New displacements by conflict and disaster in 2016

Country names and figures are shown only when the total new displacements value exceeds 20,000.
Disasters in 2016

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.
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Cover photo: Atai and her children pose in front of their make-shift shelter in the one of the IDP camps in Maiduguri, Nigeria. It is largely constructed from burlap sacks. Atai had lived with her family, working as a tailor, in her village, Bama. Just over two years ago, Atai and her children fled when Boko Haram attacked the village. Boko Haram kidnapped her daughter and killed her husband during the brutal attack. © IOM/Muse Mohammed, February 2016

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GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

MAY 2017
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In April 2017, diplomats and donors met in Brussels to support the future of the Syrian people and their neighbours. The conference was overshadowed by a horrific chemical attack on civilians in Idlib, Syria. As people were dying in harrowing circumstances, the leaders in Brussels had scheduled discussing the return of refugees to the country. The contrast between those plans and the reality on the ground could not have been starker.

By the end of 2016, more than half of Syria’s 22 million people had fled the violence of the past six years. People continue to flee daily, and many remain displaced within the country. These days Syrians can only move so far. The country’s international borders were effectively closed in 2015-2016, leaving hundreds of thousands internally displaced near crossing points into neighbouring countries. As the conflict evolves some are returning to their homes. But we do not know if this is because the situation in their area of origin has improved, or because it was unsustainable in their place of refuge.

The plight of refugees returning elsewhere, as in Afghanistan and Somalia, is also a cause for concern as the number of refugees worldwide continues to rise and global interest in returns increases. The risk that unprepared, involuntary or premature returns will cause more internal displacement in the future cannot be underestimated.

This year, IDMC’s Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) examines the connections between internal and cross-border displacement. It shows that people unable to find safety by fleeing within their own country eventually embark on dangerous journeys across borders in search of refuge and a better life.

It also indicates that refugees and migrants who return or are deported back to conditions similar to those that led to their flight risk becoming displaced again. This will only add to the country’s existing number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Given the current attention to these issues, and that patterns and trajectories vary significantly from one country to another, a much stronger evidence base is needed.

This year’s GRID continues to publish estimates and analysis of people internally displaced by conflict, violence and disasters in a single report. Many more people were displaced once again by disasters than conflict, showing that disaster risk reduction remains a core priority of our times. In addition to large scale and sudden-onset events, slowly developing food security crises triggered by drought and exacerbated by existing vulnerabilities and protracted conflict also continue to affect millions of people. A significant number of new internal displacements in 2016 had multiple causes.

People also continue to be displaced by development projects and investments, and while the GRID does not yet provide global figures for this, it is important to remember that development can benefit some while severely affecting others.

IDMC continues to be the reference point for statistics on internal displacement. But the picture we paint is still incomplete. More accurate and rigorous data is vital to a number of current global policy processes, so we appeal to governments and partners to increase their efforts to provide comprehensive and timely information.

We must remember that behind the figures presented here lie many millions of people whose lives have been torn apart. Our hope is that through better information and evidence, decisions that affect their fragile futures can be improved.

Jan Egeland
Secretary-General of the Norwegian Refugee Council
2016 was a year in which the global focus on refugees and migrants contrasted with little political attention to the millions of people displaced within their countries by conflict, violence and disaster.

As the year progressed, global policy commitments to IDPs gradually lost momentum. The plight and needs of IDPs featured prominently during discussions at the World Humanitarian Summit in May: the UN Secretary-General called for renewed efforts to prevent internal displacement, address its root causes and support safe, dignified and durable solutions for internally displaced people, and suggested to establish a target of halving internal displacement globally by 2030.

Several months later, however, IDPs were out of sight and out of mind once again, and they ended up largely excluded from the outcomes of the UN’s Summit for Refugees and Migrants in September. The single reference to IDPs in the New York Declaration pointed to links between internal displacement and large movements of migrants and refugees. However, addressing internal displacement was recognised mostly as a way of mitigating large cross-border movements of vulnerable people.

The current focus on refugees and migrants and the UN General Assembly’s collective commitment to sharing responsibility for refugees are important signs in these times of fragile solidarity. There is a real risk, however, that as political efforts are focused on strengthening borders, less attention will be paid to what happens behind them. This has implications not only for refugees and migrants in transit and for those being returned to their countries of origin, but also for those who stay behind.

This year’s GRID seeks to redress this imbalance and puts the spotlight onto internal displacement as a key challenge of our times. Part 1 of the report, “On the GRID” presents the figures and trends on the scale and patterns of conflict and disaster-related displacement worldwide during 2016, shining a spotlight on countries of particular concern. Part 2 of the report, “Off the GRID” responds to the overshadowing of IDPs in the 2016 policy landscape described above by examining the evidence on the relationship between internal and cross-border displacement. Part 3 of the report, “Inside the GRID” presents some of the methodological and conceptual
challenges faced in trying to paint as complete a global picture as possible, and highlights the importance of reliable data in keeping internal displacement high on the global policy agenda.

The increasing number of people displaced by conflict and violence in low-income countries presents considerable challenges to the achievement of the ambitious goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including those of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Paris Agreement on climate change.

The pledge to “leave no one behind” at the heart of the 2030 Agenda recognises that the continued presence of vulnerable groups, including displaced people, affects the development prospects of the communities that host them and of societies as a whole. Unless more targeted and concerted efforts are directed at addressing internal displacement, the goal of significantly reducing numbers by 2030 is likely to recede further into the distance.

This recognition has prompted new strategies and engagement by development agencies such as the World Bank, which is a significant step forward. That said, investment in addressing the structural drivers of conflict and disasters, and with it displacement risk, are not sufficiently prioritised. The new UN Secretary-General, António Guterres recognised this when he declared that conflict prevention would be the first priority of his tenure. Even for disasters, where there have been advances in international policy and national programmes on risk reduction, the vast majority of funding still goes to managing and responding to their impacts rather than pre-empting them.

The steady rise over the past two decades in the number of IDPs and refugees has been mirrored by increases in humanitarian appeals and spending, but the funding gaps and the growing share of assistance spent within donor countries means that not enough is currently spent on countries with high levels of internal displacement. Spending on refugee resettlement within donor countries surpassed humanitarian financing for other countries for the first time in 2016 (see figure 1). In addition, overall bilateral aid to least-developed countries, including those with the highest levels of new displacement, fell by 3.9 per cent compared with 2015, as some Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members backtracked on a commitment to reverse past declines in flows to the poorest countries.

Significant progress has been made over the past three decades in raising the profile of IDPs, but the grim figures set out in this report highlight that we are still far from meeting their needs in a satisfactory manner. The evidence underscores the need for a long-overdue paradigm shift: from a focus on meeting immediate needs to understanding the interwoven causes and structural drivers of displacement; and from offering solutions driven by institutional mandates to jointly investing in reducing vulnerability and mitigating the longer-term impacts of displacement.

Without this paradigm shift, countries will continue to struggle to reduce the economic and social impacts of internal displacement, and the number of people whose lives are blighted by displacement around the world will only continue to rise.

Figure 1: Comparison of the number of IDPs and refugees and humanitarian spending in donor countries and overseas, 2000 to 2016

Sources: IDMC for IDP data; UNHCR and UNRWA for refugee data (2016 figures not yet available); OECD for spending data
Significant new internal displacement associated with conflict and disasters takes place every year, mainly in low and lower-middle income countries. Those affected add to the many millions of people already living in displacement, some of whom have been doing so for years and even decades. This reflects the intractable nature of the phenomenon, and governments’ inability to cope with, respond to and recover sustainably from its impacts.

Some countries drop off the international agenda only to re-emerge a few years later with significant numbers of new displacements. This was the case in 2016 for the Democratic Republic of Congo, and highlights how the failure to address the underlying causes of conflict and displacement results in recurrent crises, takes a heavy toll on communities and undermines the search for sustainable solutions to IDPs’ needs.

Despite the fact that IDPs outnumber refugees by around two to one, internal displacement has been sidelined in recent global policy processes and is overshadowed by the current focus on refugees and migrants. There is a relationship between internal and cross-border movement, both in terms of flight and return, but its nature and extent need to be better understood, including the push and pull factors that prompt IDPs to become refugees, asylum seekers and international migrants. Such an evidence base is essential to set the global agenda, and for national planning and international support.

Persistently high levels of internal displacement underscore the need for more development spending to be allocated to reducing existing vulnerabilities and future risk and for mitigating the longer-term impacts of internal displacement. Humanitarian and development sectors need to invest simultaneously rather than sequentially across all phases of displacement. Current humanitarian budgets are not designed to respond to the many and complex needs of the millions of IDPs caught up in protracted, cyclical and repeated displacement.

Displacement will continue to take a heavy toll on communities and national economies unless the drivers of poverty, environmental change and state fragility are addressed. Many more political and financial resources should be invested in conflict prevention, disaster risk management, state-building and diplomacy to address the multiple interwoven causes of displacement crises.

A more explicit focus on displacement risk presents an opportunity to link policies and programmes more closely to the broader global development agenda. To do so will require greater attention in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the New Urban Agenda if commitments are to be realised.

There have been several clearly articulated demands for rigorous and transparent data on internal displacement, which is needed to establish a global baseline and measure progress toward targets. Longitudinal data in particular is needed to measure needs and vulnerability. Displacement, however, is rarely monitored from its outset to its end, which means that global figures currently do not reflect the true scale, nature and patterns of the phenomenon.

States are not investing sufficiently in the collection and publication of credible data on internal displacement. Despite repeated UN resolutions calling on member states to collect and share data, only a small number of countries do so. This severely limits their capacity to address IDPs’ needs, and our ability to paint a comprehensive picture. It also means that the right levers and incentives for governments to develop stronger accountability mechanisms at regional and global levels have not yet been found.
A displaced girl in Jérémie, Haiti, living in a temporary shelter next to a church, sells biscuits as she had been doing since before Hurricane Matthew struck.

Photo: ©UNICEF/UN035682/LeMoyne, October 2016
As in previous years, high levels of new displacement by conflict and disaster in 2016 added to already existing high numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs). A total of 31.1 million new displacements were recorded in 125 countries and territories in 2016 – roughly the equivalent of one person forced to flee every second.

Disasters continue to bring about the highest numbers of new displacements each year, while conflict-related displacement has been on an overall upward trend over the last decade (figure 1.1). As the main triggers of forced displacement currently recorded, armed conflicts and disasters brought on by sudden onset natural hazards show few if any signs of abating. Nor do their many underlying drivers, which include poverty and inequality, fragile and weak governance, rapid urbanisation, climate change and environmental degradation.

High risk and low capacity

The majority of new displacements in 2016 took place in environments characterised by a high exposure to natural and human-made hazards, high levels of socioeconomic vulnerability, and low coping capacity of both institutions and infrastructure. Of the 6.9 million new displacements by conflict, 6.6 million – more than 95 per cent – took place in countries that rank high or very high on INFORM’s risk index (see figure 1.2).

This implies that many of the new caseloads are likely to become protracted as governments with weak coping capacity struggle to respond to the multiple, varied and complex needs of IDPs. As a result, IDPs’ vulnerability could persist and worsen over time. This is a strong reminder of how the failure to address underlying risk drivers will continue to generate cyclical crises, and to take a heavy toll on affected communities and national economies. Unresolved displacement and a failure to address the drivers of displacement risk will, in turn, result in more displacement in the future.
**KEY FINDINGS**

In 2016, 31.1 million new cases of internal displacement by conflict, violence and disasters were recorded. This represents an increase of 3.3 million from 2015, and is the equivalent of one person displaced every second.

With 24.2 new displacements in 2016, disasters triggered by sudden onset hazard events continue to bring about the highest numbers of new displacements each year. A majority of these occur in low and lower-middle income countries and as a result of large-scale weather events, and predominantly in South and East Asia. While China, the Philippines and India have the highest absolute numbers, small island states suffer disproportionately once population size is taken into account. Slow-onset disasters, existing vulnerabilities and conflict also continue to converge into explosive tipping points for displacement.

Of the 6.9 million new displacements by conflict in 2016, 6.6 million – more than 95 per cent – took place in high-risk contexts. Most conflict displacement occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) overtaking Syria in the top ranking. Ongoing levels of violence in Syria meant that more than 800,000 new displacements were recorded there during the year. In Iraq, almost 680,000 new displacements occurred as a result of nine military campaigns. In Yemen, at least 478,000 new displacements took place against the backdrop of a persistently dynamic and volatile security situation.

Although the phenomenon of displacement by generalised violence is still inconsistently monitored across the world, in El Salvador significant numbers of people were displaced by criminal and gang violence in 2016, placing the country second in the ranking of highest new displacements relative to population size.

By the end of 2016, there were 40.3 million people internally displaced by conflict and violence across the world. An unknown number remain displaced as a result of disasters that occurred in and prior to 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New displacements Jan – Dec 2016</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs as of the end of 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT</td>
<td>6.9 million</td>
<td>40.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISASTERS</td>
<td>24.2 million</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WHAT ARE WE COUNTING?**

The GRID presents two types of headline figures: new displacements caused by conflict and disasters during the course of the year and the total number of people displaced by conflict at year’s end. We commonly refer to “new displacements” or “incidents” and “cases” of displacement as this may include individuals who have been displaced more than once. Where we refer to the total number of people displaced, this is to mean single incidents or cases affecting one person. This can be the case in the context of specific disaster events and is also used to present the total number of people displaced by conflict at year’s end.
New research into displacement risk suggests that displacements associated with disasters will continue at a similar scale to current trends. However, the impacts of climate change on the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and environmental degradation will increase displacement risk further.

**Increasing complexity**

In several contexts, a clear-cut distinction between conflict and disasters as the immediate causes of displacement is becoming increasingly difficult to uphold. Separating the many underlying and interlinked drivers of the conflict and disasters that result in forced displacement is even more problematic. These complexities have been recognised before, but current data collection and analysis does not reflect them, and quantitative research remains limited.

Data from the Horn of Africa suggests that recurring droughts, poor access to basic services and infrastructure, lack of livelihood options and ongoing conflict and insecurity converge in a toxic mix that leaves highly vulnerable and exposed people with no other option but to move. In Ethiopia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Somalia, and South Sudan, the confluence of different drivers and causes of new displacement in 2016 was complex enough that distinguishing between final triggers was impossible. Consideration should be given to reporting displacement in such contexts across multiple drivers and causes.

**Figure 1.2: New displacements by conflict and disasters in 2016, disaggregated by INFORM risk levels in the countries concerned**

![Figure 1.2: New displacements by conflict and disasters in 2016, disaggregated by INFORM risk levels in the countries concerned](source: IDMC, with INFORM data)

**ON THE GRID: Global internal displacement in 2016**

**DISASTERS** 24.2m
- Very high: 33.0% - 2.3m
- High: 4.7% - 0.3m
- Medium: 15.9% - 3.8m
- Low: 62.3% - 4.3m
- Very low: 0.1% - 26,000

**CONFLICT** 6.9m
- Very high: 14.4% - 3.5m
- High: 4.5% - 1.1m
- Medium: 65.1% - 15.7m
- Low: 0.1% - 26,000
- Very low: 4.5% - 1.1m

Source: IDMC, with INFORM data
CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE
New displacement in 2016

There were 6.9 million new internal displace-
ments associated with conflict and violence in
2016, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa and the
Middle East (see figure 1.3). This represents a
20 per cent decrease from 2015 estimates, due
largely to fewer reported new displacements in
Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

That said, figures for new displacement by
conflict still indicate an overall rising trend (see
figure 1.4), with an annual average of 5.3 million
new displacements a year since 2003, roughly
15,000 people forced to flee their homes every
day. This correlates with findings that although
the number of active conflicts has declined over
the same period, those being fought became
steadily more lethal from 2010 to 2014 and then
slightly less so in 2015.5

The downturn over the last two years should not
mask significant new internal displacement not
only in the Middle East, but also in Afghanistan,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Nigeria and Yemen, as well as that associated
with violence perpetrated by drug gangs and
other criminal groups in Central America (see
figure 1.5).6

Figure 1.3: New displacements by conflict and violence by World Bank-defined region in 2016

Source: IDMC, with World Bank data

Figure 1.4: New displacements by conflict and violence, 2003 to 2016

Source: IDMC
Sub-Saharan Africa: overtaking the Middle East

With a decline in the number of people fleeing violence in the Middle East and a spike in DRC, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for the highest number of new internal displacements associated with conflict and violence in 2016.

The majority occurred in DRC, where ongoing conflict in North and South Kivu and an increase in inter-communal clashes in southern and central regions such as Tanganyika, Kasai, Kasai-Oriental, Ituri and Uele, caused more than 922,000 new displacements in total during the year. Some people were forced to flee more than once. This was an increase of nearly 50 per cent on figures for 2015 (see spotlight, p.14).

More than 500,000 new displacements were reported in Nigeria during the year, as violence committed by Boko Haram and military operations against the group continued to plague the economically deprived Lake Chad basin. Borno, Adamawa and Yobe were worst affected, and protection needs in all three states were acute, particularly for vulnerable groups such as women, children and older people. The insecurity also impeded access to IDPs and other people in need of urgent life-saving assistance, leaving many trapped by the conflict and reporting famine-like conditions.7

Against the backdrop of new displacement, around a million IDPs and refugees started to return toward their areas of origin in north-east Nigeria in 2016. Given, however, that many towns have been destroyed and insecurity persists across large areas of Borno, many communities are likely to continue living in internal displacement – around 80 per cent of them with host communities – and to be dependent on humanitarian support.8

South Sudan’s humanitarian crisis deepened in 2016, with more than 281,000 new displacements, some in areas previously considered stable. Armed conflict spread beyond the Greater Upper Nile region to new locations, particularly following July 2016 clashes in the capital city of Juba. These sparked an escalation of the conflict in many other areas in the latter half of the year, including the Greater Equatoria region and Unity.9

By December, one in four people in South Sudan had been forced to flee their homes since the conflict broke out in 2013.10 This included almost 1.9 million IDPs still internally displaced by end-2016, the majority of whom were children, and 1.3 million people who fled to neighbouring countries as refugees. Some found themselves caught up in circular displacement back and forth across borders (see spotlight, p.57). Around 212,000 IDPs had sought refuge in UN protection of civilian (PoC) sites by the end of the year, the highest number since the conflict began.11

The food security situation in South Sudan in 2016 was also at its most severe level since the crisis broke out.12 The combination of conflict, economic crisis and inadequate access to food has eroded vulnerable households’ ability to cope and added to the already complex and multiple drivers of population movements.

Figure 1.5: Countries with most new displacements by conflict and violence in 2016

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Political insecurity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) aggravated long-standing ethnic tensions and clashes between armed groups in 2016, particularly in the provinces of North and South Kivu in the east of the country. There were more than 920,000 new displacements over the course of the year, the highest number associated with conflict recorded globally. Ninety-three per cent of IDPs cited violence as the main driver of their displacement.\(^{13}\)

Of the 2.2 million IDPs currently in DRC, 837,000 are in North Kivu and 378,000 in South Kivu.\(^{14}\) Together they account for 55 per cent of the country’s displaced population. The humanitarian situation is increasingly dire, but little seems to have been done to stem the violence, respect IDPs’ human rights or address their protection needs.

People in North Kivu, who have already endured years of war and disasters, have been left with acute needs. Raids and inter-ethnic and communal clashes between armed groups in Walikale and Lubero territories forced nearly 373,000 people to flee their homes, making up 42 per cent of the province’s displaced population as of the end of 2016. Some IDPs have been persuaded to return to their home villages, but many in Lubero remain displaced because of continued insecurity.\(^{15}\)

The provincial government’s call for North Kivu’s displacement camps to be closed has complicated humanitarian efforts even further. Five camps were closed in 2016. The authorities justified the move by claiming that the camps harbour anti-government militias and foster violence among IDPs. It has also claimed that several areas of the province have stabilised and that IDPs can return to their homes.
The UN mission to DRC, MONUSCO, has also cited improved security as the basis for reducing its presence in some territories. Whether proper measures will be taken to ensure that IDPs are moved to areas where their protection needs are fully addressed as camps close remains to be seen.

Kasai province in central DRC had remained relatively calm until July 2016, when conflict broke out between a tribal group and the country’s armed forces. Brutal fighting affected around 36,000 households, uprooting residents and forcing them to flee to nearby villages and forests. Many parents who remained in the territory have taken their children out of school in an attempt to spare them the violence.

IDPs’ protection needs were at their most acute in Beni territory, where civilians have been kidnapped, maimed and executed. Nearly 200,000 people have been displaced by armed conflict between foreign militias and government forces that continues to uproot vulnerable men, women and children and shows no sign of easing.

Inter-communal violence also led to kidnappings, rape and killings in Rutshuru. At least 15,000 IDPs were seeking shelter in the territory and required emergency assistance following their displacement from Nyanzale town and nearby areas in mid-2016. Humanitarian agencies working in the area have said that the violence has hindered their ability to help.

Funding for the response to the crisis in DRC has become a major concern. Data shows a steady decline in donor governments’ commitments over the last four years, and only 60 per cent of pledged funding was provided in 2016. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has said that it needs at least $748 million to implement its 2017 action plan to meet the needs of more than 7.3 million people in need of aid.

DRC’s crisis is often overlooked by media and an international community focused on the latest disaster or conflict to capture their attention. This will have dire consequences for several million people in desperate need of assistance. The country has been in conflict for the best part of 20 years, but evidence shows that the situation for the most vulnerable has deteriorated severely in recent years.

Humanitarian agencies that bear the brunt of the protection burdens are having to work ever harder and longer in very dangerous conditions, and with ever fewer financial and human resources.
Middle East: less displacement, but unceasing conflict

The number of new displacements in the Middle East and North Africa decreased by almost 60 per cent in 2016. In a return to 2012 levels, 2.1 million incidents were reported, a downturn that supports a World Bank hypothesis that displacement flows tend to peak 4.1 years following the first large wave of displacement. The number of new displacements in the Middle East and North Africa decreased by almost 60 per cent in 2016. In a return to 2012 levels, 2.1 million incidents were reported, a downturn that supports a World Bank hypothesis that displacement flows tend to peak 4.1 years following the first large wave of displacement.

Significantly lower figures were recorded in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, countries that accounted for more than half the global total in 2015. The sharp decline reflects a relative stabilisation of the front lines of the conflicts – along with two brief ceasefires in Syria – which translated into less dynamic population movements. Restrictions on freedom of movement also emerged as a common theme in 2016 with people trapped in besieged cities such as Aleppo and Mosul, which is likely to have meant that fewer people were able to flee to safety. The decline in the figures is also explained in part by actors on the ground adjusting the methodology used for data collection, as was the case in both Yemen and Syria.

Despite the decline, the three countries still featured among those with most new displacements by conflict in 2016 (see figure 1.6). In Syria, there were at least 824,000 displacements during the year, often with people fleeing at very short notice and leaving their assets and documentation behind. Multiple displacement there has become the norm, and persistent and extreme violence and family separation have created a high-risk protection environment for all civilians, with women and children particularly vulnerable (see spotlight, p.17).

Almost 660,000 new internal displacements were reported in 2016 in neighbouring Iraq, where the pace of the phenomenon over the past three years has been “nearly without precedent”. There were nine major military campaigns during the year, including an offensive by United States (US)-backed Iraqi forces to retake Mosul from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Each resulted in people fleeing for safety. At the same time, more than a million Iraqis are thought to have returned to their homes during the year, some to areas contaminated by unexploded ordnance and many to places where public infrastructure and private housing have been damaged or destroyed (see spotlight, p.19).

At least 478,000 new internal displacements were reported in Yemen during 2016, linked to two main waves of violence in March and May. The decrease in the number of new displacements compared to 2015 and the relatively stable number of IDPs reported throughout 2016 are potentially misleading and do not reflect the volatile displacement dynamics within Yemen. High return rates were reported during the year, and new displacement figures do not comprehensively capture multiple displacements and back-and-forth movements, which remain unquantified and unreported. If these movements were accounted for, the number of displacements in country may have exceeded 750,000. At the end of 2016 more than half of the IDPs in Yemen were sheltering in Hajjah, Taiz and Sana’a governorates, around 77 per cent of them living with host families or in rented accommodation.

Figure 1.6: New displacements by conflict and violence in the Middle East and North Africa, 2009 to 2016

Source: IDMC
The sixth year of Syria’s civil war brought no respite for civilians, who continued to bear the brunt of extreme levels of violence committed by all parties to the conflict with unprecedented humanitarian consequences. People fled their homes across the country, many of them displaced more than once to areas of steadily diminishing safety. The hostilities were relentless throughout 2016 and included gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights law as all parties repeatedly targeted densely populated areas and civilian infrastructure.

Two cessation of hostilities agreements brokered by the US and Russia in February and August led to temporary lulls in the fighting and a drop in the rate of internal displacement, but hostilities and their impact on the civilian population flared again after each agreement. Intense fighting in and around eastern Aleppo in December caused the temporary displacement of at least 100,000 people from and within the city.

Offensives against ISIL took place on various fronts. Turkish forces crossed into Syria to launch an operation with allied local forces in August, and the opposition Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) went on the attack in Raqqa governorate in November. Both campaigns caused waves of displacements across northern Syria. Between 35,000 and 40,000 people were displaced in the north of Raqqa, most for short periods of time.

