potential famine.128 As the humanitarian situation deteriorated toward the end of 2016, particularly in northern regions, many thousands of families dependent on diminishing livestock and agriculture for survival were forced to abandon their homes and usual migratory patterns in search of food, water and work.

The border area between the Somali region of Ethiopia and the autonomous region of Somalia in Somalia, known as the Hawd, is a traditional rainy season pasture area. In “normal” dry periods, pastoralists move their livestock to areas where rain has fallen, including across the porous border, as part of their usual migration patterns. In 2016, however, nowhere received enough rain and cross-border movements took place in both directions. As both areas were suffering severe drought conditions, the search for pasture or water was often unsuccessful.129

During the first half of 2016, some pastoralists from the Somali region, where around 1.5 million people were in need of food assistance, were displaced beyond their homelands to the coast of Somaliland in search of adequate pasture. The pasture was not enough for those who made the journey, however, and they and their depleted herds of weakened livestock were left with two options – to make the long and arduous trek back or remain displaced where they were.130

Later in the year, following poor rains during the Deyr wet season from September to November, further drought on the Somalia side of the border drove tens of thousands of pastoralists towards the Hawd. As pastures were rapidly depleted, those with herds still in good enough condition moved further south into Ethiopia. More than 3,770 displaced Somalis crossed the border and arrived in Melkadida in the first two months of 2017.131 Internal displacement associated with the drought was reported in Somalia and Ethiopia on a much larger scale in 2016 and early 2017, but if famine is not avoided both internal and
cross-border movements are likely to become far more significant, as happened during the 2011 famine.\textsuperscript{132}

The short-term cross-border displacement of pastoralists from SOMALILAND and from the Somali region of ETHIOPIA into the small neighbouring state of DJIBOUTI was also recorded. DJIBOUTI is an important transit point for migrants and displaced people heading for the GULF states and beyond, and a relatively stable hub where international assistance can be accessed.\textsuperscript{133} Thousands of pastoralists were displaced there between January and April 2016, at which point 9,650 people were sheltering among local communities in the Ali-Sabieh, Dickhil and Obock regions.\textsuperscript{134} Many pregnant women and children under five among them showed signs of acute malnutrition and anaemia, and half of the adults were underweight and weakened by tuberculosis and other illnesses.\textsuperscript{135} With almost a quarter of DJIBOUTI’s population living in extreme poverty, the acute needs of the new arrivals stretched local services and the scarce resources of their hosts.\textsuperscript{136} A month later most had returned to their countries of origin.\textsuperscript{137}

Given that for many people in the Horn of Africa mobility within and across borders is central to their livelihoods, culture and normal adaptive behaviour, those no longer able or allowed to range further afield in search of pasture or assistance should be of equal or even greater concern. Hundreds of pastoralist families in the severely drought-affected Sanaag region of eastern SOMALILAND were left behind without the money or means to move away and little left to live on in 2016.\textsuperscript{138} Along the Kenya-SOMALIA border, the free movement of pastoralists and their livestock between available pasture in traditional grazing lands was restricted by the building of walls and trenches by militant groups, while the potential for conflict over scarce water and pasture has increased.\textsuperscript{139}

The cross-border movement of pastoralists may generally be permitted in other border areas, but it is largely unprotected by law. Nor does the human right to freedom of movement protect cross-border mobility, and the definition of a “migrant worker” in the International Covenant on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families is not adapted to the traditional livelihood mobility of pastoralists. Article 2(1) describes a migrant worker as a “person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.”\textsuperscript{140}

The African UNION and a number of regional economic communities (RECs) have recognised the need to support pastoralists’ mobility.\textsuperscript{141} With a forecast of precipitation below average for the rainy season from March to May 2017, their free movement across borders will be vital to their ability to survive the current crisis, recover their losses and build their resilience to future disaster and displacement risk.\textsuperscript{142}
Towards a global headcount of disaster displaced people

A global figure accounting for the total headcount, or global stock, of people living in displacement would significantly improve our understanding of the global scope and nature of the phenomenon. National and international policymakers also need to know how IDPs’ situations and needs evolve over time. They need to understand how many people end up living in protracted displacement, the obstacles they face in trying to achieve durable solutions and how these might be addressed to ensure no one is left behind.

IDMC’s research in 2015 identified a sample of 34 cases that had been ongoing for between one to 26 years, accounting for more than 715,000 people. This year, we attempted to estimate a total headcount, or global stock figure, for people living in displacement following disasters that included those still displaced by events in previous years. Coming up with a robust global estimate has proved impossible for the time being, however, because of the limited data available that tracks displacement situations over time (see part 3).