Displaced residents from eastern Aleppo rest at Mahalej centre.
Photo: © UNHCR/Mohamed Jertila, December 2016
As battle lines shift, people run the risk of being displaced repeatedly or prevented from fleeing at all. Syria’s international borders were effectively closed in 2016, with around 330,000 IDPs living in camps and informal settlements near the Turkish border in the north of the country.33

Against a backdrop of conflict, a deteriorating local economy and dwindling personal resources, both IDPs and host communities struggle to meet their basic needs. The destruction of property and infrastructure has left 1.1 million people living in makeshift housing and “last-resort settlements” such as collective centres, often set up in schools and other public buildings.34 Living conditions are poor. Fifty-seven per cent of collective centres are without enough water, 50 per cent have inadequate sanitation facilities and 54 per cent are overcrowded.35

Other IDPs are forced to settle on land to which they have no legal claim or to rent accommodation informally, leaving them vulnerable to eviction.36 Those living in informal settlements are also more likely to be exposed to security threats and the prospect of repeated displacement.

Access to education is a major concern. One in three schools are damaged, destroyed, used as collective centres or in inaccessible areas. Displacement also disrupts school attendance, hampering children’s ability to complete academic cycles and take exams. Children face serious protection risks, including underage recruitment, child labour, early marriage and gender-based violence.

Humanitarian access remains difficult, despite five UN Security Council resolutions demanding that all parties to the conflict allow “rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders.”37 As of December 2016, around 4.9 million people were living in “hard to reach” areas, of whom almost a million were besieged, often without access to food, water or medical services.38 The numbers of people living in besieged or hard-to-reach areas fluctuated over the year as the conflict unfolded.

The use of sieges as a weapon of war in eastern Aleppo and several areas of rural Damascus left civilians with no protection and little or no access to humanitarian assistance.39 Those in ISIL-controlled areas face a similar situation.

Returns are registered, but they are difficult to track. It is often unclear whether people return because the situation in their area of origin has improved, or because it was unsustainable in their place of refuge. As the conflict shifts, it will be of utmost importance to ensure that any returns are safe, voluntary, assisted and monitored. Returnees’ housing land and property rights and civil documentation issues will require particular attention. Without documents, people are less able to exercise their rights and may become legally invisible or stateless.

Returns to areas formerly controlled by ISIL raise protection concerns that require immediate and sustained attention, including the widespread presence of improvised explosive devices ISIL fighters left behind.40
After ISIL the real challenge begins

As the campaign to reassert government control over territory held by ISIL gathered pace in 2016, so too did the deepening of Iraq’s humanitarian crisis. The widespread military offensives taking place against the group caused almost 660,000 new displacements. Around 3 million have fled their homes since 2014.1

How the security situation develops and the humanitarian and development sectors respond to this latest phase of Iraq’s crisis will go a long way to determining whether IDPs will be able to rebuild their lives in a sustainable way, or whether they will be exposed to a new phase of violence and secondary, potentially longer-term displacement.

Anbar and Salah Al Din governorates witnessed the greatest number of returns in 2016. The security environment in the newly retaken areas remains fragile, however, and government oversight and control is still limited. Other armed groups have filled the vacuum left in ISIL’s wake, and those trying to go back to their homes have faced numerous challenges and protection risks.

Efforts to re-screen returnees have tended to be irregular and rarely monitored, and there have been credible reports in both governorates of abductions, detentions and the torture of people suspected of affiliation with ISIL. Others have been barred from returning to their homes altogether or have had them demolished or appropriated to be used as forms of compensation. Returnees also face the danger posed by unexploded ordnance, an absence of basic services and a lack of livelihood and education opportunities.2

Qayyarah was retaken from ISIL by Iraqi forces on 2 August 2016 and was declared as the base for future operations to retake the city of Mosul. ISIL set fire to oil wells south of Mosul. Photo: NRC/Wolfgang Gressmann, September 2016

ON THE GRID: Global internal displacement in 2016
As in previous years, there are also serious concerns that many returns are not voluntary – or lasting. Three thousand displaced families in Tikrit were threatened with eviction in February in a case of collective punishment after some individuals were accused of being ISIL informers. In Kirkuk, more than 4,300 displaced families have been expelled since the International Organization for Migration (IOM) began tracking displacements from the governorate on 1 September 2016. Sixty-two per cent returned to their home areas, but the remainder were pushed into secondary displacement. Of those who returned, 995 families went back to Fallujah in Anbar and 994 to Al Shirqat in Salah Al Din.

Such displacements advance the need to develop a national framework for IDPs’ return in line with the IASC framework on durable solutions, which would guarantee their fundamental rights, establish operational principles and facilitate coordination and support.

The battle for Mosul began in late 2016, and by January 2017 the Iraqi government said it had driven ISIL from the eastern half of the city. Within weeks, 30,000 of the 180,000 or so people who were displaced by the offensive began returning to the city, but they have faced similar difficulties to those who have gone back to Anbar and Salah Al Din.

State forces were pulled quickly out of east Mosul and deployed to the offensive to retake the west of the city, but a month after the east was declared to be in government hands, very few police units had returned. Other armed groups have filled the security vacuum, and in the lawless environment there have been widespread reports of arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extortion, the imposition of random curfews and movement restrictions, and assaults and threats against humanitarians.

Some families who tried to return have gone back to the camps where they were sheltering, and others have postponed their return to the city. By February, the number of people leaving because of insecurity and limited access to basic services and livelihood opportunities was higher than the number returning.

Should ISIL continue to cede territory there are fears that international attention and the will to continue supporting Iraq will wane. A decrease in funding for humanitarian work would be likely to form part of such a trend, hampering efforts to resolve the country’s crisis, including the many challenges associated with IDPs’ return to their homes.

It will also be important to ensure that stabilisation efforts, which currently focus on large infrastructure projects and the restoration of public services, are shaped by engagement with local communities to establish a parallel focus on needs at the household level.

The complex situation that people affected by the conflict face across Iraq means that 2017 could prove to be just as tumultuous for the country as previous years. The number of people fleeing military operations to retake western Mosul increased rapidly in the early months of the year, with critical needs reported among displaced families living both in and out of camps. As of April 2017, more than 450,000 people had been displaced during the six months since the launch of the campaign to retake Mosul. The real challenge for Baghdad and the international community of securing the safety and dignity of all civilians starts now.
Nearly two years of conflict and displacement have devastated Yemen, pushing the country toward social, economic and institutional collapse. Nearly 90 per cent of IDPs in Yemen have been displaced for more than 10 months, with scarce resources dwindling and humanitarian needs rising sharply in all sectors. At the same time, more than a million people provisionally returned to their areas of origin, but the sustainability of their return is highly questionable. Nearly 70 per cent of returnees are in Aden, Sana’a or Taiz, where more than 85 per cent were reported to be living in their original homes. Substantial numbers were living in damaged buildings and faced serious protection risks.

Under-reported: displacement by generalised violence

Disaggregating new displacements associated with conflict and violence recorded in 2016 reveals that 88 per cent were triggered by active armed conflicts, six per cent by criminal violence, five per cent by political violence and one per cent by communal violence (see figure 1.7). People fled generalised violence in a number of forms, from gang violence in central America (see spotlight, p.22) to post-electoral violence in Burundi and Burkina Faso. Their movements are not however systematically monitored worldwide.

This “unseen” flight has widespread repercussions for individuals and societies. Only the existence of an international or non-international armed conflict triggers the application of international humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of armed conflict. In practical terms, IHL sets limits on how the parties may conduct hostilities and protects all persons affected by the conflict, including humanitarian agencies responding to its effects. This means that although the consequences of generalised violence can be as devastating and deadly to the civilian population as those of an armed conflict, there is no special protection provided by IHL.

There is far less information on people who flee criminal violence than on those displaced by conflict, and an even weaker response to their plight. Given the high rates of urban violence and homicide in some of the world’s major cities, many more people are probably displaced globally by this type of violence than the current data reflects.
El Salvador has consistently been one of the world’s most violent countries over the last decade. We estimate that nearly 220,000 people were forced to flee generalised violence in 2016. This puts the country second in terms of the number of new displacements relative to population size (see figure 1.8).

Despite the scale of displacement, however, there is no official recognition of the role violence plays in driving the problem. This means there is also no national strategy, legislative or policy framework in place to comprehensively monitor, address and respond to it.

Displacement in El Salvador is driven by organised criminal groups committing egregious acts of violence against civilians with impunity. The population’s perception is that the state is unable, and given the human rights violations committed in the “war on gangs”, in some cases unwilling to provide protection and assistance.

Efforts to document internal displacement and assist victims are further frustrated by the secrecy in which people flee and their reluctance to report crimes to the authorities. IDPs in El Salvador tend not to seek refuge in camps or shelters, but rather go into hiding, behaviour that local civil society organisations (CSOs) call “confinement.”48 IDPs feel forced to restrict their own basic freedoms and rights to avoid detection by criminal groups or the authorities. Of 193 cases documented by four CSOs in 2016, only 43 per cent reported crimes to authorities.49

The main reasons victims give for not reporting crimes related to their displacement are fear of reprisal by criminal groups, fear of infiltration and corruption in state institutions, and a belief that the state is unwilling or unable to help them.50

Eighty-four per cent of the people displaced in 2016 reported fleeing persecution and violence by gangs, which use many forms of violence including murder, torture, forced disappearances, rape, sexual exploitation and threats to exercise control over territories and populations.51

Victims describe a daily life in which they negotiate with, and acquiesce to criminal groups over basic aspects of their lives such as freedom of movement, and whether and where to attend school and work, access medical care and seek justice. They also balance their safety and security against coercion by succumbing to blackmail,
collaborating in criminal activity, submitting to sexual abuse and forced relationships and joining the ranks of criminal organisations themselves. Resistance can trigger threats and violence.

Victims of violence and displacement also face stigmatisation and discrimination based on their perceived association with criminal organisations. In the polarising and bellicose narrative of the “war on gangs,” public officials regularly associate them with “the enemy” rather than recognising them as citizens with a right to protection.

The implementation of extraordinary security measures has also contributed to the erosion of the human rights environment in communities most vulnerable to criminal violence. In pursuit of the legitimate goal of suppressing criminal groups, state security forces have allegedly perpetrated extrajudicial executions, physical abuse, sexual harassment and mass arrests. Of the cases of displacement documented by civil society, the police and armed forces were directly responsible for eight per cent.

Humanitarian organisations and donors increasingly recognise the need to develop new approaches and more robust interventions in the region. They acknowledge that addressing criminal violence challenges many of their precepts and traditional working practices and will require considerable time.
People internally displaced by conflict and violence
as of 31 December 2016
(Total: 40.3 million)
CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE
Total number of IDPs as of end 2016

There were around 40.3 million people displaced within the borders of 56 countries and territories as a result of armed conflict and generalised violence as of the end of 2016 (see map, p.24). The total number of IDPs has nearly doubled since 2000 and increased sharply over the last five years. The latter spike was due in large part to the conflict and violence that spread across the Middle East following the Arab spring uprisings in late 2010. Following a peak in 2015, which represented the highest figure IDMC has reported since it began its work in 1998, the total number of IDPs fell slightly in 2016 – but there is no sign of a downward trend.

The persistence of large numbers of IDPs across the world reflects the intractability of conflicts and crises, notably in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, where IDPs face all but insurmountable obstacles in re-establishing normal lives. It is also explained in part by the inconsistent monitoring of displacement over time and by the lack of updated data, particularly on protracted situations. Such information would allow us to track IDPs’ progress toward durable solutions and ultimately start to take them off the books.

Twice the number of refugees

Global displacement caused by conflict and violence has hit a record-high. As of the end of 2015, 65.3 million people were displaced within or across borders as a result of conflict, generalised violence, persecution and human rights violations. The vast majority of them, nearly two-thirds, had not crossed international borders and were internally displaced. The number of IDPs has been roughly twice that of refugees in recent years, and the gap between estimates for the two groups has been growing since 1997 (see figure 1.9).

Despite this, IDPs receive relatively little global attention, particularly when compared with the highly visible influx of refugees and migrants to Europe in recent years. People who flee conflict or persecution across an international border are eligible for globally recognised protection, as embodied in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol and supported by a dedicated UN agency. IDPs’ fate, meanwhile, lies in the hands of their own governments, some of whom are unwilling or unable to assist or protect them. Indeed, in some cases, they may have caused their displacement in the first place.

Figure 1.9: Refugees and IDPs displaced by conflict and violence, 1990 to 2016

Source: IDMC, with UNHCR and UNRWA for refugee data (2016 figures not yet available)
Intractable conflicts and poor capacity to cope

The total number of people internally displaced by conflict and violence has increased since 1998. The overall upward trend is a harsh reflection of the intractability of conflicts and the protracted nature of displacement in many parts of the world, fuelled and complicated by under-development in countries with little capacity to cope with crises.

Some of the most persistently high numbers of IDPs have been in sub-Saharan Africa and, since 2012, the Middle East (see figure 1.10). Colombia has also had one of the highest numbers of IDPs over the last 20 years, though this is due in part to the fact that its official registry does not account for the end of displacement (see spotlight, p. 29).

From Baghdad to Bogotá, the nature of internal displacement varies considerably. There may be more IDPs in Colombia than in Yemen or South Sudan, but those in the latter two countries tend to face greater deprivation and threats to their lives, safety and wellbeing. IDPs who fled violence in Azerbaijan two decades ago still struggle with precarious livelihoods and adequate housing, but their plight does not compare with that of those in Nigeria, who face many and sometimes daily threats, in some cases suffering attacks and airstrikes on the very camps they flee to in search of safety and life-saving assistance.

Disaggregating the global caseload of IDPs by the severity of their situation and highlighting which features require most attention – whether it be physical safety, access to food, water and basic services, standard of living or access to livelihoods – would paint a more realistic and three-dimensional picture and provide a much-needed metric by which to assess how to prioritise attention and resources when responding to their needs.

Ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, a group of UN human rights experts called for a spotlight to be thrown on this “invisible majority.” They described IDPs as highly vulnerable, and argued that without measures to protect them, address the causes of their plight and prevent future displacement, they could easily become tomorrow’s refugees and migrants (see part 2).

**Intractable conflicts and poor capacity to cope**

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Of the total number of IDPs globally, over three-quarters, or more than 30 million people, live in just ten countries (see figure 1.11). Of these, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Sudan and South Sudan have been among the ten countries with the world’s largest populations of IDPs every year since 2003.

Most countries on this list are grappling with intractable and recurrent armed conflicts. Over the last ten years, the number of IDPs in sub-Saharan Africa has fluctuated by region but stagnated overall because of the failure to resolve conflicts such as those in DRC, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Sudan. In the Middle East, the latest waves of violence in Iraq and the relatively recent conflicts in Syria and Yemen have also stranded millions of people for whom there is no end to their displacement in sight. In Afghanistan, continuous conflict and insecurity mean that flight and mobility have become a familiar coping strategy for almost four decades.
People internally displaced amid ongoing conflict live in flux, and are likely to become displaced again, whether within or across borders. Multiple and chronic displacement is commonplace in DRC, while IDPs in Syria have been compelled to flee as many as 25 times because a single move has not protected them from constantly shifting frontlines and the breakdown of basic services. Each displacement chips away at IDPs’ resilience and self-reliance and increases their vulnerability and impoverishment.

Some conflicts and the displacement they cause may fall off the international radar and become overshadowed by “newer” crises. Because their underlying drivers go unaddressed, they resurface cyclically when a new wave of violence and displacement erupts. DRC is a striking case in point. There were more than 920,000 new displacements associated with conflict in 2016, the highest in the world, but its crisis received very little international media attention during the year.

The remaining 13.3 million IDPs live in upper middle and high income countries. The prevalence of conflict and internal displacement in these wealthier income brackets means that the development community’s perception of violence is no longer associated only with low-income countries, prompting new strategies for response by organisations such as the World Bank.

Much internal displacement takes place in low-income countries weakened by decades of war. Two-thirds of the world’s IDPs, or 27 million people, live in low and lower middle-income countries (see figure 1.12). Every sub-Saharan African country that hosts IDPs is in this income bracket, as are most of their counterparts in the Middle East. The governments of such countries have relatively little capacity to meet their IDPs’ protection and assistance needs, and displacement puts additional strain on already weak institutions.
Inconsistent monitoring

Beside the reality that more people are becoming internally displaced each year and remaining so for long periods of time, the generally upward trend in the total number of IDPs is also at least partly explained by inconsistent monitoring and accounting for caseloads over time. The tracking of IDPs’ trajectories and vulnerabilities tends to trail off after an initial period, because humanitarians, national governments and civil society lose or divert the resources, and often the interest, to continue monitoring and counting them. The lack of regular and updated information precludes us from measuring IDPs’ progress toward sustainable solutions, and continues to swell the global figures each year (see part 3).

Perhaps the most visible example of how an overly broad counting method can lead to ever-increasing figures is the case of Colombia. With more than 7.2 million IDPs as of the end of 2016, it hosts the highest number worldwide – more than in Afghanistan, Nigeria and South Sudan combined and surpassing Syria by a wide margin (see figure 1.11). As the country emerges from more than five decades of armed conflict, Colombia serves as a crucial litmus test for the new approach to protracted displacement called for at the World Humanitarian Summit (see spotlight, p.29).63

The country’s registry for IDPs, part of the national victims’ registry administered by the government’s victims unit, is primarily intended as a tool to facilitate the provision of reparations, in accordance with law 1448 of 2011. Widely known as the victims’ law, it establishes that a person only loses their recognition if they provide fraudulent information during their registration process. Victims are meant to be recognised as such forever, in some ways symbolically, but also to ensure continued access to assistance and reparations.

In other words, the number of IDPs in the country never decreases. Even if IDPs are able to progressively reduce the vulnerability, impoverishment and marginalisation they face, there is no system in place to monitor their progress toward achieving durable solutions. Anecdotal evidence, meantime, suggests that large numbers have resettled in urban areas and live in conditions comparable with those of their host communities.

Until there is a monitoring system in place that determines if and when IDPs have achieved durable solutions, their number will continue to increase. Should Colombia’s definition and approach be applied to the victims of conflict in other countries with persistently high numbers of IDPs, such as DRC, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria or Ukraine, one can only imagine the ever-growing global total reported annually and the repercussions for planning and prioritising responses.
COLOMBIA
Tackling protracted displacement post-conflict

After six years of negotiations between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country finally reached a peace deal in late 2016 to end more than 50 years of armed conflict that cost more than 260,000 lives and displaced more than seven million people. Violence has continued, however, with the assassination of 17 community leaders since the agreement was signed in November and thousands of people newly displaced.

With a cumulative figure of 7.2 million IDPs, Colombia has the largest displaced population in the world, but this is likely to be an overestimate. Another 340,000 Colombians are living as refugees or in a refugee-like situation abroad.

Around 78 per cent of all IDPs in Colombia live in 282 of the country’s 1,122 municipalities, with large numbers in major cities such as Bogotá and Cali and their surroundings. As many as 80 per cent live below the poverty line, including between 33 and 35 per cent who live in extreme poverty. Indigenous and African-Colombian communities have long been disproportionately affected. The two groups together made up 74 per cent of IDPs involved in mass displacement events – events in which at least 10 families or 50 people are displaced – between January 2014 and August 2016. They also accounted for 6.7 per cent and 14.5 per cent of all registered displacements in 2016, but represent only 3.4 per cent and 10.6 per cent of the total population.

Colombia’s IDPs continue to face substantial obstacles in their pursuit of durable solutions. A recent report notes the following reasons for the protracted nature of their displacement:

ON THE GRID: Global internal displacement in 2016
Prolonged conflict and insecurity in areas of origin are made worse by a lack of state presence, and levels of crime and violence are also high in areas of refuge. The latter not only triggers secondary displacement, but also adds to IDPs’ unaddressed trauma and other mental health issues.

Many IDPs, particularly those from rural backgrounds or indigenous and African-Colombian communities, do not have the skills to compete in urban labour markets. Nor do young IDPs have enough access to higher education, which is essential for moving out of poverty in Colombia.

Land restitution in areas of origin is difficult, tenure is insecure, and the illegal status of the settlements where many IDPs live prevents municipal authorities from providing services and infrastructure.

Local authorities’ capacity is weak and the central government does not allocate them enough funds, in part because its calculations are based on outdated census data.

IDPs are not integrated into regular state action, and coordination between line ministries is weak.

Donors have allocated only limited resources for durable solutions, because funding prioritises other aspects of the peace agreement, such as disaster risk reduction and transitional justice.

Colombia has an advanced legal framework for IDPs, and since 2004 the Constitutional Court has been demanding that the government guarantee victims’ rights. This led to the introduction of the 2011 victims’ law, a pioneering piece of legislation that entitles IDPs and other victims of the conflict to reparations. It also led to the creation of a dedicated government victim’s unit and a national plan for assistance and reparation.

The 2011 law envisages addressing IDPs’ needs on three levels. First, they receive immediate humanitarian assistance, vital given that 4.9 million people in Colombia are considered to be in need of it. This falls under the responsibility of the victim’s unit, with support from international organisations. The second level aims to overcome socioeconomic vulnerability, and focuses on seven components: food; education; identification documents; family reunion; health, including psychosocial attention; housing; and livelihoods, including vocational training and occupational orientation. The third level is reparation, involving compensation, rehabilitation, restitution and guarantees of non-repetition.

In less than four years, the programme has compensated more than 500,000 victims, but this represents less than 10 per cent of the total number who are supposed to receive compensation by 2021. According to an evaluation by Harvard University’s Carr Center, to do so would require a sevenfold increase in the victims’ unit capacity.

In support of the government, UNHCR and UNDP have also been running a “transitional solutions initiative” in 17 communities to help IDPs become less dependent on the authorities and more self-reliant. The programme aims to improve quality of life, strengthen organisations and institutions, and protect victims and their rights.

Most of the victims of Colombia’s conflict are IDPs. The fact that the government has included them among those entitled to compensation is a commendable and significant first step. The commitment, however, creates unprecedented challenges given that more than 12 per cent of the country’s population is eligible for reparation.

Given that implementing the many requirements of the peace agreement with FARC will require significant attention and resources, it will be vital to keep the country’s seven million IDPs at the top of the government’s agenda and to help them overcome the obstacles they still face in achieving durable solutions. This also means ensuring that the humanitarian and development sectors, local authorities and private enterprises work collectively to end aid dependency and promote IDPs’ self-reliance.
DISASTERS
New displacement in 2016

There were 24.2 million new displacements by disasters brought on by sudden-onset natural hazards in 118 countries and territories in 2016. They outnumbered new displacements associated with conflict and violence by more than three to one. In the nine years since 2008, 227.6 million such displacements have been recorded, or an average of 25.3 million per year.

The largest events determine much of the variation in global totals from year to year. IDMC recorded 31 disaster-related displacement events that each caused at least 100,000 displacements in 2016, accounting for 86 per cent of the total. They included five very large events that each displaced between one and three million people. Unlike most other years, however, there were no mega-scale events that triggered more than three million displacements (see figure 1.13). A significant percentage of total new displacements in the context of sudden-onset disasters are usually related to planned or spontaneous evacuations, many of which present only short-term displacement occurring in a relatively safe and orderly manner. However, in the absence of reliable reporting on returns, it is not currently possible to clearly determine the numbers, length and severity of displacement.

IDMC’s global estimates cover disasters triggered by sudden-onset hydro-meteorological and climatological hazards such as floods, storms, wildfires and extreme winter conditions; and geophysical hazards such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and landslides. They do not include displacements associated with slow-onset disasters such as drought and environmental degradation. Nor do they cover those associated with technological and biological hazards, such as industrial accidents and epidemics, except when they are triggered by a natural hazard. The displacement caused by radiation exposure in Fukushima following the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011 is one such example.

On the Grid: Global internal displacement in 2016

Figure 1.13: New displacements by disasters by scale of event

Source: IDMC
Extreme weather events drive up the numbers

Several new climate records were set in 2016. As data from previous years shows, climate and weather-related disasters regularly account for most of the global total (see figure 1.14). In 2016, they were responsible for 23.5 million displacements, or 97% per cent of all disaster-related displacements. All of the 10 largest disaster displacement events in absolute terms were weather-related.

Flood disasters tend to make up the majority of climate and weather-related displacements each year. In 2016, however, storms caused 12.9 million displacements worldwide – 55% per cent of all weather-related disasters – by triggering mass displacement of populations living in exposed and vulnerable coastal areas. Seven of the 10 largest displacement events of 2016 were storm-related, and nine out of 10 relative to population size (see figure 1.15).

The number of new climate and weather-related disaster displacements in 2016 was above the annual average since 2008 of 21.7 million, but displacements associated with geophysical hazards were well below average, with approximately 700,000 displacements recorded in 2016. Excluding 2008 as a highly unusual year because of the Sichuan earthquake disaster in China, disasters triggered by geophysical hazards have caused an average of around two million displacements a year.

Despite the lower than usual figure, there were still some significant earthquake disasters in 2016 that were followed by prolonged displacement and increasing vulnerability for those affected. A 7.8 magnitude earthquake and strong aftershocks struck the Manabí and Esmeraldas provinces of Ecuador on 16 April, killing more than 600 people, displacing at least 259,000 and leaving some towns needing to be permanently relocated.78

On the same day on the other side of the Pacific, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake displaced at least 196,000 people in and around Kumamoto in the southern Japanese prefecture of Kyushu.79 One year on, more than 47,000 people who lost their homes are still displaced.80 Health problems brought on or worsened by prolonged displacement, especially among older people, caused more deaths than the direct impacts of the earthquake, such as collapsing buildings. Out of 170 indirect deaths reported, 90 per cent were of people over the age of 60.81

Figure 1.14: New displacements by disasters by hazard category, 2008 to 2016

Source: IDMC
Figure 1.15: The ten largest disaster displacement events of 2016

Absolute numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines: Typhoon Novach Ton (locally known as Nina)</td>
<td>2,592,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>2,377,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China: Yangtze River floods (1st wave)</td>
<td>1,990,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India: Bihar floods</td>
<td>1,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba: Hurricane Matthew</td>
<td>1,079,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia: Peak rainy season floods and landslides</td>
<td>448,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States: Hurricane Matthew</td>
<td>871,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China: Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>782,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China: Typhoon Megi</td>
<td>658,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China: Typhoon Meranti</td>
<td>567,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDMC, with UN Population Division data

Relative to population size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba: Hurricane Matthew</td>
<td>1,079,000/1,079,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji: Tropical Cyclone Winston</td>
<td>871,000/871,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines: Typhoon Novach Ton (locally known as Nina)</td>
<td>2,592,000/2,592,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka: Tropical Cyclone Roanu</td>
<td>1,990,000/1,990,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga: Tropical Cyclone Winston</td>
<td>1,670,000/1,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>1,670,000/1,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti: Hurricane Matthew</td>
<td>1,670,000/1,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador: Northwestern Ecuador earthquake (April)</td>
<td>1,670,000/1,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji: Tropical Cyclone Zena</td>
<td>1,670,000/1,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize: Hurricane Earl</td>
<td>1,670,000/1,670,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDMC, with UN Population Division data
Hurricane Matthew caused devastation across the eastern Caribbean and south-eastern US in October 2016 (see figure 1.16). It was the most powerful storm of the season, claiming hundreds of lives.  

Different levels of exposure, vulnerability and coping capacity in each country and area affected, and the storm’s path and changing intensity, meant that its impacts varied significantly from place to place. As the initial and evolving displacement figures show, understanding the severity of those impacts requires far more than a consideration of the number of people who fled.

As the storm developed in late September and early October, it prompted small-scale and short-lived evacuations in St Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia, Barbados, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Jamaica, though it did not make landfall in any of these small island countries. In Jamaica, 3,500 people moved to 193 shelters, of which 900 people were staying in the two shelters that remained open a couple of days after the storm passed. Indirect impacts of the storm also brought floods and landslides to the Dominican Republic where nineteen provinces were placed under red alert and almost 18,000 people evacuated to stay with friends and relatives while around 800 moved to official shelters. The Bahamas was hit more directly, and of around 5,000 people evacuated to safer places, 3,500 were still living in shelters or with their relatives ten days later.

Matthew made its first landfall in Haiti and its second in Cuba, each time as a very strong category four storm. In Cuba, the hurricane forced the evacuation of 1,079,000 people in six eastern provinces before it made landfall. It is a testament to the effectiveness of the evacuations that there appear to have been no casualties. Evacuations were followed however by continued displacement for thousands of people whose homes were destroyed or left uninhabitable.

In the worst-affected municipalities of Baracoa and Maisí in Guantánamo province, up to 94 per cent of homes were damaged or destroyed, with houses with lightweight roofs shown to be particularly vulnerable. Including figures for Imías and San Antonio del Sur in Guantánamo as well, the homes and possessions of 121,176 people, or more than 77 per cent of the province’s population, were lost or damaged. As of 31 October, the national civil defence authorities reported that more than 70,000 evacuees in Guantánamo province were still unable to return to their homes because of the hurricane’s impacts.

By the end of the year, around 54 per cent of damaged homes had been repaired or reconstructed. This reconstruction rate was remarkably quick. Nevertheless, thousands of families whose homes were completely destroyed were left facing longer delays and more time in displacement.

Mass evacuations also took place in southern and eastern states of the US, where Florida, Georgia, North and South Carolina were worst affected by heavy rainfall and floods. Of more than 2.5 million people the authorities ordered to evacuate as the hurricane approached, between 875,000 and 1.25 million people – or 35 to 50 per cent – are estimated to have complied.

Though the impacts in some areas were significant, the overall damage was less feared because the storm weakened and only made brief landfall in Georgia. Overall loss and damage statistics were only publicly available online for North Carolina, where 28 lives were lost and 82,000 people registered for state or federal assistance in the storm’s aftermath, including displaced homeowners and low-income tenants. The last emergency shelter was closed on 14 November, but more than 1,400 households whose homes were left uninhabitable were put up in hotel rooms under the government’s transitional shelter assistance programme. Other reports point to particular communities where people were struggling to recover. In Nichols, South Carolina, for example, four out of five homes were still unoccupied five months later, with some displaced people unlikely to return.

Haiti, however, suffered the worst impacts and displacement. Matthew made landfall as a category four storm overnight on 3 October in the poor and largely rural south-west of the country. Around 550 people lost their lives and as many
as half a million displaced people sought refuge with friends and family or set up makeshift shelters, but the majority returned to their home areas within weeks of the hurricane. Many people moved out of the badly affected departments of Sud, Grand’Anse and Nippes toward urban areas including the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, Jeremie and Les Cayes and more than 175,500 displaced people took shelter in more than 220 evacuation sites.

An estimated 90 per cent of homes were destroyed in the worst-affected areas, and the pace of reconstruction has been slow. Most of the destruction was in rural areas where traditionally built homes of timber, thatch and mud were unable to withstand the strong winds and flooding. In the coastal town of Les Cayes in Sud department between 70 and 80 per cent of houses were rendered uninhabitable.

Six months after the hurricane, hundreds of thousands of people whose homes were damaged or destroyed were still living in makeshift shelters. Little assistance had reached the mountainous or island areas of Grand’Anse department, which were only accessible by motorcycle or boat or on foot, and whose populations were already extremely vulnerable before the hurricane hit. Matthew damaged or destroyed 98 per cent of homes in these areas, 85 per cent of which had yet to be repaired or rebuilt five months on. Few families had the means or materials to do so. This meant that most people displaced to shelter with friends or family or in evacuation sites elsewhere had returned to their former home areas to ongoing displacement near their original houses.

Widespread vulnerability has been heightened by the devastation of food production, loss of livelihoods and capital and rising food prices following Hurricane Matthew, resulting in a food and nutritional crisis. The fate of around 47,000 people still displaced almost seven years after the 2010 earthquake shows the potential for recent displacement to become further prolonged and protracted.
Uneven distribution across incomes and regions

The distribution of disaster displacement provides insights into the drivers of global disaster risk patterns. Climate change is affecting the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, but most of the change in disaster risk over the relatively short period of time covered by IDMC’s data is linked to exposure and vulnerability. Most striking is the strong correlation between displacement and populations’ exposure to natural hazards.\textsuperscript{109}

Human settlement patterns are closely linked to historical and recent processes of economic development and population growth, particularly in urban areas. Since 1970, population growth in urban areas has taken place at almost twice the global rate, and more than three times as fast in urban areas of low and middle-income countries.\textsuperscript{110}

Thirty-eight per cent of displacement associated with disasters in 2016 occurred in upper middle-income countries (see figure 1.17). The figure of more than nine million people was more than double the previous year’s, and reflects the persistently high exposure of dense and growing urban populations. In many middle-income countries, urban growth has been poorly and governed, leading to both high exposure and vulnerability that affects the poorer and more marginalised segments of society disproportionately.

High-income countries also faced significant new displacement but at a similar level to 2015, with a figure of 2.3 million accounting for around nine per cent of the global total. These included the US and Japan, which are regularly among the countries with the highest figures worldwide, but also – more unusually – Israel, where wildfires displaced 75,000 people or almost one in 100 of the country’s population.

Low and lower middle-income countries such as DRC, Haiti, and Bangladesh accounted for 12.7 million displacements in 2016. Here disaster risk tends to go hand in hand with rapid and poorly planned urbanisation and the growth of informal settlements where building standards and land-use plans are not enforced.\textsuperscript{111} This should be of particular concern because governments and affected populations in such countries generally have less capacity to minimise, respond to and recover from disasters or to mitigate the adverse impacts of displacement.

More than two-thirds of all new displacement associated with disasters in 2016 took place in East Asia and the Pacific, where 16.4 million incidents accounted for 68 per cent of the global total (see figure 1.18). Most took place in upper middle and lower middle-income countries. The figure is almost double the 8.4 million displacements in 2015.

China accounted for 45 per cent of the regional total, with 7.4 million new displacements. The country experienced its wettest year on record in 2016, with 16 per cent more rainfall than the long-term average. The Yangtze river basin flood season was the most significant since 1999.\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.17.png}
\caption{New displacements by disasters by income group, 2016}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{Source: IDMC, with World Bank data}
The Philippines experienced very high levels of displacement again, both in absolute terms and relative to population size. There were 5.9 million new displacements, including the two largest events of the year, brought on by typhoons Nock-Ten, known locally as Nina, which made landfall on 25 December, and Haima, known locally as Lawin, in October. The data is far from comprehensive, but most people appear to have been able to return home relatively quickly. That said, based on the number of people still sheltering in evacuation centres, around 31,000 were still displaced a month after Haima struck, and around 400 a month after Nock-Ten.

The 3.6 million new displacements in South Asia in 2016 represented a drop of more than half from the 2015 figure of 7.9 million. Sixty-seven per cent, or 2.4 million, were in India, most of them associated with monsoon season floods in the state of Bihar that led to more than 1.6 million displacements between mid-July and October.

Cyclone Roanu brought Sri Lanka its heaviest rainfall in more than 25 years. Widespread flooding and landslides were reported in 22 out of 25 districts in May, killing 64 people, forcing around 500,000 to evacuate and leaving some 30,000 homes in need of repair or reconstruction. Six months on, thousands of people were still living in camps where they faced deteriorating health conditions as they awaited relocation to housing in safer areas.

In absolute terms, the large and populous countries of China, the Philippines and India had the highest numbers of displacements. When considered relative to the population size, however, the exposure and vulnerability of small, low-lying coastal and island countries to tropical storms and flooding becomes clear. Fiji and Tonga in the Pacific and Haiti, Belize and Cuba in the Caribbean accounted for five of the 10 countries with the largest per capita disaster displacements (see figure 1.19).

Some events in these countries were also among the 10 largest events of the year in relation to population size (see figure 1.15). The mass evacuation of 1,079,000 people in six eastern provinces of Cuba ahead of Hurricane Matthew in October was the largest, with almost one in 10 inhabitants forced or obliged to leave their homes and shelter in safer locations (see spotlight, p.34).

Cyclone Winston, the strongest southern hemisphere storm on record, struck Fiji in February. In many of the hardest hit areas, people had been struggling before the storm with drought and water shortages exacerbated by El Niño. More than 62,000 people were displaced and took shelter in evacuation sites. Despite an emphasis on “building back safer” and increased attention to protection needs in the country, several thousand people in the worst-affected areas were still living in tents or temporary shelters a year later.
There were no sub-Saharan African countries among the 10 to experience the largest-scale or relatively largest-scale displacement in 2016 (see figure 1.19). Significant sudden-onset disasters did occur, however, and the displacements they triggered compounded the impacts of other natural and man-made hazards, including drought, coastal erosion, land degradation and conflict.

In Ethiopia, heavy rains and exceptional floods displaced about 300,000 people in April and May after 18 months of severe drought and food insecurity. They also hampered the delivery of food aid and recovery assistance for pastoralist families. Floods across various areas of Sudan in August displaced 123,000 people, including around 22,000 households whose homes were destroyed and a further 1,700 whose long-term housing was also destroyed in displacement camps in Nierteti in central Darfur. DRC, which was the country with most new displacements associated with conflict in 2016, was also hit by floods that displaced around 127,000 people.

If displacement associated with slow-onset disasters were included in our estimates, particularly those related to drought conditions and food insecurity, the figures for Africa would be significantly higher.
Slow-onset disasters and multiple drivers

Given the drought conditions that affected hundreds of millions of people in Asia and Africa in 2016, IDMC made a concerted effort to collect quantitative data on the displacement associated with them. Some figures were obtained from Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Mozambique, Somalia and South Sudan, but they hardly paint a complete or coherent picture.

Instead, the data speaks to the variety of ways in which drought combines with other factors to result in displacement as well as other more voluntary forms of population movement or migration. In India, population movements associated with the impacts of drought are recorded as part of broader seasonal and labour migration. This makes it difficult to identify people in distress whose movements might be better described as displacement. In Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan, displacement was reported in areas where people’s vulnerability was strongly linked to conflict and violence as well as the impacts of drought.

While multiple interlocking factors make it difficult to isolate and estimate the number of people whose displacement is strongly associated with drought conditions, data collection rarely captures more than a single reason why people have had to leave their homes. Some displaced people coming from drought-affected areas may name drought as the primary cause in response to surveys, while others may refer to loss of livelihoods, hunger, or conflict as the more immediate reason why they were forced to leave. In South Sudan, for example, crop yields and food insecurity are influenced both by agricultural drought and by farmers’ inability to access their crops because of conflict. At the same time, food insecurity is also one of several drivers of conflict and violence in the country. As people compete for dwindling resources, flashpoints include cattle rustling, the encroachment of livestock onto agricultural land and tensions between clans and communities over water points and pasture areas. In pastoral areas of Ethiopia affected by drought, displacement – including across borders – was brought about by a number of factors of which a lack of rainfall was just one, and not necessarily the most significant.

These situations challenge the artificial distinctions that have been made in the past when disaggregating displacement figures by “cause” whether it be conflict, disasters or development projects. Focusing on a single cause distorts and oversimplifies the context and, without further analysis, may hamper the identification of appropriate solutions. Complex combinations of both natural and human factors that intertwine to influence the risk of future displacement call for a more holistic interpretation that includes not only triggers, but also the latent and structural factors that determine how exposed and vulnerable people are to hazards in the first place.

Ethiopia is experiencing one of the most severe droughts in half a century related to the effects of El Niño. Photo: NRC, April 2016
A third consecutive year of drought across the Horn of Africa in 2016 compounded the fragility of countries and communities in the region by precipitating crop failure, livestock deaths, rising food insecurity and malnutrition. Community coping capacities were pushed to new limits as household resources and support networks already under stress were further eroded and the movement of displaced populations increasingly reported within and out of areas affected by drought.122

While the drivers of displacement in these contexts are clearly multiple and complex, the UNHCR-led Protection Monitoring and Reporting Network and IOM use a simple “drought” or “drought-related” category for the purpose of recording displacement data. This short-hand appears to be used to refer to people whose proximate reasons for leaving their homes are related to severe food and livelihood insecurity linked to pasture, water and food shortages, as opposed to those labelled as being displaced by conflict or violence, even where conflict may be an underlying or contributing factor. Some reports include “lack of livelihood” as an additional cause of displacement in Somalia as a whole.123 At the same time, displacement in the Bay region of Somalia in 2016 has been ascribed to “drought coupled with heavy ‘taxation’” by the non-state armed group al-Shabaab.124

In slow-onset disasters and gradually evolving crises, the difference between forced displacement and voluntary migration can be difficult to distinguish.125 In this case, however, extreme conditions and severe food insecurity in the home areas of thousands of people on the move, their dependence on external life-saving assistance and levels of distress and vulnerability reported in 2016 and early 2017 all strongly suggest displacement to be the more appropriate term.126 Around 12.8 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda as of the beginning of 2017.

Later in the year, following poor rains during the Deyr wet season from September to November, further drought on the Somalia side of the border drove tens of thousands of pastoralists towards the Hawd. As pastures were rapidly depleted, those with herds still in good enough condition moved further south into Ethiopia. More than 3,770 displaced Somalis crossed the border and arrived in Melkadida in the first two months of 2017.131 Internal displacement associated with the drought was reported in Somalia and Ethiopia on a much larger scale in 2016 and early 2017, but if famine is not avoided both internal and

The border area between the Somali region of Ethiopia and the autonomous region of Somalia, known as the Hawd, is a traditional rainy season pasture area. In “normal” dry periods, pastoralists move their livestock to areas where rain has fallen, including across the porous border, as part of their usual migration patterns. In 2016, however, nowhere received enough rain and cross-border movements took place in both directions. As both areas were suffering severe drought conditions, the search for pasture or water was often unsuccessful.129

During the first half of 2016, some pastoralists from the Somali region, where around 1.5 million people were in need of food assistance, were displaced beyond their homelands to the coast of Somaliland in search of adequate pasture. The pasture was not enough for those who made the journey, however, and they and their depleted herds of weakened livestock were left with two options – to make the long and arduous trek back or remain displaced where they were.130

In Somalia, against a backdrop of weak governance, protracted insecurity and chronic poverty similar to the pre-famine situation in 2010 and 2011, severe and persistent drought conditions have taken a heavy toll.127 In October and November, the federal government and the authorities in Jubaland, Puntland and Somalia appealed to all Somalis and the international community for support. In February 2017, the UN issued a warning of potential famine.128 As the humanitarian situation deteriorated toward the end of 2016, particularly in northern regions, many thousands of families dependent on diminishing livestock and agriculture for survival were forced to abandon their homes and usual migratory patterns in search of food, water and work.
cross-border movements are likely to become far more significant, as happened during the 2011 famine.\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{2}

The short-term cross-border displacement of pastoralists from Somaliland and from the Somali region of Ethiopia into the small neighbouring state of Djibouti was also recorded. Djibouti is an important transit point for migrants and displaced people heading for the Gulf states and beyond, and a relatively stable hub where international assistance can be accessed.\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{3} Thousands of pastoralists were displaced there between January and April 2016, at which point 9,650 people were sheltering among local communities in the Ali-Sabieh, Dickhil and Obock regions.\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{4}

Many pregnant women and children under five among them showed signs of acute malnutrition and anaemia, and half of the adults were underweight and weakened by tuberculosis and other illnesses.\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{5} With almost a quarter of Djibouti’s population living in extreme poverty, the acute needs of the new arrivals stretched local services and the scarce resources of their hosts.\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{6} A month later most had returned to their countries of origin.\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{7}

Given that for many people in the Horn of Africa mobility within and across borders is central to their livelihoods, culture and normal adaptive behaviour, those no longer able or allowed to range further afield in search of pasture or assistance should be of equal or even greater concern. Hundreds of pastoralist families in the severely drought-affected Sanaag region of eastern Somaliland were left behind without the money or means to move away and little left to live on in 2016.\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{8}

Along the Kenya-Somalia border, the free movement of pastoralists and their livestock between available pasture in traditional grazing lands was restricted by the building of walls and trenches by militant groups, while the potential for conflict over scarce water and pasture has increased.\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{9}

The cross-border movement of pastoralists may generally be permitted in other border areas, but it is largely unprotected by law. Nor does the human right to freedom of movement protect cross-border mobility, and the definition of a “migrant worker” in the International Covenant on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families is not adapted to the traditional livelihood mobility of pastoralists. Article 2(1) describes a migrant worker as a “person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.”\textsuperscript{14}\textsuperscript{0}

The African Union and a number of regional economic communities (RECs) have recognised the need to support pastoralists’ mobility.\textsuperscript{14}\textsuperscript{1} With a forecast of precipitation below average for the rainy season from March to May 2017, their free movement across borders will be vital to their ability to survive the current crisis, recover their losses and build their resilience to future disaster and displacement risk.\textsuperscript{14}\textsuperscript{2}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure_1.20.png}
\caption{Drought-affected areas in the Horn of Africa}
\end{figure}

This map shows anomalies in the mean value of soil moisture for the month of December 2016. Values were calculated taking as reference the average value of 30 years of Earth Observation data from 1982 to 2011. Red areas represent below average values while blue areas represent above average values.

\begin{itemize}
\item **Above average values**
\item **Below average values**
\item **Soil moisture difference**
\end{itemize}

Sources: Soil moisture difference anomaly (NOAA NCEP CPC, 2016). The boundaries, names and designations shown in this map do not imply any official endorsement or acceptance by IDMC.
Towards a global headcount of disaster displaced people

A global figure accounting for the total headcount, or global stock, of people living in displacement would significantly improve our understanding of the global scope and nature of the phenomenon. National and international policymakers also need to know how IDPs’ situations and needs evolve over time. They need to understand how many people end up living in prolonged or protracted displacement, the obstacles they face in trying to achieve durable solutions and how these might be addressed to ensure no one is left behind.

IDMC’s research in 2015 identified a sample of 34 cases that had been ongoing for between one to 26 years, accounting for more than 715,000 people. This year, we attempted to estimate a total headcount, or global stock figure, for people living in displacement following disasters that included those still displaced by events in previous years. Coming up with a robust global estimate has proved impossible for the time being, however, because of the limited data available that tracks displacement situations over time (see part 3).

Examples from a wide range of countries suggest that better monitoring and data collection on displacement over time would make generating a headcount possible, if still difficult. They also show that the evolution of displacement depends greatly on the context in which it occurs. In some cases, high numbers of people evacuated around the time of the onset of a disaster are able to return to their homes soon afterwards, while in others millions lose their homes and remain displaced years after the event.

Two years after Nepal’s major earthquake disaster that led to the loss of over 8,850 lives and the displacement of some 2.8 million people, around 2.6 million are still thought to be displaced and living in temporary shelters. The recovery and reconstruction process has been severely delayed while the government is absorbed with the country’s ongoing political crisis.

In the Philippines, typhoon Nock-Ten made first landfall in the Bicol region of Luzon on 25 December, before tracking across various provinces and out over the South China Sea the following day. The category four storm triggered the mass evacuation of as many as 2.6 million people, the largest disaster displacement event of 2016. Government data six days later captured just 230,000 displaced people staying either in or outside evacuation centres, a figure that had dropped to only 368 by the end of January 2017. Given, however, that Nock-Ten is estimated to have damaged or destroyed at least 70,000 homes, it is unclear how many people may still be displaced and staying temporarily elsewhere while recovery and reconstruction efforts continue.

These cases highlight some of the displacement patterns and impacts following disasters, and the challenges in arriving at robust estimates of the number of people displaced without adequate information over time. They also illustrate that initially high numbers tend to relate to necessary and life-saving evacuations, which may include a large number of people who are able to return to their homes soon after the event. However, they also show that such evacuations may be just the beginning of a longer period of displacement for significant numbers of people for whom return is either not a safe option if possible at all. Moreover, the range of economic, social, cultural and psycho-social impacts that the experience of displacement can have over prolonged periods of time, on both those displaced and as well as host communities, highlights the difficulty in determining when displacement ends. This difficulty is as much conceptual as it is practical in terms of monitoring and planning for support. The situation of tens of thousands of people still displaced in Japan following the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami disaster in 2011 is a further case in point (see spotlight, p.43).
The combined impacts of a devastating earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011, followed by radiation leaks from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, displaced more than 470,000 people from their homes. Major recovery operations have made good progress in most of the affected municipalities, but some areas have lagged behind. Six years on, the disaster is far from over for around 124,000 people still living in displacement.

The physical and mental health impacts of long-lasting displacement have been widely observed among evacuees. They are strongly associated with the dislocation from close-knit communities and familiar surroundings, the loss of their homes and livelihoods and the separation of families caused by their displacement. People evacuated from Fukushima because of nuclear radiation suffered from higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression for a longer period of time than those affected in other prefectures. Many evacuees were still suffering from sleeping disorders, anxiety, loneliness and depression five years later.

In the other prefectures devastated by the earthquake and tsunami, the incidence of mental health problems also remains high. A recent survey of residents from Miyagi and Iwate found 14.3 per cent were still suffering psychological distress in 2015, an overall decline from 18.4 per cent in 2011 but still above the national average of 10 per cent. Among women still living in temporary housing complexes, the rates of PTSD and insomnia were significantly higher. Reclu-
sive behaviour among evacuees living in temporary housing units has been linked to their loss of employment and sense of purpose.\textsuperscript{152} Social stigma, including the bullying of schoolchildren, has also been a problem for IDPs from areas of Fukushima affected by radiation.\textsuperscript{153}

Older people have been particularly vulnerable to the impacts of prolonged and protracted displacement. The residents of temporary housing units, the majority of whom are older people, have gradually been relocating to more permanent public housing or rebuilt private homes, but those left behind report feeling increasingly isolated.\textsuperscript{154} Their isolation has contributed to a growing number of stress-related deaths and the phenomenon of *kodokushi*, or people dying alone and unnoticed.\textsuperscript{155} As of March 2014, 90 per cent of an increasing number of evacuees who died of poor health while living in temporary housing were people over the age of 66.\textsuperscript{156} In Fukushima, the number of deaths associated with the long-term effects of the disaster exceeds those caused by its direct impacts.\textsuperscript{157}

The effects of displacement following the 2016 Kumamoto earthquakes follow a similar pattern. Twelve months on, health problems brought on or made worse by prolonged displacement are already responsible for more deaths than those caused by the more direct impacts of the disaster.\textsuperscript{158}

These unquantified but profound social, psychological and health consequences of displacement show that “soft” protection and support measures that improve people’s mental, physical and socioeconomic resilience during displacement are as important as “hard” investments in infrastructure reconstruction and environmental remediation. They also make it clear that those who remain displaced for long periods tend to be the most vulnerable, without the means, capacity or support networks to forge their own paths.