Examples from a wide range of countries suggest that better monitoring and data collection on displacement over time would make generating a headcount possible, if still difficult. They also show that the evolution of displacement depends greatly on the context in which it occurs. In some cases, high numbers of people evacuated around the time of the onset of a disaster are able to return to their homes soon afterwards, while in others millions lose their homes and remain displaced years after the event.

Two years after Nepal’s major earthquake disaster that led to the loss of over 8,850 lives and the displacement of some 2.8 million people, around 2.6 million are still thought to be displaced and living in temporary shelters. The recovery and reconstruction process has been severely delayed while the government is absorbed with the country’s ongoing political crisis.

In the Philippines, typhoon Nock-Ten made first landfall in the Bicol region of Luzon on 25 December, before tracking across various provinces and out over the South China Sea the following day. The category four storm triggered the mass evacuation of as many as 2.6 million people, the largest disaster displacement event of 2016. Government data six days later captured just 230,000 displaced people staying either in or outside evacuation centres, a figure that had dropped to only 368 by the end of January 2017. Given, however, that Nock-Ten is estimated to have damaged or destroyed at least 70,000 homes, it is unclear how many people may still be displaced and staying temporarily elsewhere while recovery and reconstruction efforts continue.

These cases highlight some of the displacement patterns and impacts following disasters, and the challenges in arriving at robust estimates of the number of people displaced without adequate information over time. They also illustrate that initially high numbers tend to relate to necessary and life-saving evacuations, which may include a large number of people who are able to return to their homes soon after the event. However, they also show that such evacuations may be just the beginning of a longer period of displacement for significant numbers of people for whom return is either not a safe option if possible at all. Moreover, the range of economic, social, cultural and psycho-social impacts that the experience of displacement can have over prolonged periods of time, on both those displaced as well as host communities, highlights the difficulty in determining when displacement ends. This difficulty is as much conceptual as it is practical in terms of monitoring and planning for support. The situation of tens of thousands of people still displaced in Japan following the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami disaster in 2011 is a further case in point (see spotlight, p.43).
JAPAN
Psychosocial impacts of prolonged disaster displacement

The combined impacts of a devastating earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011, followed by radiation leaks from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, displaced more than 470,000 people from their homes. Major recovery operations have made good progress in most of the affected municipalities, but some areas have lagged behind. Six years on, the disaster is far from over for around 124,000 people still living in displacement.

The physical and mental health impacts of long-lasting displacement have been widely observed among evacuees. They are strongly associated with the dislocation from close-knit communities and familiar surroundings, the loss of their homes and livelihoods and the separation of families caused by their displacement. People evacuated from Fukushima because of nuclear radiation suffered from higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression for a longer period of time than those affected in other prefectures. Many evacuees were still suffering from sleeping disorders, anxiety, loneliness and depression five years later.

In the other prefectures devastated by the earthquake and tsunami, the incidence of mental health problems also remains high. A recent survey of residents from Miyagi and Iwate found 14.3 per cent were still suffering psychological distress in 2015, an overall decline from 18.4 per cent in 2011 but still above the national average of 10 per cent. Among women still living in temporary housing complexes, the rates of PTSD and insomnia were significantly higher.

Along the Fukushima coast, enormous walls are being constructed to reduce the danger of tsunamis similar to that of 11 March 2011. Photo: IFRC/Masaya Noda, February 2016
sive behaviour among evacuees living in temporary housing units has been linked to their loss of employment and sense of purpose. Social stigma, including the bullying of schoolchildren, has also been a problem for IDPs from areas of Fukushima affected by radiation.

Older people have been particularly vulnerable to the impacts of prolonged and protracted displacement. The residents of temporary housing units, the majority of whom are older people, have gradually been relocating to more permanent public housing or rebuilt private homes, but those left behind report feeling increasingly isolated. Their isolation has contributed to a growing number of stress-related deaths and the phenomenon of kodokushi, or people dying alone and unnoticed. As of March 2014, 90 per cent of an increasing number of evacuees who died of poor health while living in temporary housing were people over the age of 66. In Fukushima, the number of deaths associated with the long-term effects of the disaster exceeds those caused by its direct impacts.

The effects of displacement following the 2016 Kumamoto earthquakes follow a similar pattern. Twelve months on, health problems brought on or made worse by prolonged displacement are already responsible for more deaths than those caused by the more direct impacts of the disaster.

These unquantified but profound social, psychological and health consequences of displacement show that “soft” protection and support measures that improve people’s mental, physical and socioeconomic resilience during displacement are as important as “hard” investments in infrastructure reconstruction and environmental remediation. They also make it clear that those who remain displaced for long periods tend to be the most vulnerable, without the means, capacity or support networks to forge their own paths.