Wherever displacement occurs, older people and other vulnerable groups with specific needs, such as women and children, should be prioritised from the start of any response. In areas at risk of disasters, they should also be considered and prepared for in advance. Mitigating and addressing the issues that drive and prolong displacement and worsen its impacts are vital to ensure that people affected by disasters are able to recover fully, and that development progress for the country as a whole leaves no one behind.
Global disaster displacement risk

The data currently available gives us information on past and current patterns of internal displacement associated with disasters, but it does not tell us enough about what to expect in the future. The fact that most disasters that could take place have not yet happened means that what we know about the associated scale and global distribution of displacement does not necessarily correspond to what it may be in the years and decades to come.

The limitations we face in trying to gain insights into future displacement risk from interpreting historical data are overcome by modelling. Probabilistic risk assessments simulate future displacement events associated with disasters which are likely to occur. This is vital not only for framing global policy, but also for policymakers, budget holders and planners at the national level, who need to allocate scarce resources based on limited understanding of future trends and risk. Presently, IDMC’s modelled estimates provide the only global baseline of future displacement risk.

How many people are at risk of being displaced? Where? How often, and as a result of which types of hazard? These are questions raised in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the UNFCCC Paris Agreement. In order to begin answering these questions our updated model simulates displacement caused by large-scale and relatively infrequent hazards for which there is little or no recorded data. We assess prospective displacement risk by analysing the frequency and severity of hazards, and the number of people and homes exposed and vulnerable to them.

Probabilistic risk models for disasters are normally used to present potential economic losses in the form of metrics such as average annual loss and probable maximum loss. In the case of displacement risk, the model shows us potential average numbers of people displaced annually over long periods of time, and the probable maximum displacement that might be expected within a given period of time. The latter can also be presented as the probability of at least a certain number of people being displaced for a given return period. This metric is particularly relevant for urban planners and settlement programmes in areas prone to hazards, which have to consider the expected lifespan of the built environment and the associated risks for those who inhabit it beyond a few decades.

Modelled global average annual displacement associated with hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, riverine floods and tropical cyclones is almost 11 million. This number is significantly lower than IDMC’s reported figures because it is only based on housing destruction. Absolute numbers are concentrated in countries with a high density of settlements and populations in coastal areas, and on seismic fault lines and flood-prone river basins. In such areas, exposure tends to be the dominant driver of displacement risk (see figure 1.22).

Figure 1.22: Countries with largest modelled Average Annual Displacement (absolute value)

Source: IDMC, with UNISDR data
Nine of the ten countries with the highest displacement risk are in south and south-east Asia. Most of these countries regularly rank in the top ten in IDMC’s annual disaster-related displacement estimates, and some appear every year. This reflects the region’s large number of people exposed to sudden-onset hazards. Exposure, however, also drives displacement risk in upper middle-income countries such as China and high income countries such as the US. Large numbers of densely populated settlements in coastal areas, and on seismic fault lines and riverine basins across the US mean the country faces average annual displacement associated with the major hazards of more than 200,000 people.

Vulnerability also plays a significant role. Eight of the ten countries with the highest displacement risk are in the lower middle-income group. As in the US, the size and density of populations exposed to hazards in India, China and Bangladesh results in high displacement risk, but it is pushed higher still by the numbers of people living in substandard buildings and with less resources to cope, which makes them more vulnerable.

In comparison to the risk of economic loss from disasters, which in absolute terms is usually highest in high-income countries, absolute displacement risk associated with disasters is highest in low and lower middle income countries. The relative distribution of displacement risk – average annual displacement relative to population size – would be expected to be concentrated disproportionately in low and lower middle-income countries or small island states, but it is the case regardless of whether understood in absolute numbers or in relation to population size. While the large majority of countries with the highest displacement risk in absolute terms are in the low and lower middle income category, all top 10 countries in terms of displacement risk relative to population size are small island states, several of which are also low and lower middle income countries (see figure 1.23). This reflects the fact that vulnerability and limited capacity to reduce disaster risk tend to be the overriding factors in determining displacement risk. The two measures taken together reveal the extreme challenges these countries face.

Our risk model can also be used to estimate the frequency and magnitude of displacement events associated with disasters with specific return periods. Results expressed in exceedance curves show the probability of a certain number of displacements being exceeded for any given return period. For a return period of 10 years, for example, Indonesia faces the displacement of at least 100,000 people as a result of earthquakes alone. At least another 700,000 people can be expected to be displaced by floods (see figure 1.24).

**Figure 1.23: Countries with largest modelled Average Annual Displacement (relative to population size)**

Source: IDMC, with UNISDR data
The vast scale of disaster displacement risk becomes very visible in these curves, and it can be expected to grow as economic and demographic concentration continue to drive exposure, while at the same time environmental degradation and climate change, weak governance, limited capacity and persistent inequality and poverty increase vulnerability.

As such, the humanitarian resource gap that already exists can be expected to grow unless the causes and structural drivers of exposure and vulnerability are addressed globally and particularly in hazard-prone regions.
A six-year-old Somali refugee waits at the airstrip to board a plane to Mogadishu, Somalia. She is one of the tens of thousands of refugees who have left Kenya’s Dadaab camp in 2016 to return back to Somalia.

Photo: NRC/Fredrik Lerneryd, September 2016
It is often assumed that many refugees were at some point internally displaced at the beginning of their journey, even if only for a short period or in transit, and that IDPs are prime candidates to become refugees or migrants. Despite these assumptions, there is still insufficient data to determine how many of the people who flee or migrate across borders were IDPs before doing so. Nor is there sufficient understanding of the processes that lead from internal to external displacement and migration, and the specific vulnerabilities that might contribute to onward movement. This represents a major gap in current knowledge.

An evidence base that establishes how many IDPs cross borders as migrants, refugees or displaced people, and why they do so, would indeed be critical at this juncture. It would allow governments, policy-makers and responders on the ground to better meet displaced people’s immediate protection and assistance needs at their points of departure, transit and arrival. Understanding the degree to which cross-border movements reflect inadequate protection and assistance in countries of origin could be significant in shaping preparedness and response efforts throughout the displacement cycle, and in addressing the long-term political and development challenges brought about by unresolved internal displacement.

This section focuses primarily on displacement associated with conflict and violence, and considers three broad questions:

| What is the available evidence on the link between internal displacement and cross-border movement? |

| Are refugees and migrants who return to their countries of origin at risk of finding themselves living as an IDPs, whether for the first time or anew? |

“The difficult choice to leave their country comes only when all other options for safety have been exhausted. Without fully addressing their human rights, needs and internal protection, today’s internally displaced persons will be tomorrow’s refugees and trafficked or smuggled migrants.”

– Former Special Rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs

| Under what circumstances do IDPs cross a border rather than try to find safety in another location within their own country? |

The objective of this section is to examine existing knowledge gaps with a view to informing better responses in the future. Efforts to understand when, how and why IDPs cross borders should not be used to legitimise the closing of borders or the creation of policies to contain them in their own country. People have a fundamental right to freedom of movement, which includes being able to move within and leave their country. Those who face threats to their lives and safety because of conflict and persecution have the right to seek asylum in another country. It should also be made clear that internal displacement is a pressing issue in its own right, and that IDPs’ plight should be recognised and addressed whether it is linked to cross-border movements or not.
The total global number of IDPs has been roughly twice that of refugees in recent years, and the gap between estimates for the two groups has been growing over the last 20 years. Data on conflict-related displacement shows that many of the top refugee-producing countries are also home to the highest numbers of IDPs. Six of the ten countries that produced the most refugees in 2016 – Afghanistan, Colombia, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan and Syria – were also among the ten with the largest numbers of IDPs.

While the return of refugees to their country of origin is often regarded as a viable and politically preferred solution, returnees may in fact return to situations of questionable security and stability and risk becoming displaced again, this time internally. The return of refugees from Pakistan to Afghanistan and the announced returns from the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya to Somalia are cases in point. Similarly, escalating and violent conflicts such as that in South Sudan can mean that people become caught up in a revolving door of circular cross-border displacement that is difficult to monitor.

The phenomenon of IDPs moving onwards across borders is not systematically measured, and there is insufficient quantitative and qualitative data and analysis to inform effective policy and operational responses. Cross-border displacement by disasters is also not systematically recorded and while estimated to be lower in numbers, does occur and needs to be better understood.

Available evidence suggests that the push and pull factors for internal displacement from areas affected by conflict are similar to those reported by refugees. Overall, there is currently not enough research or data to understand the exact relationship between internal displacement, cross-border movement and return. A research and policy agenda is needed to:

a) capture more accurately the scale and proportion of IDPs who cross borders, and how these vary across different contexts and crises: this requires the alignment and interoperability of data collection systems, with joint collection exercises to monitor displacement trajectories, including across borders, over longer time periods;

b) understand the combination of factors that determine IDPs’ onward and cross-border flight: understanding how and when people make such decisions and the different influencing factors is a prerequisite for planning and preparedness;

c) better understand the circumstances in which people return to their countries of origin, and a measure of the risk this carries for future displacement: monitoring returnees’ trajectories and gathering data on the indicators for durable solutions over time are essential.
Just as there is insufficient data on IDPs’ progress toward durable solutions and the processes that lead to the end of displacement, there is also a lack of data and information when it comes to the scale, scope and patterns of IDPs’ flight across international borders and the factors that prompt or inhibit such onward movements. It is currently impossible to determine the global number or proportion of IDPs from areas or countries affected by conflict who eventually cross international borders. The available evidence, based on a small number of case studies, indicates that figures depend largely on the context. This, combined with the fact that we do not know how representative the studies are, makes it impossible to extrapolate to generate even regional estimates.

IDMC’s data on internal displacement associated with conflict does point to a correlation between IDP and refugee movements: many of the countries that produce the most refugees are also home to the highest numbers of IDPs. Six of the ten countries that produced the most refugees in 2015 – Afghanistan, Colombia, DRC, Sudan, South Sudan and Syria – were also among the ten with the largest numbers of IDPs (see figure 2.1).

A large part of Afghan and Syrian refugees, around 55 and 85 per cent respectively, interviewed in Greece in early 2016 said that they had not left directly their areas of origin, the implication being that they had formerly been IDPs, refugees in other countries or another type of migrant before arriving in Europe. Despite Syria’s relentless conflict, the number of IDPs dropped by more than a million from 2014 to 2015, partly the result of some crossing international borders to seek protection outside the country. Nearly 70 per cent of female asylum seekers from countries in Central America’s northern triangle (NTCA) were also internally displaced before making the decision to flee abroad.

In other countries and contexts, however, this ratio can differ significantly. For example, in a survey of migrants and refugees arriving in Europe via the western Balkans between December 2015 and May 2016, 90 per cent of the interviewees
Figure 2.1: Countries with high numbers of IDPs and producing significant refugee flows

![Map of countries showing high numbers of IDPs and producing significant refugee flows.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of people displaced in 2016</th>
<th>Number of people displaced in 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,553,000</td>
<td>2,666,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>1,854,000</td>
<td>779,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>2,230,000</td>
<td>541,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>629,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>6,326,000</td>
<td>4,873,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>7,246,000</td>
<td>341,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IDMC, with UNHCR data

Asking people the right questions is important, because not all displaced people have the same concept of their plight, or would even have considered themselves to have been internally displaced. Some may respond to survey questions in certain ways for other reasons – if, for example, they think that providing certain information may give them a better chance of securing assistance. Others may cross a border unwittingly, for example when borders are porous and poorly marked, and others still may cross knowingly but then deliberately withhold their personal information to protect themselves or to seek asylum in other countries where conditions are more favourable.

There are conceptual and methodological challenges in producing global statistics on the number of people internally displaced by conflict who eventually cross a border. The question of whether every refugee or asylum seeker should be considered an IDP from the time they flee their place of residence until they cross an international border is but one example. In addition, not all IDPs who cross international borders fit the legal definition of a refugee, are granted official status with UNHCR or seek asylum. While UNHCR also registers such people, here again there is little quantitative evidence to suggest how many may have been internally displaced first.

As IDPs and refugees, they are in a vulnerable situation. Many of the conflict-affected areas where they live are remote, resource-poor, and often harsh environments. They may lack access to adequate shelter, food, water, medical care, and education for their children. This is a major concern, particularly with the numbers involved: 17.3 million people worldwide were internally displaced by the end of 2016. Some IDPs, particularly those who have lived in camps for long periods, experience a lack of agency and self-determination.

This issue is especially important in countries with high numbers of IDPs. In Colombia, for example, where the conflict ended with the peace agreement between the FARC and the government, the number of IDPs decreased significantly. However, in other countries such as Syria and Afghanistan, the numbers remain high due to ongoing conflicts.

Moreover, there are challenges in identifying and counting IDPs. The lack of a clear definition and the difficulty in distinguishing between IDPs and refugees can lead to underestimations or overestimations of the numbers involved. This is particularly true in situations where there is a rapid increase or decrease in the number of displaced people, as seen in the case of Myanmar and the Rohingya crisis.

In summary, the challenge of accurately counting IDPs is complex and requires a multidisciplinary approach involving experts from various fields such as anthropology, sociology, and demographics. The need for better data collection and analysis is urgent to provide a more accurate picture of the global displacement crisis and to inform policy decisions on how to address the needs of these vulnerable populations.
It is widely accepted that the vast majority of displacement by disasters tends to take place internally, but comparisons with cross-border movements have not been quantified with any precision.

IDMC’s data does not yet capture global trends in terms of where people are displaced to, including to other countries, and where they eventually settle again. Nor does it capture all types of disaster that displace people. Those driven by slow-onset hazards such as drought and other human-made technological and environmental hazards are not included.

That said, increasing knowledge about cross-border disaster displacement shows that when people cross borders, most tend to remain in countries in the same geographical region.169

The assumption is supported by preliminary research into more than 100 disasters that occurred in 2016 using a range of displacement-related reporting terms to identify cross-border cases. Basic data was found to be scarce, incomplete and difficult to interpret because this type of displacement is not systematically monitored and reported on from the local to the global level. Evidence remains case-based and anecdotal as a result.170

The flood and landslides in the Ayeyarwaddy and Bago regions of Myanmar nearly destroyed Daw Tin Ngwe’s house. She fled to higher ground when the flood hit, surviving without proper shelter for weeks. Her crops were badly affected by the flood. Photo: NRC/Hla Yamin, Eian, October 2016
The small number of cross-border displacements that were identified appears to support the assumption that while numbers may in some cases be significant, they are relatively small compared with those for people displaced internally. Factors that drive people to cross borders include the extent of the damage wrought by a disaster, poor access to basic services and recovery assistance and the proximity and porosity of the nearest borders.

The severe food crisis or famine brought on by recurrent drought against a backdrop of poverty and insecurity in some parts of the Horn of Africa illustrate both the importance of understanding that cross-border displacement can be key to the survival and resilience of vulnerable populations, and the limited nature of the data and information available. This is discussed further in the spotlight on South Sudan.

Even when cross-border disaster displacement is monitored or quantified, common frameworks and methodologies for doing so are lacking. People who flee beyond their own countries for reasons other than conflict, generalised violence or persecution do not fit the legal definition of a refugee or asylum seeker. The fact that someone displaced across a border by a disaster does not exist as a legal category makes it less likely that they will be systematically recorded or identifiable in official data and statistics.

As with other types of displacement, nor are there any universally recognised criteria to determine whether a person’s flight across a border as a result of disaster should be characterised as forced or voluntary. For the purpose of providing protection and assistance, the Nansen Initiative suggests criteria that include the directness and seriousness of a disaster’s impact on the person in question, and their pre-existing vulnerabilities.

It also suggests benchmarks that consider solidarity with an affected country temporarily unable to assist and protect all of those in need, whether international humanitarian access is possible or not, and the extent of the people’s ties with family or diaspora communities in the destination country. An alternative approach might be to consider whether obliging people to return would be realistic, legal or morally responsible.

Before any such criteria can be applied and priority given to those in greatest need, the systematic collection and sharing of data must overcome conceptual, technical and political obstacles to monitoring and reporting. Addressing data and knowledge gaps is the first of three priorities identified in the Nansen Initiative’s protection agenda for people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change. This is reflected in the 2016 to 2019 work plan for the Platform on Disaster Displacement, a state-led multi-stakeholder initiative taking forward the agenda’s implementation.

In support of the protection agenda and work plan, and in order to better quantify and understand displacement associated with disasters, IDMC is gradually broadening the scope of its global monitoring to capture data and build knowledge about both internal and cross-border flows. Its work also supports the agenda’s comprehensive approach, which recognises the need “to reduce vulnerability and build resilience to disaster displacement risk, facilitate migration out of hazardous areas, conduct planned relocation and respond to the needs of internally displaced persons.”
Anecdotal evidence from countries where cross-border movements of IDPs fleeing conflict and persecution have been reported – across the Middle East, parts of Africa and Central America – indicate various factors that help to determine their decision to leave. These include their proximity or otherwise to a border and their financial resources. Others may be unable or unwilling to cross a border, despite the absence of security or basic services in their own country.

Syria was the most visible example in 2016 of the connection between human suffering inside a country’s borders and exodus abroad. During six years of civil war, more than half of the country’s pre-war population of 22 million have been displaced within or across its borders (see part 1, Syria spotlight). As reported by the 2017 humanitarian needs overview: “All areas of the country, north, south, east and west, are impacted by the continuing conflict, which has grown more violent over the last year, resulting in thousands of deaths and injuries, increased internal displacement, large-scale migration to Europe and beyond, lost livelihoods, mounting humanitarian needs and diminished humanitarian access to many areas.”

Faced with such levels of violence and chaos, displacement is a survival strategy for people with the means and opportunity to escape. Many IDPs have been compelled to move within the country multiple times in search of safety in recent years, because a single move has not protected them from constantly changing battle lines and the breakdown of basic services. One study reported families moving anything from two to 25 times. Increasingly desperate for a safe haven, many eventually made the now infamously perilous journey abroad as refugees and asylum seekers.

Figures for IDPs sheltering inside Syria and refugees leaving point to 2012, and the battle for Homs in particular, as a tipping point in the dynamics, scale and nature of displacement when the number of people began to rise exponentially. Figures for the next four years support a World Bank hypothesis that the number of IDPs and refugees tends to increase or decline in tandem, although increases in the number of refugees lag behind slightly as more people start to leave the country altogether for safety abroad (see figure 2.2).

The patterns observed in Syria of people being displaced internally various times only to flee the country altogether when they are unable to find safety can be seen elsewhere. In neighbouring Iraq, a growing percentage of displaced people have also been displaced more than once. Protection needs are most severe in governorates with high numbers of IDPs and areas where return movements have been observed.

As a last resort, some Iraqis embark on journeys facilitated by smugglers and traffickers in search of safety and a better life further afield. At least 52,000 people sought refuge in Europe in 2015. One group of 500 who did so described themselves as an exception, because they had been able to afford to make the journey while most other IDPs could not and were left behind in vulnerable conditions.

In the NTCA countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, persistent targeted violence including harassment and threats appears to be a primary tipping point that forces people displaced internally various times to eventually cross international borders. Women targeted by gang members said they had moved frequently within their countries before going abroad. Two-thirds of female refugees from NTCA said they had tried to find safety elsewhere in their own country before fleeing further afield.

Across some regions of Africa affected by conflict and violence, a different pattern has been
observed, a type of circular cross-border displacement. This occurs when people flee back and forth in response to the ebb and flow of hostilities, particularly when they take place close to borders or are part of regional conflicts in countries with a number of borders. In north-east Nigeria and the wider Lake Chad basin, displaced people cross the border repeatedly to escape attacks by Boko Haram and heavy-handed military operations against the group. One family had to flee within Nigeria and across the border to Cameroon and back seven times in 18 months.

In east and central Africa, porous borders and a lack of coordination between countries have facilitated circular cross-border displacement, with people moving back and forth between the Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, South Sudan and Sudan when they are unable to find safety (see South Sudan spotlight). The four countries were hosting 7.8 million people uprooted by conflict and violence as of the end of 2016 – almost one in five IDPs worldwide. As of September 2016, more than 660,000 refugees from the four countries were living in one of the others.

In countries already struggling to meet their IDPs’ needs, an influx of refugees risks triggering a vicious cycle of population movements within and across borders, as resources wane and tensions rise across the region. Violence in host countries in central and eastern Africa has also forced refugees back inside their own borders, putting them at risk of becoming internally displaced upon their return.

In the absence of systematic monitoring it is difficult to assess the extent to which such patterns are generalised, but there is a consensus that displacement is often a complex process involving more than one episode. The onward trajectory of an IDP, as with other people on the move, depends on a number of factors ranging from the location of friends and relatives to the accessibility of safe areas. For people displaced various times internally before fleeing abroad and those caught up in circular displacement, each new movement depletes their resources further, deepens their impoverishment, creates new vulnerabilities and makes existing ones worse.
After three years of sustained conflict, more than 1.8 million people were internally displaced in South Sudan as of December 2016, an increase of around 230,000 since November 2015. Many report being displaced various times as they flee the shifting violence in search of protection and assistance, and in response to seasonal flooding.

The southern Greater Equatoria region has become a significant new area of displacement in the country’s ever expanding and deepening crisis. It alone was hosting more than 414,000 IDPs as of the end of the year. More than one in four South Sudanese people are now displaced either inside or beyond the country’s borders, and some have been caught up in circular, cross-border displacement patterns.

South Sudan’s refugee population became the largest in Africa in 2016, with more than 1.5 million people estimated to be living in the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. Around 760,000 people sought asylum during the year, almost 50 per cent of them under the age of 11. It has tended to be women and children who flee, while young men stay behind in an attempt to safeguard their families’ livelihoods. In doing so, they risk being recruited by armed groups or being displaced to avoid that fate.

The spread of conflict into Greater Equatoria created new waves of displacement during 2016, with the majority of new refugees from South Sudan fleeing into Uganda. Around 16,000 people did so between 16 and 22 July alone, and Uganda is now the largest host of South Sudanese refugees. The movements echo the displacement of people from what was then southern Sudan into Uganda during the civil war of 1983 to 2005.

As with displacements into Ethiopia from Jonglei and Upper Nile states, they also continue the pattern seen in the past of IDPs moving to areas where they have ethnic links. Despite the high number of people from Greater Equatoria who became refugees in 2016, between 70 and 80 per cent of the displaced population fled into the bush. Those that did cross the border into Uganda had lived there before.

The triggers and push factors for people to flee both within and beyond the country’s borders vary, but insecurity is cited as the main reason for displacement. The activities of groups such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition, armed ranchers and bandits have heightened tensions and pose a significant threat to civilians.

There are repeated reports of rape and forced recruitment, including of children, and the wanton destruction of civilian property. The situation has fuelled speculation about ethnic cleansing among the country’s 64 ethnic groups, and the UN’s special adviser on the prevention of genocide, Adama Dieng, recently reiterated his concern about the potential for such an atrocity in South Sudan.

Food insecurity is also a major issue, and the situation continues to deteriorate with 4.9 million people, or about 42 per cent of population, estimated to be severely food insecure in early 2017. The figure is projected to increase to 5.5 million by July. These numbers are unprecedented, and farmers face significant challenges in planting to ensure a harvest later in 2017.

For others schooling has been a factor. Fifty-two per cent of people moving from Akobo in Jonglei state into Ethiopia in early 2017 identified a lack of education opportunities as their main reason for doing so. More than 30 per cent of South Sudan’s schools have come under armed attack at least once.

The increasing fragmentation of the conflict, shifting frontlines and ethnic segregation make the provision of assistance difficult, and there is a growing need to negotiate access with various groups at the local level. The same factors also make it more dangerous and unpredictable for people to access markets and livelihoods. Traffic on many of the country’s transport arteries, including river routes and the main road to Uganda, are prone to attacks by armed...
groups and bandits. Such attacks have disrupted commercial traffic and humanitarian access in the south of the country significantly.

OCHA estimates that 7.5 million people in South Sudan will require assistance in 2017, and the humanitarian community faces extraordinary challenges to reach them before the rainy season begins in May and populations become cut off. Armed groups tend to step up their activity before the rainy season, looking to make territorial gains before it sets in and vast swaths of the country become inaccessible by road for up to six months.

The flow of people out of South Sudan, including those already internally displaced, is likely to continue and may increase in 2017 unless at least some of these issues are addressed. At the same time, there are concerns that some of the most vulnerable groups such elderly and disabled people and those with no material assets are unable to make the journey across the border or access the assistance they need inside the country.

Others have returned from Uganda because the significant devaluation of South Sudan’s currency has reduced their assets and the value of their remittances to the point that their situation was no longer sustainable. Others still have gone back to reunite with family members or for security reasons.

South Sudan also hosts almost 300,000 refugees from neighbouring countries. Ninety per cent live in the northern states of Upper Nile and Unity, which continue to be two of the worst affected by conflict and displacement. The vast majority of the refugees, 92 per cent, are from Sudan, and the remainder from CAR, DRC and Ethiopia. In June 2016, assistance was provided to Ethiopian refugees in Jonglei state for the first time since 2009.

As the conflict escalates and spreads South Sudan continues plummeting to new depths of violence, displacement and food insecurity, and people are likely to resort to ever more desperate measures to seek safety and assistance. Increasing numbers are continuously on the move, and their high degree of mobility combined with the lack of humanitarian access make their situation difficult to monitor. It is clear, however, that the country’s borders have become a revolving door of displacement.
There is a wealth of research and first-hand testimony on the reasons people flee their countries. For those recognised as refugees, they are part of their legal definition and status. The circumstances under which people already displaced internally end up crossing a border are much less clear.

The little research available on why IDPs who have fled conflict and violence cross borders suggests their push and pull factors are largely similar to those refugees report. Beyond such a binary interpretation, however, it is important to remember that displacement and migration are multifaceted and interconnected processes. They sit on a continuum from movements that are predominantly forced or obliged, to those which are predominantly voluntary and depend on a host of social and geographical factors, steered by human agency and very personal decisions.

Whatever the label or status assigned to them, people’s displacement tends to share the same causes and they have the same need for safety, dignity and a secure home and livelihood. Differences in their options, resources and access to protection and assistance may lead them to seek refuge and solutions in different places over time, either within and beyond their own country.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that direct attacks or threats to personal safety are the main reason IDPs flee across borders. Nine out of ten Syrians arriving in Greece from Turkey in January 2016, the vast majority of whom had been internally displaced before embarking on their journey to Europe, said in interviews that they had left the country because there was no safe haven from the conflict and violence. Almost three quarters of Afghans, of whom 55 per cent had initially been IDPs, also said lack of safety was their main reason for leaving (see spotlight, p.61).

Once IDPs attain a degree of safety, access to livelihoods and basic services appear to be main factors in deciding whether to stay within their country or start a new life abroad. A survey of families preparing to leave Iraq, a third of whom were IDPs, found that their primary reasons for moving on related to their lack of income, high cost of living and inability to access basic services. Nearly half of one group of displaced Afghans interviewed in Greece said education was their main consideration in choosing their destination country. Their Syrian counterparts said education was their second most important consideration.

Pull factors, the things that attract people to a particular location, tend to mirror push factors. Safety is a key draw to a new country for many IDPs. Others are attracted to their new home by potential economic opportunities and access to services, including education for their children. Nearly half of one group of displaced Afghans interviewed in Greece said education was their main consideration in choosing their destination country. Their Syrian counterparts said education was their second most important consideration.

Social networks, including reuniting with family members, are also a significant pull factor. Almost half of the Syrians interviewed in Greece said family reunification was their main consideration in choosing their destination country. They put joining communities of other Syrians third. One group of Afghans said family reunification was their third most important consideration.

“Refugees and IDPs are fleeing the same risks by going to different destinations.”

– World Bank, 2016
Along with local integration and resettlement, return or voluntary repatriation is considered a durable solution to the refugee cycle. Evidence from across the world, however, points to many returnees becoming internally displaced once they return to their countries of origin. According to the World Bank, large-scale returns were mirrored by a considerable increase in the number of IDPs in 46 per cent of cases between 2000 and 2016. Of the 15 largest return events since the 1990s, around a third were followed by renewed fighting within a few years, either because the conflicts concerned had not been properly resolved before people returned or their arrival derailed a fragile recovery.

The two highest profile cases of large-scale returns in 2016 presented considerable risks and indeed evidence of internal displacement. Around 600,000 Afghans returned from Pakistan to a country that was already experiencing high levels of internal displacement. UNHCR estimates that around half of them were unable to return to their place of origin (see spotlight, p.61). Evidence from Somalia also suggests that people returning from Kenya face a real risk of a continued cycle of displacement, whether within or again beyond the country’s borders (see spotlight, p.64). These two cases highlight how shortsighted return programmes can be. Rather than bringing displacement and vulnerability to an end, they simply shift it from one place to another.

Research indicates that security and access to services, housing and livelihood opportunities are returnees’ primary considerations. Without them in place, returns are unlikely to be sustainable. Each of the conditions is, however, highly subjective. Reductions in threats or a peace agreement are unlikely to be sufficient indicators of security for all, and minorities and direct victims of violence are less likely to feel safe to return.

Even if the conditions were in place, studies show that return is not always the favoured solution, and that preferences vary depending on people’s age, gender, education, economic status, occupation and political affiliation, the duration of their exile and the remoteness of their place of origin. Only 32 per cent of Somali refugees living in Ethiopian and Kenyan camps in 2013 expressed willingness to return. For Afghan refugees in Pakistan in 2011 the figure was 16 per cent, and for Iraqi refugees in 2008 a mere 10 per cent. Young Afghan refugees were found to be far less interested in returning than the older generation, and were mainly concerned about access to education and employment.
Continuous armed conflict, insecurity, human rights violations and recurrent disasters mean that flight and mobility have become a familiar coping strategy for many Afghans for almost four decades. Large numbers of people have experienced some form of displacement in their lives.

There are currently around 1.6 million IDPs in the country and their number continues to grow, primarily as a result of conflict. There are also millions of registered and undocumented Afghan refugees living in neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, and a significant number who have sought international protection elsewhere, mainly in Europe and Australia. Overall, Afghanistan continues to be the second largest source country for refugees, behind Syria.241

Many Afghans have been displaced more than once, whether within their own country or by becoming refugees and then returning to find they are unable to resettle sustainably at home. The reasons for their plight are manifold, but those most commonly cited are the struggle to find a place to live, a lack of livelihood opportunities and pervasive insecurity.

Their inability to re-establish their lives in their places of origin has led many to undertake dangerous journeys further afield. More than half of those who entered Europe via Greece in the first three months of 2016 said they had initially been displaced internally, and another quarter were first or second generation refugees who had never lived in Afghanistan.242

More recently, however, Afghans’ migration options have narrowed considerably. The adoption of restrictive border control measures and deterrence policies in 2016 means that Europe
is no longer seen as a viable option for those seeking protection abroad. Asylum acceptance rates have also dropped sharply and an EU declaration signed in October 2016 has paved the way for at least 80,000 Afghans who have had their applications rejected to be returned.243

A major campaign has also been underway in Pakistan to push Afghan refugees back home. More than 600,000 registered and undocumented returnees arrived in eastern Afghanistan between July and December 2016. Asylum space in Pakistan and Iran has been shrinking for some time, and new refugee registration exercises have not been conducted in either country since 2007.244

These large-scale returns, whether forced, spontaneous or assisted, have prompted UN agencies and NGOs to warn that significant secondary displacement is likely, and the humanitarian country team for Afghanistan has said this will create considerable needs.245 Undocumented and involuntary returnees are at particular risk, because they tend not to be monitored or assisted, but rather fall off humanitarian agencies’ radar soon after returning. As such they are far less likely to reintegrate into their communities.246

Afghanistan’s national policy on IDPs is clear that returnees, including those coming back from outside the country, should be counted as internally displaced unless they are able to settle sustainably in their places of origin.247 So far, however, there has been no concerted effort to assess the impact of large scale returns on the number of IDPs in the country, nor has it been possible to record the true extent of secondary displacement more generally.

There has also been a sharp increase in the number of IDPs in Afghanistan in recent years. Every province currently either produces or is hosting IDPs, and the country is already struggling to respond to their protection and assistance needs.248 Addressing those of the huge influx of returning refugees in the east of the country and a predicted surge in 2017 in the number of refused asylum seekers coming back from Europe will be a major challenge.
For those who do return, it is often a process of trying to build new lives in a transformed environment rather than re-establishing their previous existence. Many do not go back to their places of origin, moving instead to urban centres in search of security, livelihoods and educational opportunities. This was true for almost two million South Sudanese from largely rural backgrounds who returned following signature of the peace agreement to end the second Sudanese civil war, doubling the population of Juba between 2005 and 2011.

From Kabul to Monrovia and Abidjan, returning refugees have joined large numbers of IDPs from rural areas in rapidly expanding urban areas. They face many of the same problems as the urban poor, but the trauma of being uprooted (often more than once), discrimination, lack of documentation, fractured support networks and poor employment prospects all combine to make them more vulnerable still. The scale of urban returns is not clear. It is difficult to differentiate between those who return to live as IDPs and those who migrate internally in search of better opportunities.

Despite the emphasis in the 1951 Refugee Convention on the principle of non-refoulement, which is recognised as the cornerstone of repatriation policy, large-scale returns are often politically driven and less than voluntary. In South Sudan, the impetus was to have as many returnees as possible back in time for the 2008 census that paved the way for the referendum on independence. In Cambodia, the motivation was people’s participation in the 1993 elections. In Europe, political pressure from European Union (EU) countries hosting Bosnian refugees played an important role in early returns in the 1990s.

In such circumstances, return is often prioritised over other courses of action that may be more conducive to durable solutions. It tends to be rushed and under-funded, which reduces the likelihood of returnees being able to rebuild their lives and contribute to society. Large-scale repatriation schemes are usually managed under assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes, but there are doubts about how voluntary such initiatives are when they are undertaken in close partnership with host governments that have an interest in reducing refugee numbers. Whether repatriation undertaken under the threat of forcible removal can be deemed voluntary is clearly questionable.

The US, EU and other countries have increasingly used deportation as a tool to manage migration. The practice mushroomed in the US between 2009 and 2015, when around 2.5 million people were expelled, mainly to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Research suggests that many of the deportees faced severe social stigma on their return and struggled to meet their basic needs in terms of shelter, healthcare, food and employment. Others were exposed to exploitation and extreme danger.

The EU signed a multilateral “readmission” agreement with the Afghan government in October 2016 that focussed on deportation. Afghans were the second-largest group of asylum seekers in Europe in 2015, with almost 200,000 applications. The EU is said to have threatened to strip Afghanistan of aid if it failed to cooperate. The use of aid as a lever is part of a growing migration management strategy, the most controversial example being the March 2016 deal the EU struck with Turkey to take asylum seekers and migrants (mostly of Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi origin) back from Greece and improve border controls in exchange for 6 billion Euros. Bilateral deals are also increasingly common in Europe. Finland deported just under 3,000 Iraqi asylum seekers in 2016.

If deportees are forced to return before they choose or are ready to do so, their reintegration is likely to be difficult, if not impossible. They face deepening economic losses, growing debt that they are unable to pay off, a lack of social networks and the stigma of failure and suspicion in the eyes of the communities they return to. Research suggests there is often a revolving door of migration amongst these groups, in which they tend to move on again whether within or beyond their borders.

Refugees and migrants who become internally displaced when they return home eke out a living in squatter camps or shanty towns, and may be compelled to move again in an effort to meet their basic needs or escape fresh rounds of fighting. They clearly cannot be considered to have found a lasting solution to their displacement, and much more research is needed to understand, document and respond to their plight.
With nearly 900,000 refugees from Somalia living mainly in Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen, the cross-border displacement of Somalis is a regional phenomenon. Another 1.1 million people are internally displaced within the country, more than 890,000 of them in south-central areas, and Somalia hosts significant numbers of refugees from other countries. All of these factors both contribute to, and are a result of its persistent insecurity.

There were 324,000 Somali refugees registered with UNHCR in Kenya at the start of 2017. Many arrived in search of protection as long ago as 1991. Others have been born and raised in the country. Life, however, is extremely precarious, particularly for those in the Dadaab refugee camps. The Kenyan government announced in May 2016 that it would make further attempts to close the camp complex and disband its Department of Refugee Affairs, which had previously been responsible for the registration, coordination and the revocation of prima facie refugee status for Somali refugees.

These moves have increased pressure on Somalis to return to their country via a voluntary repatriation scheme established under a tripartite agreement between UNHCR and the Kenyan and Somali governments in 2014. The scheme helped more than 33,000 to do so in 2016, compared with 6,000 in the preceding two years. The Somalia Protection, Return and Monitoring Network (PRMN) recorded a further 28,355 spontaneous returns outside the repatriation scheme. This brings the total number of recorded returns in 2016 to more than 67,000. A UNHCR survey in mid-2016, however, found that 74 per cent of Somali refugees in the Dadaab camps did...
not want to go back.\textsuperscript{254} A subsequent survey of Somali Dadaab residents conducted by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) put the figure even higher, at 86 per cent.\textsuperscript{255} Among the reasons for their reluctance to return in the UNHCR survey, 66 per cent cited fears of insecurity and ten per cent their inability to access shelter.\textsuperscript{256} Of those who did return under the voluntary repatriation scheme in 2016, the vast majority moved to three of 12 designated return areas – 50 per cent to Kismayu, 22 per cent to Baidoa and 19 per cent to Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{257}

For 25 per cent of the returnees, however, the three areas are not their place of origin or previous residence.\textsuperscript{258} They are also located in south-central Somalia, which hosts the vast majority of the country’s IDPs, and there are concerns that many returnees are simply adding to their number. High levels of acute malnutrition persist in most settlements of IDPs across Somalia.\textsuperscript{259}

The likelihood of returnees being forced to move again in search of basic assistance, services and sustainable livelihoods is high. Much of Somalia is suffering the effects of recurrent and severe drought on pastoral and agricultural livelihoods and food insecurity, and there are warnings of impending famine if the situation does not improve. Returnees are coming back to a country where around half of the population are in need of emergency food assistance, and all 12 designated return areas are affected by food insecurity.\textsuperscript{260}

Former refugees previously registered in Dadaab are already among an increasing number of Somalis crossing into Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{261} PMRN has also recorded incidents of refugees previously registered in Ethiopia returning to Somalia only to cross back into their former country of refuge.\textsuperscript{262} The same has also been reported of Somalis returning to Dadaab, a phenomenon which has continued into 2017: 500 refugees arrived in Kenya’s Dadaab camp in March, 100 of whom who had previously received UNHCR support to voluntarily return to Somalia.\textsuperscript{263}

Accounting for returned Somali refugees remains a challenge since some settle in IDP camps, where they may not be distinguished from people who had not crossed an international border. Returnees who remain in Somalia temporarily before moving on again to their prior country of refuge, or another country, are also not accounted for in the year-end headcount since they have not remained within the borders of their country.
A concerted effort is required to advance our understanding of the dynamics of internal and cross-border displacement, returns and onward movements and the relationships between them. A number of questions need to be answered if national governments, policymakers and humanitarian agencies are to meet the needs of all forcibly displaced people, regardless of whether they flee within or across borders. Such an evidence base is also a prerequisite for reducing the risk of new, onward and repeated displacement in future.

First, we need to get better at capturing how many IDPs cross borders, and where and when this happens. What proportion of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants were previously IDPs, and how does this vary across different contexts and crises? Do some types of crisis lead to more cross-border movement than others, and at what point do IDPs decide to flee beyond their own borders? More systematic data would allow us to analyse both historical and forward-looking trends, and to make comparisons between countries and regions. These in turn would be useful planning tools for governments and humanitarian and development agencies to better prepare for and respond to large flows of people such as those Europe has experienced over the last few years.

To achieve this, data collection will have to be more joined-up. At the very minimum, datasets on IDPs, migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers need to be aligned and interoperable, and based on complementary definitions, standards and methods that are systematically applied. Those gathering data should strive for joint and regular

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A pickup truck filled with Afghans leaving for neighbouring Iran makes its way through the rough Nimroz landscape. Civilians trying to escape the insecurity in Afghanistan are paying smugglers to take them all the way to Europe. Photo: NRC/ Jim Huylebroek, August 2016
collection and profiling exercises, and to monitor people’s situations and trajectories, including across borders, over longer periods of time. If donors are serious about improving responses, they should invest in bringing data collection agencies together and piloting such a system. This could be done for crises such as Iraq, South Sudan or the countries of Central America’s Northern Triangle, where mixed migration is a feature and urgent attention is required.

Second, we need more qualitative data and clarity on the combination of factors that determine IDPs’ onward and cross-border flight. Understanding how and when they make such decisions and which issues weigh heaviest on them is key. Is physical safety and security their prime concern, which would reflect a clear failure to protect them at home? How important are social and economic considerations, when livelihoods, employment and education options have all but disappeared and people have no choice but to seek opportunities elsewhere? To what extent are decisions taken by individuals or within families? Or are they driven more by external pressure, rumour or the appeal of destination countries based on their border and asylum policies or socioeconomic conditions? A clear understanding of the push and pull factors that drive people to flee is a prerequisite for national and international responders to prioritise resources and offer the right type of support when and where it is needed.

These questions can be answered with systemic analyses and system dynamics models of the environmental, socioeconomic, political and security variables that prompt, force or hinder cross-border movement. Such work has to be a collaborative effort between regional experts, humanitarian responders, economists and development specialists. Qualitative information is also required, including the anonymised interview transcripts and profiling data that different agencies currently collect at different points of transit and arrival but as yet only share inconsistently. These exercises need to be prioritised, expanded and adequately funded to increase the current coverage and allow for the collection of more data over longer periods of time. Countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan and Syria would be prime candidates for this type of analysis.

Third, we need a much better understanding of the circumstances in which people return to their countries of origin, and a measure of the risk this carries of future displacement. We need insights into the proportion of people who return voluntarily or under external pressure, those who return to their home areas or find themselves living in internal displacement camps, and those who eventually conclude they have no choice but to go back to their country of refuge or move on to a third country. Thorough contextual analyses of the exact conditions in designated return areas, and the ability of national and local authorities to respond adequately to the needs of those in them, will be key to measuring the sustainability of returns and the risk of onward movement or displacement.

To achieve this, agencies and authorities on the ground need to monitor returnees’ trajectories over time, not just at drop-off but much further into the settlement and reintegration process. We also need to reach a consensus on the notion that a returned refugee who faces conditions of insecurity and precariousness and is unable to integrate sustainably in their place of origin or elsewhere becomes internally displaced, and qualifies for protection and assistance as any other IDP would.

This means gathering data on the full range of indicators contained in the IASC framework for durable solutions systematically, comprehensively and longitudinally, and in ways that are collaborative and interoperable. It goes without saying that much greater political will and financial investment is required to reach this objective, and to ensure the needs of all those displaced are met until they have fully recovered from their plight and re-established stable and sustainable lives.
Khan Ahmad from Ghor province sits in his mud house in Police Rah informal settlement near Herat city. He fled his Taliban-controlled village three years ago for security reasons and now finds himself stranded without money or work. Photo: © UNHCR/Jim Huylebroek, June 2016
A number of global and regional policy processes have recognised the importance of collecting and analysing credible and transparent data on internal displacement. Such an evidence base is essential as a yardstick against which to measure progress toward implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Agenda for Humanity, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and other commitments on climate change, the Nansen Initiative’s protection agenda for people displaced across borders by disasters, the Valletta Summit action plan and the New Urban Agenda.

There is also a growing demand for evidence to inform the two-year negotiations on the global compacts for safe, orderly and regular migration, and on sharing responsibility for refugees in 2018.

In his report to the World Humanitarian Summit, the previous UN secretary-general stated that:

_Data and joint analysis must become the bedrock of our action. Data and analysis are the starting point for moving from a supply-driven approach to one informed by the greatest risks and the needs of the most vulnerable. National Governments and subregional, regional and international actors need to dedicate significant financial and human resource capacity towards collecting data and monitoring and analysing risk before, during and after crises, particularly in the most risk-prone countries and areas._

IDMC’s global data will serve as the baseline against which progress toward this target is measured and to direct attention where it is most needed. In addition to the secretary general, the UN General Assembly and member states have repeatedly underscored the need for global data, and for IDMC to provide it.

This section of the GRID highlights some of the main challenges IDMC faced this year, and what they mean for future data analysis and global policy monitoring, both in terms of the need to harmonise data collection systems and approaches, and for more investment by governments in monitoring displacement situations over time. A full description of IDMC’s accounting is included in the methodological annex.

The UN Statistical Commission (UNSC) has also recognised the need for better data on IDPs. At its 47th session in March 2016, it established an expert group and called for a technical report on official statistics for IDPs and refugees to be prepared in time for its 49th session in 2018. Importantly, it has also recognised the need for such data to be more interoperable and account for the times when IDPs cross international borders to seek protection.

Comprehensive stock and flow data is also needed to monitor progress towards the UN secretary-general’s ambitious target of “reducing new and protracted internal displacement by 2030” by at least 50 per cent in ways that “always guarantee voluntariness, dignity and safety” and “never compromise the right to flee.”

IDMC’s global data will serve as the baseline against which progress toward this target is measured and to direct attention where it is most needed. In addition to the secretary general, the UN General Assembly and member states have repeatedly underscored the need for global data, and for IDMC to provide it.
Reliable data and analysis are central to the achievement of global and regional development and humanitarian policy processes relevant to IDPs. Demands for systematic data collection, analysis and research have not however been matched by the political will and resources required to meet them. As a result, the current baseline and global picture of internal displacement are currently incomplete.

The time-series data needed to measure progress toward global targets is not collected through to the end of displacement. This means that we do not properly understand how different displacement situations and specific IDPs’ vulnerabilities evolve over time. Further gaps include limited geographical scope, exclusion of certain types of displacement, and disaggregation of data by age, sex, location, needs and vulnerabilities.

Without comparable data on different situations and how they have changed over time, there is little evidence to tell us what works. Yet this information is critical to remove the guesswork currently involved in humanitarian and development financing. New and innovative solutions need to be deployed to fill the data gaps and establish a more comprehensive picture of displacement. New “hybrid” approaches that combine event detection with the analysis of time-series data on evolving situations are essential.

Detecting incidents of new displacement needs to be scaled up significantly, employing semi-automated processes that monitor displacement associated with disasters, conflict, violence and development projects. For disasters, more time-series data on people once they have become displaced is key in order to infer both the total number of people displaced by an event and to track the number and needs of displaced people as they evolve over time. In addition, more investment is needed in probabilistic risk modelling for disaster displacement in order to identify and address the drivers of displacement risk. Furthermore, the assessment of displacement risk and the factors that contribute to it should be extended to other contexts.
Internal displacement data
AN INCOMPLETE PICTURE

Despite our best efforts, the GRID does not yet paint a comprehensive picture of internal displacement worldwide (see figure 3.1). This means that our global baseline is still a significant underestimate. Key gaps include the lack of data on all relevant phenomena, our limited ability both to obtain and analyse all of the information that does exist and to systematically identify new incidents of displacement. Without this information, we do not have an accurate measure of how many people have become internally displaced, the reasons they have fled and how long they remain displaced for.

Limits in geographical coverage

We added Algeria, Burkina Faso and Mozambique to our dataset on displacement associated with conflict in 2016, bringing the total number of countries and territories monitored to 56. Our monitoring of displacement associated with disasters covered 118 countries and territories in 2016 and 176 since 2008.

ACCOUNTING TERMS AND CONCEPTS

The language we use to describe how we account for internal displacement can seem abstract and far removed from people at the heart of this report. Behind all of our figures are people whose lives have been threatened and disrupted, in many cases severely, by traumatic events. Most displaced people flee their homes and places of residence as a last resort and only in response to life-threatening situations.

Most displacement figures and statistics refer to “stocks” or “flows”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Commonly used terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stock</strong></td>
<td>The number of people, in this case IDPs, in a given situation and/or location at a particular moment in time</td>
<td>IDPs, refugees, migrants, returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flows</strong></td>
<td>Processes, such as the rate at which people are newly displaced or return over a given period of time</td>
<td>New displacements, returns, resettlements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a report to UNSC noted: “The production of statistics on [displaced people] requires a clear distinction between stocks and flows.” Doing so remains a challenge though, even among national statistics offices and those collecting displacement data. The term “returnees”, for example, can refer to IDPs who are no longer displaced, having returned to their homes or places of origin. It is also used, however, to describe refugees who have returned to their country of origin but who may still be displaced and accounted for as such (see below for more detail).
Not all causes of internal displacement are included in the global baseline

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement recognise that people may become displaced for a number of reasons including, but not limited to “armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters.”270 Current monitoring and data collection do not systematically cover all of these causes of displacement, let alone the other ways people become internally displaced.

The global figures in this report include only people displaced by conflict and disasters caused by sudden-onset natural hazards. We are working toward global figures for internal displacement caused by development and droughts, but these people remain largely unaccounted for.

We removed figures for Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe from our dataset on displacement associated with conflict in 2016, because their primary cause of displacement was forced eviction. This is not to say that the evictions occurred without violence or the threat of it, but because the displacement occurred outside an internationally recognised armed conflict or generalised violence, we stopped counting those affected as IDPs. The scale of this blind spot is significant. In Zimbabwe alone around 266,000 people are currently internally displaced as a result of forced evictions.271 They live in near-emergency conditions, at risk of food insecurity and without basic sanitation.272

We have detailed five ways that people became displaced as a result of the 2013 to 2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa and the measures put in place to contain the spread of the disease.273 Given the difficulty of monitoring these phenomena, however, these IDPs are not included in our global baseline.

Incomplete data on the start, dynamics and duration of displacement

From a policy perspective, there are at least two reasons it is essential to have information about specific incidents of new displacement, particularly when it comes to the goal of reducing internal displacement by 50 per cent by 2030. We
need to be able to identify the start of displacement if we are to gauge its duration, which is vital for measuring and addressing protracted situations. If the causes of displacement are to be addressed, it is also crucial to know when, where, how and why new, repeated and secondary displacements occur.

Sometimes we receive information about the number of displacements that have occurred during the course of a particular year. This was the case for Algeria, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Iraq, Syria and Turkey in 2016. In other cases, such as Mozambique, we inferred the new displacements from the simple fact that there were 15,000 IDPs accounted for in December 2016 against none in 2015.

Without flow data about specific individuals or cases, we use the term “new displacements” to cover the following:

- People being displaced for the first time from their home or place of habitual residence
- People previously displaced who had returned or settled elsewhere being displaced again
- IDPs being displaced from their place of temporary shelter or residence

Given the way data is collected and reported, “new displacements” often mask secondary, tertiary and repeated displacement. In the absence of specific data on each inflow and outflow, we are forced to infer these processes from the contextual analysis of changes in stock data using a consistently applied set of decision rules. In order to avoid miscounting IDPs’ voluntary movements as incidents of displacement we take a conservative line, inferring new displacements associated with conflict when the total number of IDPs in a country increases from one point in time to another, and when the increase is not the result of a change in measurement or methodology (see figure 3.2).