Wherever displacement occurs, older people and other vulnerable groups with specific needs, such as women and children, should be prioritised from the start of any response. In areas at risk of disasters, they should also be considered and prepared for in advance. Mitigating and addressing the issues that drive and prolong displacement and worsen its impacts are vital to ensure that people affected by disasters are able to recover fully, and that development progress for the country as a whole leaves no one behind.
Global disaster displacement risk

The data currently available gives us information on past and current patterns of internal displacement associated with disasters, but it does not tell us enough about what to expect in the future. The fact that most disasters that could take place have not yet happened means that what we know about the associated scale and global distribution of displacement does not necessarily correspond to what it may be in the years and decades to come.

The limitations we face in trying to gain insights into future displacement risk from interpreting historical data are overcome by modelling. Probabilistic risk assessments simulate future displacement events associated with disasters which are likely to occur. This is vital not only for framing global policy, but also for policymakers, budget holders and planners at the national level, who need to allocate scarce resources based on limited understanding of future trends and risk. Presently, IDMC’s modelled estimates provide the only global baseline of future displacement risk.

How many people are at risk of being displaced? Where? How often, and as a result of which types of hazard? These are questions raised in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the UNFCCC Paris Agreement. In order to begin answering these questions our updated model simulates displacement caused by large-scale and relatively infrequent hazards for which there is little or no recorded data. We assess prospective displacement risk by analysing the frequency and severity of hazards, and the number of people and homes exposed and vulnerable to them.

Probabilistic risk models for disasters are normally used to present potential economic losses in the form of metrics such as average annual loss and probable maximum loss. In the case of displacement risk, the model shows us potential average numbers of people displaced annually over long periods of time, and the probable maximum displacement that might be expected within a given period of time. The latter can also be presented as the probability of at least a certain number of people being displaced for a given return period. This metric is particularly relevant for urban planners and settlement programmes in areas prone to hazards, which have to consider the expected lifespan of the built environment and the associated risks for those who inhabit it beyond a few decades.

Modelled global average annual displacement associated with hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, riverine floods and tropical cyclones is almost 11 million. This number is significantly lower than IDMC’s reported figures because it is only based on housing destruction. Absolute numbers are concentrated in countries with a high density of settlements and populations in coastal areas, and on seismic fault lines and flood-prone river basins. In such areas, exposure tends to be the dominant driver of displacement risk (see figure 1.22).

Figure 1.22: Countries with largest modelled Average Annual Displacement (absolute value)

Source: IDMC, with UNISDR data
Nine of the ten countries with the highest displacement risk are in south and south-east Asia. Most of these countries regularly rank in the top ten in IDMC’s annual disaster-related displacement estimates, and some appear every year. This reflects the region’s large number of people exposed to sudden-onset hazards. Exposure, however, also drives displacement risk in upper middle-income countries such as China and high income countries such as the US. Large numbers of densely populated settlements in coastal areas, and on seismic fault lines and riverine basins across the US mean the country faces average annual displacement associated with the major hazards of more than 200,000 people.

Vulnerability also plays a significant role. Eight of the ten countries with the highest displacement risk are in the lower middle-income group. As in the US, the size and density of populations exposed to hazards in India, China and Bangladesh results in high displacement risk, but it is pushed higher still by the numbers of people living in substandard buildings and with less resources to cope, which makes them more vulnerable.

In comparison to the risk of economic loss from disasters, which in absolute terms is usually highest in high-income countries, absolute displacement risk associated with disasters is highest in low and lower middle-income countries. The relative distribution of displacement risk – average annual displacement relative to population size – would be expected to be concentrated disproportionately in low and lower middle-income countries or small island states, but it is the case regardless of whether understood in absolute numbers or in relation to population size. While the large majority of countries with the highest displacement risk in absolute terms are in the low and lower middle income category, all top 10 countries in terms of displacement risk relative to population size are small island states, several of which are also low and lower middle income countries (see figure 1.23). This reflects the fact that vulnerability and limited capacity to reduce disaster risk tend to be the overriding factors in determining displacement risk. The two measures taken together reveal the extreme challenges these countries face.

Our risk model can also be used to estimate the frequency and magnitude of displacement events associated with disasters with specific return periods. Results expressed in exceedance curves show the probability of a certain number of displacements being exceeded for any given return period. For a return period of 10 years, for example, Indonesia faces the displacement of at least 100,000 people as a result of earthquakes alone. At least another 700,000 people can be expected to be displaced by floods (see figure 1.24).

Figure 1.23: Countries with largest modelled Average Annual Displacement (relative to population size)

Source: IDMC, with UNISDR data
The vast scale of disaster displacement risk becomes very visible in these curves, and it can be expected to grow as economic and demographic concentration continue to drive exposure, while at the same time environmental degradation and climate change, weak governance, limited capacity and persistent inequality and poverty increase vulnerability.

As such, the humanitarian resource gap that already exists can be expected to grow unless the causes and structural drivers of exposure and vulnerability are addressed globally and particularly in hazard-prone regions.