This is an imperfect approach which, depending on the specifics of a given situation, involves varying degrees of uncertainty. For example, based on additional contextual information we have obtained we have reason to believe our estimate of new displacements in CAR to be an underestimate. In the absence of credible quantitative data on the number of new displacements, however, we opt to err on the side of caution and indicate that there were “at least” 46,000 new displacements in 2016 instead of the 60,000 to 80,000 displacements that have been reported to us anecdotally.

**Difficulties detecting repeated, secondary and onward movements**

We also confront numerous gaps when it comes to covering all flows in and out of displacement. In only a few situations do we receive direct observational data and information about new, secondary or repeated displacement, returns and other processes. Sometimes we receive information about children born to IDPs, which is not the same as new displacement, and deaths in displacement.

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**Figure 3.2: Internal displacement figures from the Central African Republic**

Source: Commission Mouvements de Population
One of the main limitations of working with flow data is that after an initial report of new displacement, there is seldom time-series data that follows up on the evolution of the IDPs’ situation over time. Discussed in greater detail in the section below, this lack of follow-up is one of the greatest sources of uncertainty over our year-end figure of 40.3 million people displaced by conflict and violence.

Accounting for secondary and repeated displacement is a particular challenge, as these flows are often recorded simply as “arrivals”. Without knowing whether they constitute new, secondary or repeated displacements, we report them as new. The failure to properly capture the dynamics of certain situations makes it hard for those responding, because people who have been displaced for the third or fourth time are likely to face different and greater needs and risks than those who have only been displaced once.

**ACCOUNTING FOR THE END OF DISPLACEMENT**

Quantifying progress toward durable solutions remains a challenge for several reasons. To start with, there is very little data on the different settlement options being pursued, and the IASC framework for durable solutions is an analytical but not an accounting tool. There is currently no agreed method, for example, for measuring progress toward durable local integrations in Bogotá, Goma or Kiev consistently. The information required to make consistent assessments is not available either, because data on the necessary indicators is no longer collected or it was never collected in the first place.

A number of experts and institutions, including the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) are currently working on ways to put the IASC framework into practice, in order to establish a globally consistent way of accounting for the end of displacement. Without such recognised standards and working with the scant information available about IDPs’ progress toward achieving durable solutions, we apply a set of decision rules, documented in the methodological annex, to generate consistent estimates across all countries and contexts.

The approach is far from ideal, however, because it may overstate the number of people who have returned, integrated locally or settled elsewhere. Our figures for the three settlement options should not be considered confirmation that the people in question have achieved a durable solution, but rather a statement of what our sources have reported.

**Limited disaggregated data on IDPs’ profile and location**

This year, we obtained data on displacement associated with conflict disaggregated by sex for 12 out of 56 countries or territories (21 per cent), and disaggregated by age for 11 countries or territories (20 per cent). In other countries some of the data we received was disaggregated in this way, but these datasets either did not cover the entire country or the whole year.

Data disaggregated by IDPs’ location and shelter type is also available in only a fraction of the countries we monitor. Displacement data classified as either urban or rural was available in two countries (3.6 per cent), and information reflecting IDPs’ shelter type was available in 15 countries (26 per cent).

Without information about who is displaced, where they are located and what kind of shelter they have found, our picture of internal displacement remains one-dimensional. Simply knowing the number of IDPs is not enough for effective programming and policymaking. Those responsible for providing services and protection need to know who their beneficiaries are to ensure that assistance is well targeted and addresses their needs.
Understanding the limitations

SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY

The process of obtaining data on internal displacement remains a major challenge despite various UN General Assembly resolutions encouraging governments to collect and share their data with IDMC. We contact member states every year to remind them that they have requested this of themselves and to offer methodological guidance.

In 2016, as in previous years, some governments – such as Azerbaijan, El Salvador, Georgia and Russia – responded directly by providing some of the data requested (see table 3.1). Others did not respond directly but do collect and publish some data on a regular basis. These include China and the Philippines for disaster and Nigeria and Ukraine for conflict.

Many neither responded directly nor publish data themselves, but work with or allow IOM, OCHA, UNHCR or consortia to do so. These situations often coincide with humanitarian crises or complex emergencies in which international actors are involved. Government involvement ranges from active collaboration, such as Nigeria, to passive involvement, such as Syria.

Table 3.1 also reveals that for some countries our only sources of credible data are civil society organisations, academia or the media. Not surprisingly, our displacement estimates for some of the countries in this group include those where the data is most out of date and for which we have low confidence. We encourage more countries to either collect and publish this data or, when capacities and resources are a limiting factor, to support the work of others to do so.

One of the most basic but important challenges we face is establishing how to interpret the data from our many sources and map it onto our data model (see figure 3.3). As noted above, the vast majority of internal displacement data is on stocks. Depending on the source, the location may be a specific site such as a camp, a group of sites, an administrative area such as a neighbourhood, city, province or governorate, or an entire country.

Table 3.1 Internal displacement data sharing scorecard

| Government provided data directly to IDMC | Azerbaijan, Congo, El Salvador, Russia, Sri Lanka |
| Government published data but did not send it directly to IDMC | Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Georgia, Macedonia, Niger, Peru, Ukraine |
| Government made data available through a partner (e.g. consortium or UN agencies, NGOs) | Afghanistan, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Honduras, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Yemen |
| No evidence of systematic collection or sharing of displacement data by the government | Abyei Area, Algeria, Armenia, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Senegal, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda |
IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) has become an increasingly important source of data for us. In some countries, such as Iraq, we have collaborated with IOM in designing the DTM questionnaire and methodology. Even when this does not happen, it is the tool used to collect much of the data we analyse, even when we obtain it from another source (see figure 3.4). For example, in the DRC we obtain conflict-related displacement data from the Commission Mouvements de Population (CMP), who in turn relies on the DTM for part of its data collection. The same is true for Burundi, CAR, Mali, Somalia, Syria, Yemen and several other countries.

In the context of disasters, we rely less on IOM’s DTM and work more closely with national authorities who collect data and report on events (see figure 3.5). Some notable exceptions include Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013 and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, for each of which IOM collected time-series data over a period of several years. The DTM has played a contributing role even when we receive data from government authorities. For example, the data-collection system used by the Philippines’ Department of Social Welfare and Development was based on the DTM and set up with support from IOM.

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**Figure 3.4: New displacements by conflict by data source**

**Source:** IDMC, with IOM data

**Figure 3.5: New displacements by disasters by data source**

**Source:** IDMC, with IOM data
Another regular challenge we face concerns the way our sources characterise “returnees”. Sometimes the term refers to IDPs who are said to have returned to their place of origin or habitual residence, but it is also used to refer to people who have returned to their country of origin having fled across a border. In both cases, the people concerned may or not have returned voluntarily, and they are still defined – if not necessarily counted – as displaced until they are able to achieve a durable solution. They may also be displaced again if they find themselves facing renewed violence or another hazard (see part 2).

To make things even more confusing, sometimes data on returnees is needed to measure the number of displacements, rather than the number of people displaced at a particular moment in time. In El Salvador and Iraq, for example, our sources surveyed several hundred thousand people who said they had been displaced by conflict and violence during 2016, but many of whom were no longer displaced at the time they were interviewed. While these people are not included in our year-end figures, we nevertheless need to account for these incidents of displacement.

Why more investment is needed in monitoring over time

One of the key gaps in our data and knowledge concerns what happens to people once they have become displaced. This information is absolutely vital for measuring the extent to which the global target of reducing internal displacement by 50 per cent by 2030 is being achieved. Most importantly, without longitudinal data it is impossible to know how many IDPs there are at a given moment in time. This explains why we have struggled to produce stock figures for displacement associated with disasters.

More importantly, halving the number of IDPs is not simply about bringing the numbers down. It’s about ensuring that the people counted achieve durable solutions. Without multiple comparable data sets on different situations and how they have evolved over time, there is relatively little empirical evidence that indicates what works and what doesn’t. Having this information would remove some of the guesswork involved in humanitarian and development financing. It is needed to monitor and evaluate programmes intended to benefit IDPs, to hold those responsible to account and to ensure that limited funding is allocated effectively.

Every time we compile our annual figures for displacement associated with conflict, we find ourselves asking the same questions. Should we use data we believe to be out of date? And if so, how? As we attempted to produce a global stock figure for people displaced by disasters for the first time this year, we confronted the same problem in a different form. What do we do when data stops being collected before the number “goes back to zero”? Do we keep counting these IDPs? And if so, for how long before we feel that the data no longer accurately reflects the situation on the ground?

Outdated information on certain conflict caseloads

Last year, we introduced the concept of “decaying” data and presented our estimates for displacement associated with conflict based on the age of the source data. We have done so again this year. Around 93 per cent of the people displaced by conflict as of 31 December 2016 are accounted for by data that was last updated during the year (see figure 3.6). That said, a small number of our estimates are based on old data sources, some of them more than a decade old.
Much of the data we rely on is collected by UN agencies such as OCHA, UNHCR and IOM and their NGO partners. In some cases, it is collected by an institution or consortium mandated with that single primary function, such as DRC’s Commission on Population Movements, the Task Force on Population Movement in Yemen and IOM’s numerous DTM operations.

Much of the time, however, data on IDPs is collected by institutions working under broader mandates, such as the UN’s humanitarian profiles, humanitarian needs overviews and humanitarian response plans. In these cases, the data is updated only a few times a year, and often lapses once the humanitarian phase of a crisis has ended, even if the displacement has not.

As noted in part 1, our source of data on internal displacement associated with conflict in Colombia comes from the government’s registry of victims (Registro Único de Víctimas, RUV). The purpose of the RUV is to account for all victims of the conflict. This involves identifying people who are or were internally displaced, but it does not necessitate tracking them over time. Once someone has been registered they remain so, meaning there is little or no follow-up information with which to determine whether or not they are still displaced.

Gathering time-series data systematically can be costly and sometimes a lack of funding means collection falls off before a crisis is resolved. When various crises compete for attention and resources, some inevitably lose out and become neglected, which translates into less funding and political will to stay on top of them. This can occur even when the number of IDPs is significant, as has been the case with Burundi, where more than 141,000 people were displaced at the end of 2016.227 For most of the year, IOM’s DTM covered only three of 18 provinces, excluding Bujumbura Mairie, one of the locations most affected by internal displacement in the country. In September, IOM’s DTM coverage expanded to seven provinces and in December to 11 (although still excluding Bujumbura).

At the end of the year OCHA published its annual Humanitarian Needs Overview for Burundi which also included IDP estimates for Burundi. OCHA’s figures differed from IOM’s in that they covered all provinces in the country, were collected at different intervals and were based on a different estimation methodology that placed more emphasis on expert opinion. In the few cases where both institutions published displacement figures for the same region, these differences resulted widely disparate estimates, generating even more confusion and casting some doubts on the accuracy and reliability of both datasets. For example, for the month of July 2016 IOM estimated that there were 2,444 IDPs in Rumonge province compared to 13,095 reported by OCHA.

Longitudinal data collection also ends, or is interrupted, based on government policies. This can involve who is counted as an IDP or where data collection is undertaken or permitted. These are common challenges when a government has adopted a policy that specifically aims to reduce the number of IDPs, as in Kenya, or when it wants to shift attention away from a particular crisis.

As in last year’s report, we have included these “decaying” figures, which were last updated prior to 2015 (see figure 3.6). This year, these figures account for only 6.5 per cent of the global total. We publish information about the age of the data for two reasons. It allows readers to draw their own conclusions about the figures, and by depicting them in this way we hope to encourage anyone with more recent data to come forward, or to help follow up on the situations in question if no more recent data is available.

Next year, we plan to remove the following figures from our global total unless we receive updated information (see table 3.2).

For a more comprehensive and transparent assessment of our confidence in the data we have provided, please see the methodological annex at the end of this report, where the age of the data, its geographical reach and other factors are further discussed and evaluated.
Disasters: difficulties understanding displacement patterns over time

We provide an annual global stock figure for people displaced by conflict and violence based on the best data available as of the end of the year, but as yet we have been unable to do so for people displaced by disasters.

In 2016, we began working to address this. The lack of information available on displacement associated with specific events over time, time-series data, is a serious limitation to this exercise. In order to present our first estimate of the number of people living in displacement following disasters as of 31 December 2016, we collected as much time-series data as possible for disasters that caused the 50 largest displacements in 2016 and the ten largest each year from 2008 to 2015.

This sample consists mainly of hydro-meteorological disasters such as floods and storms. These disasters make up 86 per cent of the sample and tend to predominate among the largest new displacements each year, but they may not cause long-lasting displacement compared to earthquakes. The period of time for which data was collected following each disaster varied considerably (see figure 3.7).
For more than half of the sample, the “last” data point came within a month of the disaster striking, and for several it was more a matter of days. Forty events, less than a third of the total, yielded data recorded three or more months later. Only for around 18 per cent was displacement still reported on after a year. Given that many of these displacement events would have been accompanied by the widespread damage or destruction of homes, livelihoods and basic infrastructure and services, we would expect more of them to have involved displacement continuing for over three months.

Underscoring this point, when we examine time-series data for individual disasters we see that data collection almost always ends before the number of people displaced returns to zero (see Philippines box below). Nor does available data account for multiple displacements of the same people within the same year, if they return only to face ongoing risks, or are confronted with similar or new risks that cause their secondary or onward displacement from their place of refuge.

The lack of monitoring over time and the limited availability of longitudinal data has significant consequences in estimating the total number of people displaced at a given point in time. Compared with data collected several months after a disaster, that collected immediately after it strikes tends to relate more closely to the peak number of people displaced, particularly when this data relates to the number of people evacuated. This obscures the fact that a significant number of people may have been displaced for days or weeks rather than months or years.

This is the case when voluntary returns occur and when the homes of evacuated people are not destroyed, rendered uninhabitable or remain inaccessible. If we were to include all events from our sample for which only peak displacement data is available, it would result in a figure of around 89 million people (see figure 3.8). That is an overestimate because it does not account for everyone who returned home or established a new home elsewhere after data collection stopped.
If we apply more stringent criteria and only include events for which there was data for at least three months following the onset of the disaster, we would arrive at a figure of around 17 million. This of course excludes any displacements that occurred in the last three months of 2016, but given that it is also based on data that is out of date in some cases, it may also be an overestimate – albeit a less significant one.

At the same time, the partial nature of the data available for most events means that some displaced people, particularly those in protracted or chronic situations, are currently off our radar screen. The data is simply too scant to allow us to gauge the overall situation with any accuracy. Having said that, updated data indicates that at least 3.6 million people remain displaced due to three large disasters in recent years – the earthquakes in Haiti (2010) and Nepal (2015), and Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013).

Given the considerable difference between an estimate of 89 million and 17 million, and the fact that our analysis is based on only 130 out of more than 2,000 events in our dataset, we have decided not to endorse either figure or anything in between. Instead, we have described the difficulty we faced as a clear call for more follow-up and data collection on people displaced by disasters.

As our previous reporting has shown and as our displacement risk modelling suggests, many people are exposed and vulnerable to frequently occurring, low-intensity hazards (see part 1). This increases the risk of repeated displacement and undermines long-term development gains for these communities.

Despite our lack of confidence in stock figures for displacement associated with disasters, our analysis of the time-series data available serves several purposes. It provides a useful stocktake of how much data has been captured, for how long and by whom. This has led to the identification of some good practices (see Philippines box below).

It also sheds light on patterns of displacement for different hazards, which helps explain how we have estimated the total number of new displacements for those events. Flooding in the Indian state of Bihar in July and August 2016, for example, generated two distinct waves of new displacements which resulted in 1,670,000 displacements.

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A group of children play near the edge of the IDP camp on a dirt road in Khmer, Amran, Yemen. Photo © UNHCR/Rawan Shaif, February 2016
PHILIPPINES: A MODEL FOR CAPTURING AND REPORTING TIME-SERIES DATA

Thanks to its strong law and policy on disaster risk reduction and management, and its frequent and extensive experience in responding to disasters, the Philippines does a better job than many wealthier countries of collecting and sharing data on disasters and the displacement they cause.

Its National Disaster Risk Reduction and Risk Management Council (NDRRMC) and Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) publish situation reports for several days after each disaster, and twice-daily reports for the first nine or ten days after large ones. The reports include the number of people displaced to official evacuation centres and elsewhere at a given moment in time, and a running tally of the number of people a disaster has displaced over time (see figures 3.9 and 3.10). Our figures for typhoon Nock-Ten, for example, are based on 24 situation reports published over the first few weeks of the disaster.

The daily stock figures reveal a spike in displacement on 30 December, eight days after the typhoon struck, but the cumulative figure continues to rise for several more days. This is because the data collection process identified additional returnees, people who had been displaced but had returned by the time they were counted. The challenge when dealing with these two sets of time-series data lies in bringing them together in a logical and methodologically sound way. The cumulative figure, for example, tells us how many people were displaced, but it doesn’t tell us when, where or for how long.

Of all the time-series data we obtained, in only five of the more than 130 displacements did collection continue until the number of displaced people reached zero. Two were in the Philippines, and the others were in Indonesia, Tonga and India. This represents a major blind spot, with significant implications for people who remain displaced but not counted, and those responsible for protecting them. The fact that data collection ended while people were still displaced in more than 130 displacements further underscores the need for much greater investment in monitoring displacement over time in all countries.
Given the importance of accurate information on new displacements and the evolution of situations over time, we have begun to incorporate new approaches to our monitoring (see table 3.3). Taken together, our new “hybrid” approach combines event detection and data collection with the analysis of time-series data when it is available.

For displacement associated with conflict, we have begun to identify and capture data about incidents of new displacement manually. In order to address the challenge of event detection on a global scale, we are also developing a new semi-automated process to identify potential displacements for human verification (see p. 84).

For disasters, we already capture several hundred incidents of new displacement a year – good but still not global. We tend to miss displacements associated with localised disasters that affect small numbers of people. The bigger gap, however, is in the systematic collection of time-series data on people once they have become displaced. We have begun working with partners to collect and analyse more of this data so we can infer both the total number of people displaced by an event, and track the number and needs of displaced people as they evolve over time.

One such method involves analysing satellite imagery to detect changes in human habitation in response to development projects such as dams, natural hazards and conflict. Based on the number of buildings destroyed or the extent of flooded land and population and settlement data, we will infer how many people may have been displaced, an approach already used by our sources to triangulate data obtained from the field.

Another approach will transform our probabilistic risk model for displacement associated with disasters (described in part 1) into a real-time tool to support monitoring. When a hazard has been detected or is predicted to occur, we will simulate the amount of destruction and displacement expected to result.

Using satellite imagery analysis and our displacement risk model as monitoring tools will help us extend the geographical coverage of our monitoring and address some of the factors responsible for the incomplete picture of displacement, notably language, reporting and selection biases.

Table 3.3: Challenges and solutions for our “hybrid” monitoring approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Current situation</th>
<th>Way forward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Time-series data with a focus on end-of-year updates of stocks, but limited event detection for new displacement</td>
<td>Systematic event detection to inform the collection of time-series data and more data points over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disasters</td>
<td>Event detection with a focus on the occurrence of new displacement, but limited time-series data</td>
<td>More comprehensive event detection and systematic collection of data about how displacements evolve over time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In January 2017, IDMC and the UN launched the Internal Displacement Event Tagging, Extraction and Clustering Tool (#IDETECT) challenge on the UN’s data science crowdsourcing platform, Unite Ideas. It has brought together teams representing dozens of data scientists from around the world to develop a new tool that we will use to monitor displacement associated with disasters, conflict, violence and development projects.

#IDETECT will expand and diversify the sources we use for monitoring significantly, helping to address – though not eliminate – some of the factors that impede our painting a comprehensive global picture. The tool will cast a wide net so we can obtain information about, analyse and shed light on far more displacement situations than we currently do (see figure 3.1). That said, #IDETECT’s scope will still be limited to events reported in the media or by partners in the field. To overcome this reporting bias, we have also begun exploring further approaches to detect displacement using other types of data and means of analysis.

The tool will make our monitoring more efficient and comprehensive, and it will also provide the humanitarian community with an easy way to extract and analyse facts from any type of documents, be they news, field reports, social media or other sources.

**HOW IT WORKS: FILTERING AND TAGGING**

The first step is to mine huge datasets of news, such as the GDELT Project, the European Media Monitor and social media platforms, and extract records that relate to displacement. The next is to tag the events as being related to conflict, violence, disasters or other cause or trigger.

**NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING**

The tool will use natural language processing (NLP) to extract certain facts from the source material including, but not limited to:

- The publication date of the document
- The place where the displacement reportedly occurred
- The number of people displaced

**DATA VISUALISATION, HUMAN VALIDATION AND MACHINE LEARNING**

It will then visualise the data for us and our partners to review. The results of this human validation process will inform the NLP so that it performs more accurately in the future, a process known as supervised machine learning (see figure 3.11).
The UN says at least 2.5 million people have been displaced since the Darfur conflict erupted in 2003. An educational programme urged grandmothers not to swaddle their children, which caused instances of hip displacement.
IDMC was established almost 20 years ago to provide the international community with a unique source of information on the numbers, needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs worldwide. IDMC was set up to document, collate and centralise data on internal displacement, to analyse its many drivers, patterns and impacts, and to shape and inform government responses to the phenomenon. By synthesising the latest evidence and research on what has become a truly global crisis, our annual GRID report reveals the growing scale and complexity of internal displacement, and the many shortfalls in national and international efforts to address it.

Some reflection is useful before we look ahead. We can't help but notice recurring patterns and themes in our annual findings, the most glaring of which is the relentless rise in the number of people whose lives are uprooted by internal displacement. Our calls for more data, for comprehensive solutions that bridge the humanitarian to development gap, and for more political investment in addressing the causes of displacement have gone unheeded, leading us to the following three conclusions.

There is a gulf between aspiration and reality. The international community has said it wants to halve the number of IDPs by 2030, but we expect the amount of displacement to continue increasing.

This is because the causes of displacement risk have not been addressed. Donor spending has increased, but not enough international assistance is directed toward the factors that give rise to crises in the first place. This year more money was spent on resettling refugees in donor countries than in the places where the crises that forced them to flee originated and continue to fester. As our figures for DRC reveal, neglected crises do not go away. They erupt in cycles, sending shockwaves through already fragile systems and institutions, and adding to the misery of long-suffering and increasingly vulnerable people.

Until the structural drivers of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment are addressed, conflict and human rights violations will continue to cause displacement and impede solutions. At the same time, more and more people are expected to move into areas prone to natural hazards, particularly urban centres on floodplains and along coasts exposed to cyclones and storm surges. The displacement and impoverishment disasters cause are not inevitable byproducts of rapid urbanisation and economic development, but they will continue to happen unless more is done to address people’s vulnerability and exposure, and as long as those displaced are regarded as little more than collateral damage in these processes.

The extent of international attention, resources and political will does not match the current scale of displacement and human suffering.

Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng hit the nail on the head as long ago as 1998: “What happens in one country reverberates regionally and even internationally. Conflicts allowed to fester and go unchecked can produce mass migration and leave deep political and economic scars which ultimately affect the economic well-being and political security of neighbouring states and of the international order as a whole... A world in which the privileged among nations ignore the plight of the unfortunate can be neither prosperous nor safe for anyone.”

The sad truth is that in the 20 years since they made their comments, there have been few meaningful signs of the political will, solidarity...
and investment needed to address internal displacement. States continue to renege on their commitments to document, and in some cases even recognise, the phenomenon. We struggle with data gaps largely because of authorities’ failure to track IDPs’ trajectories and vulnerabilities over time, or to allow others the access they need to do so.

There are roughly twice as many people living in internal displacement as a result of conflict in the world as there are refugees, yet the issue was sidelined at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in September last year, considered only in terms of its potential for spilling across borders. The implicit recognition that this happens should be a point of departure, but it remains to be seen whether the international community comes to the all too obvious conclusion that refugee and migrant flows can be stemmed by addressing the causes they share with internal displacement.

We highlight the need for more information on IDPs’ cross-border flight in this report in an effort to draw the world’s attention to the fact that the underlying causes of displacement within and across borders are broadly the same. We aim to help governments and policymakers make the necessary connections between trajectories that are intricately interwoven and not only share similar drivers and patterns, but have similarly devastating impacts on people’s lives.

**Evidence alone is not enough.**

The GRID reflects our best effort to paint a comprehensive picture of internal displacement. It is the sum of our partners’ often heroic efforts to collect data in what can be the most challenging of circumstances. It is a truly collective output that we put forward on behalf of a broad range of people and institutions working to improve the world’s understanding of the phenomenon, in the hope that better data and evidence will lead to better responses and better lives. The picture we paint may not be as rich or three-dimensional as we would like, but the evidence is robust and compelling.

Beyond the fact that famine and food security crises are currently taking place in some of the same countries that have produced the largest displacements, there are additional parallels between the two issues. The causes of famine, like those of internal displacement, are well understood and have been for years, but the required measures are not taken despite accurate and timely early warnings and evidence-based calls to act.

What is needed at this juncture is far more than a solid evidence base. Providing evidence year after year has failed to elicit a response that reflects the scale and complexity of the picture we paint and the challenges we face. To the extent that the GRID holds up a mirror, the reflection it projects is one of indifference, lack of accountability and states’ failure to protect their own people.

2018 marks the 20th anniversary of the Guiding Principles. It will be an opportunity to reflect on the past, and look ahead to the future. Rather than repeat exhausted pleas to prevent and resolve forced internal displacement, in anticipation of the milestone we call on world leaders to make an explicit expression of political commitment to this end. The adoption of a strong new resolution on IDPs at the 72nd UN General Assembly in September 2017 would provide an opportunity to turn years of aspirational language into definitive and firm commitments.

Addressing internal displacement does not require a separate global compact. Given how interrelated the phenomenon is with other global issues, it can and should be woven into existing policies and frameworks. To do so, a conscious, deliberate and sustained political effort is required. If governments are serious about improving the many millions of lives blighted by internal displacement and preventing others from suffering the same upheaval and trauma in the future, they will need to recognise, as Francis Deng did in 1996, that national sovereignty implies responsibility both “as a national obligation and a global imperative.”

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METHODOLOGICAL ANNEX

Introduction

The figures included in this report are the result of IDMC’s most ambitious effort yet to present our estimates as transparently as possible. We have also attempted to apply more methodological consistency to our data collection and analysis, and to document this process for our readers. These improvements have helped bring our reporting on displacement associated with disasters and that associated with conflict and violence together in one report. They have also enabled us to make more rigorous comparisons between different displacement situations and get more out of our source data.

The evidence presented represents a baseline, and indicates many areas in which we will need to improve our data gathering and analysis in order to paint a comprehensive picture of internal displacement. This section highlights some of the main challenges we face and illustrates the most significant caveats to which we call readers’ attention.

Our data on displacement associated with disasters for 2016 covers 591 displacement events triggered by sudden-onset natural hazards in 118 countries and territories. We are still in the process of developing and extending our approach to monitoring displacement associated with drought and other slow-onset phenomena, which means we do not yet have global figures for such disasters (see part 3).

Our data on displacement associated with conflict and violence covers 55 countries and one disputed territory. We have data on several other countries, but we chose not to include it in our global figures for methodological consistency.

As we did last year, as part of our innovative methodology we are also providing our assessment of confidence in the primary data and what it means for the estimates concerned. The confidence assessments signal our commitment to transparency while providing a roadmap for future work to strengthen data collection, something we are committed to helping our partners achieve over the coming years.

This annex describes how we produce our displacement figures by explaining the source data, calculations, definitions and decision rules we use in our analysis. Our aim is to provide maximum transparency so that readers understand the process, can replicate our work independently and make use of our data in innovative ways. We will make our data publicly available on our website for others to use freely.

We are also using innovative ways of allowing policymakers, researchers, partners, the media and the public to interact with our data via an open portal, making it easier to produce customised reports and analyses.

Given the complexity of displacement, we are forced to rely on a variety of internal and external sources in compiling our estimates. We have reassessed some of the criteria we use to maximise the reliability and accuracy of source data, and this report presents our figures in a way that clearly indicates how recently it was updated.

We currently use two similar but distinct methodologies to produce displacement estimates related to conflict and violence, and disasters. This annex describes both approaches.
To monitor and report on displacement associated with conflict and violence, we collect data on the countries affected and present nationally aggregated figures for:

- New incidents of displacement from 1 January to 31 December 2016
- IDPs who returned, integrated locally or settled elsewhere between the same dates, and when available, for those who crossed an international border and those who were born or died in displacement
- The total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016

We use an event-based methodology to estimate the number of people displaced by disasters during the course of the year, and derive aggregated figures for new displacement for each of the countries affected.

We have monitored displacement associated with conflict and violence since 1998 and that associated with disasters since 2008. We have continuously sought to improve the ways we collect and analyse our data, and over the past nine years we have successfully obtained data on ever larger numbers of new displacement events associated with disasters, accounting for more small to medium-sized events than in previous years (see table A.1). Reporting on these events helps paint a more comprehensive picture in terms of the number of people displaced globally. It also provides an empirical evidence base with which to understand them and how they differ from mega-events.

### Table A.1 Categories of events by magnitude

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event size</th>
<th>Number of people displaced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small to medium</td>
<td>Fewer than 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>100,000 to 999,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very large</td>
<td>One to three million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mega</td>
<td>More than three million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a result of ongoing methodological improvements, including the way partners collect data and the standardised application of the rules and criteria used to analyse displacement associated with conflict, comparisons between countries are now more valid than before.

### Relating others’ data to IDMC’s data model

In order to obtain a comprehensive and accurate picture about the scope and scale of displacement at any given point in time, we have generated a unique data model (see figure A.1). One of the challenges we face in producing our figures is relating our partners’ primary and secondary data to it.

In order to account comprehensively for the number of people displaced in a given situation, we would have to populate each component of the model, updating the information as quickly as the situation evolved. We are currently working with partners such as IOM, OCHA and UNHCR to do just that, in an effort to better reflect the dynamics of displacement.

The purpose of our data model is to better capture all incidents of new displacement, or “flows”, during the year as information becomes available, the number of IDPs reported to have found durable solutions or to have crossed an international border, the number of children born in displacement and the number of IDPs who have died.

![Figure A.1: IDMC’s displacement data model](image-url)
The model is an ideal vehicle for compiling displacement estimates, but in reality we have found it difficult to populate systematically. We seldom receive comprehensive data from our partners for all of its components. This is often because the type of data specified is simply not collected or, when it is collected, it is not disaggregated. A primary data source may report the extent to which the number of IDPs has declined during the course of the year, but may not specify the reason for the decrease.

The remainder of this annex explains how we account for the main flows we report, and how they influence our estimates. It also explains how we have selected countries and events to include and why we have excluded some countries we have reported on in the past. It also outlines how we assess and express our confidence in the source data.

We have continued to harmonise the approaches we use to monitor displacement associated with conflict and disasters – by identifying more events that caused displacement in the context of conflicts and by capturing more time-series data on caseloads of people displaced by disasters. That said, there are still some differences between the two approaches which reflect the availability of data and our ability to detect certain events and processes (see table A.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standardising the data collection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries and contested territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We use the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 standard for coding countries and for mapping, but as the territories of Kosovo and Abyei do not have an official code assigned, we adopted the following: Kosovo (XKX) and Abyei (AB9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The geographical referential we use is based on datasets such as the Global Administrative Areas (GADM) and the Global Administrative Unit Layers (GAUL) and other sources. The designations do not imply IDMC’s official endorsement or acceptance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional notes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kosovo designation is in line with UN Security Council resolution 1244/1999 and the International Court of Justice’s opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As the status of the Abyei area is not yet determined, for the purpose of monitoring we used the border representation of the 2005 peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A.2: Comparison of main monitoring attributes for displacement associated with conflict and disasters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Displacement monitoring attribute</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography or situation-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative threshold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enables reporting of number, or stock of IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covers incidents of new displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes other inflows and outflows that determine the number of IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Includes SADD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figures disaggregated based on age of source data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application of AHHS data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Population data

We use the 2015 UN World Population Prospect (WPP15) as our reference for population data. The 2016 population estimates are based on the medium fertility variant projection.

Normalising displacement data by country population size

To illustrate the magnitude of internal displacement at the country level, we normalise the data to account for population size. In doing so, a clear distinction has to be made between the notion of population and inhabitants. When displacement is acute, including refugees fleeing across international borders, the population in a country at a given time may be significantly lower than the official figure.

Syria is the most graphic case in point, but the issue also affects other countries such as Libya and Somalia, for which there are no up-to-date and reliable national population figures. As such, the ratios of IDPs to population and inhabitants will differ, but both provide useful information for research and analysis.

Income groups and geographical region

Income groups and geographical groups are based on the World Bank’s classification.

Accounting for displacement associated with conflict and violence

We produce our figures for displacement associated with conflict and violence via country-level, or situational monitoring. That is, we learn of a displacement situation and begin collecting data on it over time.

We have historically published three main figures – the total number of people displaced as of the end of the year, the number of new displacements during the year and the number of people who returned during the year. Where possible, we have also reported on the number of IDPs who have settled elsewhere or integrated locally, those who have sought safety by continuing their flight across an international border and the number of births and deaths in displacement.

We calculate our figures as follows:

New displacement

We may calculate the new displacement inflow for a given year, represented by the orange “internal displacement” arrow in figure A.1, in a number of ways. If our partners provide us with data on new displacement once a year, we simply report the annually aggregated figure. More often, however, they provide us with such data on a monthly or quarterly basis, in which case we publish the sum of the estimates reported.

For Ukraine, we analysed data on IDPs as recorded by the Ministry of Social Policy. These records cover the whole 2016 calendar year, providing the number of people displaced at a given date. Positive differences between two data points give some indication of the minimum number of displacements that occurred in that time interval (see figure A.2).

It should be noted that “new displacement” is somewhat misleading in that data may capture the same people being displaced more than once during the year. Given that we are unable to track individual IDPs, it is often not possible to determine the extent to which this is the case for the numbers reported.

The current lack of disaggregated data on IDPs who fail to achieve durable solutions, and on cross-border returns to displacement, also means that such inflows are taken as incidents of new displacement.

Capturing the end of displacement

We calculate annual return flow estimates in a similar way to those for new displacement. For Yemen, the aggregated return flow for 2016 represents the sum of the reported monthly figures (see figure A.3).
The same procedure applies to reporting data on local integration and settlement elsewhere, when it is available. It is important to note that accounting for returns, local integration and resettlement reduces the number of IDPs we report, but it does not necessarily mean that they have achieved durable solutions to their displacement. Data to assess the sustainability of these processes is not available at the global level, nor are there universally accepted indicators for measuring their progress.

Cross-border movements

When possible, we deduct the number of IDPs who flee across an international border. In order for us to be able to do this, those collecting information about refugees and asylum seekers need to register whether people had already been displaced prior to fleeing across the border. Failure to do so risks double-counting. The number of refugees and asylum seekers is currently subtracted from their country of origin’s general population but not its displaced population.
This year, for the first time, we have accounted for three types of returnees from Pakistan and Iran who found themselves in a situation of internal displacement once (back) in Afghanistan. We included 44,197 Afghans who were deported or voluntarily returned from Iran based on input from our sources in Afghanistan, including UN OCHA. This figure, approximately 10 per cent of the returns from Iran, is predominantly composed of young men who left Afghanistan in search of work and were considered displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance upon their return.

We also included 285,951 individuals, who are part of a significant wave of returns from Pakistan. UNHCR estimates 48 per cent of returning refugees were not able to return to their place of origin. These people therefore fit the government’s definition of an internally displaced person.

Finally, we have included a caseload of 22,559 undocumented Afghans who were forcibly deported from Pakistan back to Afghanistan. Given the involuntary nature of the return and the humanitarian needs of these individuals once back in Afghanistan, we consider them to be in a situation of internal displacement.

Births and deaths in displacement

We only account for births and deaths in displacement when our partners provide data. Given the shortage of disaggregated data and the fact that IDPs’ fertility and mortality rates may not correspond with national figures, we do not try to extrapolate births and deaths in displacement from national demographic data.

Depending on the scale and duration of displacement, the lack of primary data on these flows can represent a potentially significant blind spot. In protracted crises such as Macedonia’s, reported changes in the size of the displaced population may depend more on demographic trends than on returns, local integration and settlement elsewhere, given the lack of progress in these areas.

Total number of IDPs

The inflows and outflows described above all influence the total number or “stock” of IDPs at a given moment in time – 31 December 2016 in the case of this report. We estimate the number of IDPs at the end of the year by triangulating data reported from one or more sources with a mathematically derived estimate based on the “flow” data available on new displacement, returns, local integration, settlement elsewhere, cross-border flight and births and deaths in displacement.

We arrive at the total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016 by taking the total at the end of 2015 and adding or subtracting flow data as follows:

\[
\text{Total number of IDPs}_{\text{Dec 2016}} = \text{Total number of IDPs}_{\text{Dec 2015}} + \left[ \text{Births}_{2016} + \text{new displacement}_{2016} \right] - \left[ \text{Returns}_{2016} + \text{settlement elsewhere}_{2016} + \text{local integration}_{2016} + \text{cross-border flight}_{2016} + \text{deaths}_{2016} \right]
\]

The equation is technically incomplete because it does not take into account the “counterflows” represented by failed returns, local integration and settlement elsewhere, or cross-border returns into displacement. Given, however, that data is not collected and these phenomena are accounted for as new rather than repeated displacement, the equation serves its purpose.

In reality, the lack of coverage of the components of our data model and the way outflow data is aggregated mean the actual equation for most countries is often simply:

\[
\text{Total number of IDPs}_{\text{Dec 2016}} = \text{Total number of IDPs}_{\text{Dec 2015}} + \text{New displacement}_{2016} - \text{Returns}_{2016}
\]

The mathematical formula for estimating the stock of IDPs is at best a modelled approximation. We compare this with the data we obtain from our sources, and they do not always correspond. There are number of reasons for this:

- The initial value – the estimate for the end of the previous year – is incorrect and needs to be revised. This occurs in Afghanistan, among other countries, due to the length of time it takes to verify displacement figures.
- New displacement includes repeated displacement: This is the case every year in countries such as DRC or South Sudan, where pendular displacement – in which IDPs “commute” back and forth between their places of refuge and origin, often to tend to their land – generates higher numbers of displacements that often relate to the same people.
Double-counting: In Myanmar and other countries in which we compile our national figures from multiple sources, some IDPs may have been counted more than once. We reduce this risk by taking into account the geographical and temporal scope our sources’ data.

Partners change their data collection methodology, as in Ethiopia, or the scope of their geographical coverage, as in Nigeria or Burundi.

We change our primary source because of the lack of available data or doubts about their credibility, meaning we are working with two very different data sets from one year to the next.

There is a lack of data on a flow that significantly affects the number of IDPs in a country. Data on the number of refugees and asylum seekers from Syria does not indicate whether they had previously been displaced internally. Similarly, there are indications of displacements in south-eastern Chad as a result of the crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR), but a lack of reliable, updated and verified data.

Delays in data collection after events leading to displacement toward the end of the year often make it impossible to disaggregate flows by year. In several countries, the year-end figures for 2016 only became available in February or March 2017.

Reflecting the date of sources

When situations remain unchanged from one year to the next, or when flow data is not available, we base our end-of-year estimates on the data provided by our partners. In many countries, however, it has not been updated for several years. In those with complex or multiple displacement crises, such as Chad, Iraq and Myanmar, data for one crisis may be regularly reported, while for others it may be outdated or missing. If there is no credible evidence that IDPs in such situations have returned, integrated locally or settled elsewhere, we have in the past included them in our global figures.

In the interests of transparency, this year’s report stratifies the stock of IDPs based on when the primary data was collected (see figure A.4). The length of the bar as a whole represents the total number of IDPs for whom we were able to obtain data. The right-hand section represents data which is increasingly out of date.

Accounting for displacement associated with disasters

Our estimates for displacement associated with disasters are generated by event rather than by country. We monitor and collect information for all reported disasters from partners including governments, the UN, IFRC and national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, NGOs and international media outlets. We apply no threshold when doing so, either in terms of the number of people displaced or the distance they have travelled. Our database includes records of one up to 15 million IDPs.

We generate a single “new displacement” estimate for the total number of people displaced by each event. It is important to note that this figure is not necessarily the same as the peak number of IDPs, but instead aims to provide the most comprehensive cumulative figure for those displaced with minimal double-counting.

Figure A.4: Different strata for conflict related stocks of IDPs, ordered by the date of the source data

Source: IDMC
We try to collect data from a number of reports on the same disaster, each specifying whether its figures refer to individuals or households, the reporting terms and sources used, the publisher, the title of the source document and the date of publication. When possible we triangulate the figures using competing reports. Sometimes, however, our estimates are derived from a single report. In others, they are the aggregation of a number of reports that together cover the wide geographical area affected.

This dataset allows us to better interpret the context of the figure in each report. In determining our estimates, it is vital that the data selected represents the most comprehensive figure from the most reliable source available for that event at the time when data was collected.

Reporting bias

We are aware that our methodology and data may be subject to different types of reporting bias, some of which are detailed below.

Unequal availability of data: Global reporting tends to emphasise large events in a small number of countries where international agencies, funding partners and media have a substantial presence, or where there is a strong national commitment and capacity to manage disaster risk and collect information.

Under-reporting of small-scale events: These are far more common, but less reported on. Disasters that occur in isolated, insecure or marginalised areas also tend to be under-reported because access and communications are limited.

“Invisible” IDPs: There tends to be significantly more information available on IDPs who take refuge at official or collective sites than on those living with host communities and in other dispersed settings. Given that in many cases the vast majority fall into the second category, figures based on data from collective sites are likely to be substantial underestimates.

Real-time reporting is less reliable, but later assessments may underestimate: Reporting tends to be more frequent but less reliable during the most acute and highly dynamic phases of a disaster, when peak levels of displacement are likely to be reached. It becomes more accurate once there has been time to make more considered assessments.

Estimates based on later evaluations of severely damaged or destroyed housing will be more reliable, but they are also likely to understate the peak level of displacement, given that they will not include people whose homes did not suffer severe damage but who fled for other reasons.

Our estimates for some disasters are calculated by extrapolating from the number of severely damaged or destroyed homes or the number of families in evacuation centres. In both cases we multiply the housing and family data by the average number of people per household.

Estimating average household size

Primary sources often report the number of homes rendered uninhabitable or the number of families displaced, which we convert into a figure for IDPs by multiplying the numbers by the average household size (AHHS). There is, however, no universal dataset with updated and standardised AHHS data for all countries.

Given the potentially significant influence of AHHS on our estimates, we have continued to update the data and methodology we use to calculate it. This year we used a linear extrapolation obtained with improved methodology developed for the GRID 2016.3

The AHHS and therefore our estimates are subject to a margin of error, which means that by applying a particular value we may underestimate or overestimate real figures. If possible we review and update the AHHS every year and, as a general rule, when data is expressed in household or family units, we estimate the number of displaced people according to the AHHS for the year when the data is captured. This applies particularly to figures obtained from historical or retrospective research, notably in protracted or prolonged displacement cases where using a contemporary household size without accounting for demographic changes would have lead to an underestimate for an event that occurred in 2008 (see table A.3).
IDMC’s data collection, analytical process, definitions and decision rules

Definition of an IDP

We use the definition of an IDP contained in the 1998 Guiding Principles. The criteria related to the “forced” nature of displacement “within internationally recognized borders” is fundamental in determining whether a person is an IDP, but the Guiding Principles do not set other criteria by which to identity a person fleeing their “home or place of habitual residence”.

As such, we interpret IDPs to include not only citizens of a country in which displacement takes place, but also non-nationals such as migrants and asylum seekers in Libya, and Palestinian refugees in Syria and Lebanon; refugees who have returned to their home country but have been unable to go back to their habitual place of residence, such as Afghan refugees returning from Pakistan (see part 2); and stateless people such as the Rohingya.

Forced displacement should not only be associated with the notion of a fixed place of residence, but also flight from traditional “living spaces” that support people’s livelihoods, such as pastoralists’ grazing areas. Given that the concept of habitual residence is intimately linked to the issue of livelihoods, people who have lost them as a result of their displacement – such as pastoralists in Somalia and elsewhere in eastern Africa – are considered IDPs. We consider a person to be displaced regardless of how far or for how long they flee.

The IASC framework on durable solutions deems displacement to have ended when IDPs have returned home, integrated locally in their place of refuge or settled elsewhere in the country in a sustainable way, and no longer have vulnerabilities linked to their displacement. We acknowledge this concept, but for the purpose of our monitoring and reporting, we do not count IDPs who have returned to their area of origin or place of habitual residence as IDPs, and subtract the figure from our total estimates, whether they are known to have achieved a durable solution or not. This is because in the vast majority of cases it is not possible to properly gauge the extent to which IDPs have achieved a lasting end to their displacement or not.

On the other hand, we consider children born in displacement to be IDPs, and they are included in our estimates. This is particularly pertinent in countries such as Azerbaijan, where displacement has lasted for decades. As such, the number of IDPs in these countries may increase over the years as a result of demographic trends, despite the fact that the original trigger has long ceased to cause any new displacement.

For countries that have been divided into two internationally recognised states, such as Sudan and South Sudan, we do not consider people whose former place of habitual residence is in one of the new entities and refuge in the other as IDPs. For instance, we do not consider a person who fled from what was formerly southern Sudan to northern Sudan an IDP following the creation of South Sudan, but people displaced within either Sudan or South Sudan are considered IDPs.

Data sources

Our ability to report on displacement and provide reliable estimates is contingent on the availability of sources, and their willingness to gather and share data. We draw on information produced or compiled from a wide range of source types. Governments might be expected to have the primary responsibility for counting IDPs, but many others are involved in data gathering, including international organisations, community-based organisations, specialised websites, thematic databases, local authorities, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and private sector institutions. Such sources play a significant role,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AHHS as of 2008</th>
<th>AHHS as of 2010</th>
<th>AHHS as of 2012</th>
<th>AHHS as of 2014</th>
<th>AHHS as of 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated number of people displaced applying the AHHS respective to the year of the figure</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
particularly when governments lack the capacity or will to collect the data or when their estimates are unreliable.

Different sources gather different data for different purposes, with different methodologies and for different objectives. These include operational planning, which is influenced by considerations of timely funding. Divergent objectives often affect the way in which data gatherers estimate target populations or beneficiaries.

We are aware that some sources may also have an interest in manipulating or tweaking the number of IDPs. They may choose to do so in order to call international attention to a crisis, maximise the amount of external assistance received or downplay the scale of a conflict or disaster if the government is held accountable.

In order to mitigate this potential bias, whenever possible we triangulate the data by using several sources and prioritising those we have historically deemed to have been most objective. Particularly for displacement associated with disasters, we monitor the different stages of the humanitarian response cycle, from the emergency to the reconstruction and recovery phase, by identifying the different organisations and indicators that report on displacement over the time.

Language bias also affects our ability to source displacement data comprehensively. We can only obtain and analyse information in the languages we speak and read. Our staff and partners speak most of the required languages, but we inevitably fail to capture some information, particularly for parts of Asia.

Disaggregated data

We seek to obtain not only quantitative data from our sources on possible increases and decreases in the number of IDPs, but also more specific information such as data disaggregated by sex and age (SADD). This is vital in guiding an appropriate and effective response to IDPs’ protection and assistance needs.

Relatively little SADD is available for displacement associated with either conflict or disasters. This is mainly because information on IDPs’ sex, age and disabilities tends only to be captured in organised settings such as relief camps, while in many cases a significant majority of IDPs live in dispersed settings among host families and communities.

We also aim to gather and report disaggregated information by geographical area and time period in order to paint the most comprehensive and dynamic picture of displacement possible and provide a sound basis for more complex research and analysis.

Even when disaggregated data is available, however, it tends not to represent a statistically significant portion of the overall data collected. More is vital if we are to accurately inform the identification of, and respond to the specific needs of different groups of IDPs.

Methodological challenges particular to displacement associated with conflict

We gather data from primary and secondary sources on the number of people displaced by international and non-international armed conflict and other situations of violence. We aim to include all people forcibly displaced in such contexts.

Sources tend to be numerous during humanitarian crises and visible emergencies, when they compile information to target assistance, as in Syria. During protracted and neglected crises, displacement data tends to be unavailable or out-of-date, as in Armenia, Cyprus, Georgia, Togo and Turkey.

Sources often do not use the same definition of an IDP as the Guiding Principles. Nor do they use the same methodologies, which creates a serious challenge when compiling our estimates. In several countries, including Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DRC, Georgia, Pakistan and Ukraine, only IDPs who have been officially registered with the authorities are counted.

In some countries only one data source is available, while in others there may be several. For each country listed in the 2017 GRID dataset, we systematically looked for several sources. We always strive to identify new data sources, even for countries and situations where others already exist. This enables us to crosscheck, but it may also create confusion because sources rarely explain their methodologies.

When different sources are available, or when a new source provides information, we may still decide to base our estimate on only one
source. That decision may vary from year to year depending on objective criteria, such as their geographical and temporal coverage, or their perceived reliability (see below). We may equally aggregate different data from separate sources to help us extend the geographical coverage of our estimates. As such, our figures are more likely to take into account and reflect both qualitative and quantitative uncertainties.

In many countries affected by conflict and violence, no agencies or mechanisms collect data on the number and kind of people who have sought refuge in urban areas, those who are hosted by relatives or other families or those who have fled to remote areas. This leads to significant underestimates of the number of IDPs.

Data on returns varies significantly from context to context. Sometimes data on returnees is collected after people have returned to their area of origin or place of habitual residence. At other times, our sources use “returns” or “returnees” to indicate that people have departed a location such as a displacement camp with the intention of returning – but with no further information about their location or well-being. In some cases, these returnees may have moved to another camp or become displaced elsewhere, in which case they continue to be counted as displaced. In order to be consistent across all contexts, we subtract returnees from our stock figures. That said, this is a strictly accounting rule and it does not mean that these returnees have reached a durable solution. In order to make that assessment, more follow-up data on returnees is needed.

Selection of countries in the GRID dataset on displacement by conflict and violence

The 2017 GRID dataset contains information on 56 countries and territories. The inclusion of a country is not contingent on a quantitative threshold for the number of IDPs. It depends only on the availability of credible data. The fact that a country is not included does not necessarily imply that no displacement has taken place, but rather that no information has been forthcoming, or that the displacement is not caused by conflict or violence.

Our 2017 GRID estimates include a number of changes from last year’s report. They are the result of issues related to the systematic and consistent application of decision rules to all displacement situations, our analysis of the primary causes of displacement, and geopolitical considerations that affect the definition of international borders that are essential to determine whether someone is an IDP, a refugee or stateless. The border issues cover foreign occupation, the creation of new states and unilateral secession.

Geopolitical parameters

We collect and presents data on IDPs for UN members states and other self-governing territories, those with unsettled sovereignty such as the Abyei area, and others with special status such as Palestine and Kosovo. People displaced within areas of an internationally recognised state under foreign occupation are considered IDPs, irrespective of their location with respect to the de facto borders or the territorial claims of the occupying power, providing the original borders still have broad international recognition. Examples are eastern Ukraine, Crimea, South Ossetia and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The inclusion of such countries and other contested territories does not imply any political endorsement or otherwise on IDMC’s part.

a. Foreign occupation

We consider people displaced within an internationally recognised state under foreign occupation as IDPs, irrespective of their location with respect to the de facto borders or the territorial claims of the occupying power, providing the original borders still have broad international recognition.

As such, our estimate of the number of IDPs in Cyprus does not only include Greek Cypriots who moved to the southern part of the island at the time of Turkey’s invasion in 1974, as was the case in the past. It also incorporates estimates for Turkish Cypriots who moved from southern to northern Cyprus at the time. This interpretation and accounting is consistent with the methodology we have used for other occupied areas, such as Crimea and other parts of eastern Ukraine.
b. Creation of new states

For countries that have been divided into two internationally recognised states, such as Sudan and South Sudan, we consider all people displaced within each of the new entities as IDPs, and we produce separate estimates for each one. People who fled within the previously undivided state and who crossed the border that delineates the new entities are no longer counted as IDPs.

Similarly, we no longer count people who fled from Timor-Leste to West Timor when the former was established in 1999. Their number has been subtracted from our estimate for Indonesia.

c. Unilateral secession

For regional entities such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have unilaterally seceded outside an internationally supported process, we do not count IDPs within them separately from those in the state they have seceded from, in this case Georgia. In cases such as Kosovo, however, where a majority of UN member states have established diplomatic relations with a seceding entity, we do produce estimates for IDPs who have fled within it.

We no longer count people as IDPs if they have crossed what has become a de facto international border and find themselves in different entity from the one in which they were originally displaced. As such, our estimate for Kosovo refers only to people who have fled within the territory itself. Given that the Serbian government reports all IDPs in the country as having come from Kosovo, Serbia is not included in the 2017 GRID.

These decisions not to continue counting people we previously considered IDPs in no way implies that they no longer have vulnerabilities related to their displacement.

Temporal scope and frequency of reporting

The 2017 GRID dataset reports separately on the total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016, and the number of new displacements during the year. The former reflects the number of people still displaced at the end of the year; the latter includes repeated displacement or other movements of people who fled or returned home during the course of the year.

The figures reported are static, but IDPs’ movements are not. For this reason, we aim to improve our methodology and increase not only its geographical, but also its temporal coverage. We plan to produce displacement figures more frequently in order to capture the fluidity and complexity of IDPs’ movements.

To do so, we will soon begin piloting a hybrid monitoring methodology that combines event-based and country-based monitoring of displacement situations as they evolve over time (see part 3). The idea is to identify events in near-real time, manually verify those we deem to have led to people fleeing and then engage partners in the field to collect time-series data. In some cases...
these partners will help us to identify events that have the potential to trigger displacement by issuing a humanitarian alert.

Methodological challenges particular to displacement by disasters

The 2017 GRID presents our latest findings on new displacement associated with disasters in 2016, and compares it with our historical dataset for 2008 to 2016.

Taxonomic considerations

The 2017 GRID estimates are based on new displacement known to have taken place as a result of disasters for which natural hazards have been identified as the primary trigger. In part 1, we highlighted a number of displacement situations for which it is nearly impossible to identify a single cause or trigger. When available, we use the internationally acknowledged name of hazards and categorise them initially into four main types: geophysical, meteorological, hydrological and climatological. These are then refined into types, sub-types and sub-sub-types (see table A.8).

To better understand the complexities of the phenomena, we plan to break disasters down into various stages and differentiating between their primary, secondary and subsequent triggers.

The 2017 GRID dataset presents figures for displacement associated with sudden-onset hazards, but in future reports we intend to include that associated with slow-onset hazards such as drought. We developed a model-based methodology in 2014, which we used to monitor the displacement of pastoralists in the Horn of Africa during the 2010 to 2011 drought, and we started to collect data on slow-onset hazards in 2015 and continued to do so in 2016.

Temporal coverage

Our dataset records incidents of displacement that occurred in 2016 and are supported by a reliable and comprehensive source. The main challenge we faced in collecting data for the year were overlapping events, such the floods and landslides that occurred in Peru and which we did not include in our estimates because the government provided only an aggregated figure for multiple separate displacements. We have similarly omitted aggregated figures provided by the government of China when we could not trace them back to a specific event.

Table A.8: Taxonomy of natural hazards*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard category</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Sub-type</th>
<th>Sub-sub-type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geophysical</td>
<td>Earthquakes, mass movements, volcanic activity</td>
<td>Ground shaking, tsunamis, sudden subsidence, sinkholes, landslides, rockfalls, ashfalls, lahars, pyroclastic flows, lava flows, toxic gases, glacial lake outburst flows (GLOF), volcanic eruptions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorological</td>
<td>Storms, extreme temperatures</td>
<td>Extra-tropical storms, tropical storms including hurricanes and cyclones, convective storms, cold waves, heatwaves, severe winter conditions</td>
<td>Derechos, hailstorms, thunderstorms, rainstorms, tornadoes, winter storms, dust storms, storm surges, haze, gales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrological</td>
<td>Flooding, landslides, wave action</td>
<td>Coastal floods, riverine floods, flash floods, ice jam floods, avalanches – snow, debris, mudflows, rockfalls – rogue waves, seiches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climatological</td>
<td>Drought, wildfires</td>
<td>Forest fires, land fires – bush, brush and pasture</td>
<td>Fire whirls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This taxonomy is adapted from the classification system developed by the international disaster database (EM-DAT) maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in Belgium.
Protracted displacement in the aftermath of disasters is also a highly problematic. We produced a first scoping exercise in 2015, which aimed to shed light on the phenomenon by challenging the notion that people who flee a disaster are not likely to remain displaced for long. This false assumption is fostered by only occasional reporting of ongoing cases, often to mark the anniversary of a particular disaster.

Our scoping exercise allowed us to re-examine the issue, and conclude that there are likely to be many more people living in protracted displacement than previously thought. This year, we collected time-series data on the 50 largest displacements in 2016 and the ten largest each year from 2008 to 2015.

Terminology

We use the term “displaced”, but it is rarely if ever adopted consistently and unequivocally by different countries or sources (see table A.9). In some countries, such as Afghanistan, the term “returnees” can also refer to IDPs (see part 3). People displaced by floods in 2016 were referred to as “homeless” in DRC and “sheltered” in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Often, sources refer to people displaced by disasters as “directly affected”. It is true that IDPs are part of a wider population affected by a disaster, but not all those affected are IDPs. As such, additional analysis is required to make sense of the terms sources use, and to understand when and how they signal displacement.

Table A.9: Explanation of reporting terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Displaced</td>
<td>Involuntary or forced movements, evacuation or relocation – when not specified – of individuals or groups of people from their habitual places of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuated</td>
<td>Voluntary and forced evacuations, both preventive and in response to the onset of a hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocated</td>
<td>Voluntary and forced relocations, both preventive and in response to the onset of a hazard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheltered/ in relief camp</td>
<td>People accommodated in shelters provided by national authorities or organisations such as NGOs, the UN and IFRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeless</td>
<td>People rendered homeless and without adequate shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uninhabitable/ destroyed housing</td>
<td>Limited to habitual place of residence, and includes houses, retirement homes, prisons, mental healthcare centres and dormitories. The number of destroyed/uninhabitable houses is multiplied by the AHHS for that country to estimate the number of people who have been rendered homeless and so displaced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially destroyed housing</td>
<td>Data on partially destroyed houses cannot necessarily be taken as a proxy indicator of displacement. This information, however, helps us identify situations we may need to look into further, and access to more detailed shelter assessments are very helpful in this sense. We also use it to triangulate other data. Sometimes, for example, partially destroyed housing is also referred to as uninhabitable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced to flee</td>
<td>To run away from danger. “Flee” implies the forced nature of people’s movement and we take it to indicate displacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected</td>
<td>People whose life has been directly impacted by a disaster or conflict. Displaced people are amongst those affected, but not all affected people are necessarily displaced. There are exceptions, however, and in certain Latin American countries displaced people are referred to as affected for reasons of political sensitivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other indicators of displacement used by local authorities or organisations. They include context-specific terms such as rescued people, people in need of shelter, resettled people and people living in temporary or transitional shelter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Housing information

Housing information is important in estimating displacement associated with disasters. To produce our 2016 estimates, we analysed more than 300 reports that mentioned housing damage or destruction rather than the number of people displaced. In order to use housing data as a valid proxy, we only consider figures for homes that have been damaged to the extent they are no longer habitable. We calculate the number of individuals by applying the AHHS available for each country.

Terms that indicate the extent of damage include “houses at risk [of collapse]”, “houses severely affected/damaged” and “houses destroyed”. We consider housing to be any place where people have established a habitual residence. We include hospitals if the information provided suggests that long-term patients have been displaced.

We also include shelters in refugee and displacement camps. “Collapsed tents” in Jordan’s Zaatari refugee camp, for example, are counted as uninhabitable housing. Such cases constitute multiple displacement, in which people have already fled once, only to become displaced again when their camp is flooded.

Evacuation data

We often use data on mandatory evacuations and people staying in official evacuation centres to estimate event-based displacement. This was the case for 8.4 million of the new displacements we reported on in 2016.

On the one hand, the number of people counted in evacuation centres may underestimate the total number of evacuees, as others may take refuge elsewhere. On the other, the number of people ordered to evacuate may overstate the true number, given that some are likely not to heed the order. The potential for such discrepancies is much greater when authorities advise rather than order evacuation, and as a result we do not incorporate such figures into our estimates.

Quality assurance and independent peer review

As in previous years, and in order to improve our methodology, we submitted this year’s estimates to a quality assurance process to verify the data. The verification stage is as important as the data collection itself, because it allows possible discrepancies to be identified, and the data to be refined before it is finalised. This year’s process was mainly led in-house, and all of our entries have been double-checked, through rigorous analysis by experts previously not involved in the data collection and analysis for each of the events.

Colleagues were assigned each country with displacement associated with conflict and disasters involving more than 500 people. They dug through all the data collected and collated by others, asking questions and highlighting potential gaps, and so ensuring the highest possible level of transparency and clarity. As an example of an entry having undergone changes following the internal review process, reports of displacements associated with violence in India were questioned, leading to a rigorous follow-up process with existing and new sources. This allowed us to solidify our data and present it with a much higher level of confidence in its accuracy and value.

Our data on the huge volumes of historical displacement in Colombia also underwent intense scrutiny, including exchanges with OCHA, the government’s victims’ registry and NGOs. The review unearthed previously unknown information on the primary source’s methodology and data treatment processes, which led to significant changes (see spotlight, p.29).

The quality assurance process for displacement associated with conflict was supported by external advice. We presented our figures and methodology to NRC country offices, IOM teams,
UN agencies, government agencies and NGO’s in order to benefit from their field knowledge.

In future we aim to extend the disaster verification process to the entire set of annual entries. We have also submitted this methodological annex to external peer reviewers, and elements of our methodology were reviewed in previous years by a different set of independent experts.

We will embed the external peer review and internal quality assurance processes into our future work to ensure that the methods we use to produce our figures are robust and that we have presented them accurately.

**Qualitative assessment of confidence in estimates for displacement associated with conflict**

Building on lessons from existing assessments

There have been several attempts recently to design confidence assessment schemes to evaluate data on internal displacement as part of a broader movement in the field of humanitarian needs assessments. The Task Force on Population Movement in Yemen (TFPM), for example, has developed a confidence rating based on disaggregation by sex and age, and the availability of data on districts of origin and displacement.

IOM Iraq calculates a confidence rating in order to produce an estimate for each location in its displacement tracking matrix, based on the number of informants used, discrepancies between information from different sources, the accessibility of the location and the ability to independently validate the data received. The Syria dynamic monitoring report (DYNAMO) gives a confidence rating based on the number of sources, the manner and extent that the data can be independently verified, the amount of convergence among the different sources and the degree to which they correspond with contextual information about the situation.

Such assessments may seem reassuring, but if poorly conceived or implemented they may provide a false sense of certainty or confidence. They may hide the arbitrariness of the underlying criteria and the way they are weighted and aggregated. They may also reflect the biases and challenges inherent in the various steps involved in constructing an index and collecting the data. To limit evaluators’ bias and improve objectivity and consistency, clear decision rules are needed that limit the number of dimensions taken into account.

There are ways of overcoming the limitations of points-based scores, but their complexity may render them opaque, adding another layer of potential confusion. Using only four indicators with two to five possible values for each, IOM Iraq’s assessment framework yields up to 126 unique possible combinations.

The challenge of applying nationally specific tools at the global level

It is difficult to extrapolate to the global level from confidence ratings designed for national circumstances. The three examples discussed above all refer to situations in which a single organisation or cluster designs the entire national data collection process.

At the global level, aggregation and cross-country comparison is made more difficult by the number of data sources and the fact that their motivations for collecting information ranges from rapid needs assessments to victim compensation without any a priori global coordination. Sources’ methodologies also vary widely, from satellite imagery, registration, sampling, key informant interviews and censuses, to name but a few.

This diversity stands in stark contrast to the standardisation of data in the three national examples mentioned above. As such, the same set of criteria cannot easily be used to judge reliability, and the diversity in which the results are reported makes it more difficult to make comparisons between countries.

**IDMC’s confidence assessment**

We designed a comprehensive framework to assess the confidence we have in the estimates we publish. The methodology and results presented in this report are the initial steps of a process we will continue to develop through several more iterations.
Given that we are as yet unable to apply many of the criteria to our data on displacement associated with disasters, we have only assessed our confidence in the figures associated with conflict and violence. In doing so, we applied a common set of criteria based on:

- The methodologies used to collect it
- Whether it could be independently validated
- The degree to which it is geographically comprehensive in terms of the extent of the conflict and associated displacement
- Whether it is disaggregated by sex and age
- The frequency with which it was collected
- How extensively it covers the components of our data model

We have not attempted to weight or rank these factors, nor have we assigned quantitative point values for them or generated an overall score for each source and estimate. In order to do so rigorously, we will first need to empirically test the relative significance of each of the factors.

Some of the data gaps reported can be attributed to the way governments and organisations collect and disseminate data, but this is not always the case. We try to be as comprehensive as possible in our own data collection, but we may overlook some sources that may address the gaps we report. As such, our assessment reflects the level of detail of the data we were able to collect and process from various sources – not the level of detail of all the data that exists or was published by each provider.

Our confidence assessment for the largest stock and new displacement figures associated with conflict is shown below in table A.10. Our assessment for the full list of countries is available on our website.

Notes on IDMC’s confidence assessment criteria

Data disaggregated by sex and age (SADD): The availability of SADD does not directly factor into the calculation of the number of IDPs, but it can be considered a proxy for detailed data collection practices.

Geographically disaggregated data: Such data is not, per se, an absolute requirement for accurate national estimates of displacement. In many countries, however, some of the entities that collect data only have access to some regions. Geographical disaggregation allows for triangulation and gaps to be identified, while its absence can lead to possible double-counting. TFPM in Yemen uses a similar rationale in its confidence rating to justify discarding data when location information is incomplete.

Multiple data sources: The availability of data from a number of independent sources does not guarantee higher quality or more accurate overall results. It can, however, prompt discussion of the various estimates available and the methodologies used to derive them. It also sometimes permits triangulation, which is useful in situations for which displacement estimates are highly sensitive or more susceptible to data collectors’ biases.

Temporal dimensions: The frequency of updates is a relative criterion. Unfolding crises and rapidly changing situations such as those in Syria, Iraq and Yemen require more frequent updates than stable and often protracted situations such as in Armenia and Cyprus. Yearly updates may suffice for some situations, but for others, it can exclude some of the shorter-term displacements.

Next steps

Our confidence assessment is a work in progress, and we welcome input from partners interested in contributing to its development. For this report we assessed our confidence in all the conflict figures reported. This represents a significant increase with respect to the GRID 2016, where only 11 countries were considered. We plan to apply our criteria to all of the data we receive and analyse so that our estimates are as accurate as possible. In doing so, our data users will be made aware of the magnitude of uncertainty the data contains, and the underlying reasons for it.

Notes

1. UN, World Population Prospects, 2015 revision, available at goo.gl/TF6ElY
4. Benini A, Shikh Aiyob M, Chataigner P et al, Confidence in needs assessment data: the use of confidence ratings in the Syria multi-sectoral needs assessment (MSNA), a note for ACAPS and MapAction, April 2015, available at goo.gl/Vo7W01
Table A.10: IDMC confidence assessment of conflict-related displacement figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New displacements</th>
<th>Democratic Republic of the Congo</th>
<th>Syrian Arab Republic</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td>Registration, key informants, media monitoring</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Key informants</td>
<td>Registration, other</td>
<td>Registration, key informants</td>
<td>Key informants, other</td>
<td>Media monitoring</td>
<td>Registration, key informants, other</td>
<td>Registration, key informants</td>
<td>Registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data triangulation</strong></td>
<td>Some local triangulation</td>
<td>No triangulation</td>
<td>Some local triangulation</td>
<td>No triangulation</td>
<td>Some local triangulation</td>
<td>Some local triangulation</td>
<td>No triangulation</td>
<td>No triangulation</td>
<td>Some local triangulation</td>
<td>No triangulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographical coverage</strong></td>
<td>All relevant areas covered</td>
<td>All relevant areas covered</td>
<td>All relevant areas covered</td>
<td>All relevant areas covered</td>
<td>Partial coverage</td>
<td>All relevant areas covered</td>
<td>Partial coverage</td>
<td>Partial coverage</td>
<td>Partial coverage</td>
<td>All relevant areas covered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographical disaggregation</strong></td>
<td>Subnational - admin 1</td>
<td>Subnational - admin 1</td>
<td>Admin 2 or more</td>
<td>Admin 2 or more</td>
<td>Subnational - admin 1</td>
<td>Subnational - admin 1</td>
<td>Subnational - admin 1</td>
<td>Subnational - admin 1</td>
<td>Subnational - admin 1</td>
<td>Subnational - admin 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reporting unit</strong></td>
<td>People, households</td>
<td>People, households</td>
<td>People, households</td>
<td>People, households</td>
<td>People, households</td>
<td>People, households</td>
<td>People, percentage of population</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency of reporting</strong></td>
<td>More than once a month</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>More than once a month</td>
<td>More than once a month</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Every month</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>More than once a month</td>
<td>Every month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaggregation - sex</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaggregation - age</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data on returns</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data on deaths</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data on births</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data on cross-border movements</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data on local integration</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Data on settlements elsewhere</strong></td>
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**Methodological Annex**
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### Table 1: New displacements by country for disasters and conflict and total number of IDPs for conflict and violence

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<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,108,000</td>
<td>204,000</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks and Caicos Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,653,000</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,107,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>81,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1,974,000</td>
<td>478,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Largest disaster-related displacement events of 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Event name</th>
<th>Affected areas</th>
<th>Month disaster began</th>
<th>Figure source(s)</th>
<th>Displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Nock-Ten (locally known as: Nina)</td>
<td>Regions Calabarzon, Mimaropa, V, and VIII</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>DROMIC</td>
<td>2,592,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Typhoon Haima (locally known as: Lawin)</td>
<td>Regions CAR, Calabarzon, I, II, III, and V</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>DROMIC</td>
<td>2,377,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Yangtze River floods (1st wave)</td>
<td>Provinces of Anhui; Fujian; Hubei; Hunan; Jiangsu; Jiangxi and Zhejiang</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Ministry of Civil Affairs</td>
<td>1,990,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Bihar floods</td>
<td>Bihar State</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Bihar Disaster Management; Disaster Management Department (Government of Bihar State, India); National Disaster Management Agency</td>
<td>1,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Hurricane Matthew</td>
<td>Guantanamo; Maisi; Baracoa</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Cuban civil defense; La Prensa; OCHA</td>
<td>1,079,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Peak rainy season floods and landslides</td>
<td>Country-wide</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>BNPB</td>
<td>948,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Hurricane Matthew</td>
<td>South Carolina; North Carolina; Florida; Georgia</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Logistics Cluster; Media; South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley</td>
<td>875,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Typhoon Haima</td>
<td>Jiangsu, Fujian, Guangdong; Guangdong; Fujian</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Ministry of Civil Affairs</td>
<td>782,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Typhoon Megi</td>
<td>Zhejiang; Fujian; Jiangxi; Yunnan</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Ministry of Civil Affairs</td>
<td>658,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Typhoon Meranti</td>
<td>Shanghai; Jiangsu; Zhejiang; Fujian; Jiangxi</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Ministry of Civil Affairs</td>
<td>567,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>New displacements in 2016 (conflict)</td>
<td>Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016 (conflict)</td>
<td>Year that the total number of IDPs was last updated</td>
<td>Primary source/type</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abyei Area</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>This represents a single caseload of members of the Ngok Dinka community, who have been displaced since an incursion by the Sudanese Army in May 2011. UN OCHA reports that these IDPs remain in a situation of displacement since then. It is estimated the number of individuals would only have increased following average demographic trends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>653,000</td>
<td>1,553,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Based on multiple sources, these estimates include both IDPs and returnees to Afghanistan, primarily from Iran and Pakistan. Some returnees have been included in our stock figure based on contextual evidence from partners in the field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>These estimates include two waves of expulsions of migrants, from Alger and Ouargala to southern Algeria. They occurred in March and December 2016 and were reported by media, based on reports by the Algerian Red Cross.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>This is a decaying figure that has not been updated since 2005. It includes IDPs from the Artsvashen enclave who have no realistic opportunity of returning to their former place of residence as well as individuals whose current status and whereabouts are unknown or who have not managed to find durable solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
<td>582,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>This estimate is based on data reported directly by the Government of Azerbaijan from which we have subtracted a number of individuals who have returned to their place of origin as reported by NRC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>426,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Research and Academia</td>
<td></td>
<td>This figure is based on decaying data related to two caseloads: displacement in the Chittagong Hills Tracts and displaced members of the Bihari community. IDMC's research does not support removing these caseloads as no evidence suggests these IDPs have returned to their place of origin or achieved a durable solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td>This estimate corresponds to a caseload as previously reported by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2016. At the time of production of this report, updated figures have not yet been provided by the authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>These figures refer to displacement caused by post-election violence, which erupted in June, following local elections in Karangasso Vigue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>IOM; OCHA</td>
<td>These figures correspond to displacement caused by violent clashes which have occurred since early 2015, triggered by political tensions which have resulted in a humanitarian crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>New displacements in 2016 (conflict)</td>
<td>Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016 (conflict)</td>
<td>Year that the total number of IDPs was last updated</td>
<td>Primary source/type</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>177,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>These figures refer to displacement triggered by the regional crisis caused by the Boko Haram insurgency, which has affected several countries in the Lake Chad Basin, the far North region of Nigeria and Chad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>412,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Population Movement Commission and Media</td>
<td>The current displacement crisis in CAR has been ongoing since late 2012, due to the political crisis in the country and subsequent clashes and instability. IDMC's primary source is the Population Movement Commission (CMP), which publishes regular dashboards based on data provided by local and international NGOs, community and religious groups, as well as local authorities. IDMC's estimate is based on data from 2009, as well as reported new displacements from 2016. These new displacements were triggered by post-electoral violence, concentrating in the Pool region and Brazzaville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate is based on data from the Government of Cameroon's national registry, which records victims of the regional crisis caused by the Boko Haram insurgency, which has affected several countries in the Lake Chad Basin, the far North region of Nigeria and Chad. The current displacement crisis in Chad is closely linked to the Boko Haram insurgency, and is mainly concentrated around the western region of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>171,000</td>
<td>7,246,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Government, NGO and Media</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate is based on data from the Government of Colombia's national registry, which records victims of the regional crisis caused by the Boko Haram insurgency, which has affected several countries in the Lake Chad Basin, the far North region of Nigeria and Chad. The current displacement crisis in Colombia is closely linked to the Boko Haram insurgency, and is mainly concentrated around the western region of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>UNHCR and UNHCR</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate is based on data from the Government of Congo. It includes people displaced since the mid 1970s as well as the children of IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>272,000</td>
<td>922,000</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Population Movement Commission</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate is based on data from the Government of Côte d’Ivoire. It includes people displaced since the mid 1970s as well as the children of IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>272,000</td>
<td>2,230,000</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate is based on data from the Government of Cyprus. It includes people displaced since the mid 1970s as well as the children of IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. Rep. Congo</td>
<td>922,000</td>
<td>2,230,000</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate is based on data from the Government of Democratic Republic of Congo. It includes people displaced since the mid 1970s as well as the children of IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate is based on data from the Government of Egypt. It includes people displaced since the mid 1970s as well as the children of IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>177,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Research and Academia</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate is based on data from the Government of El Salvador. It includes people displaced since the mid 1970s as well as the children of IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global report on internal displacement 2017</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>New displacements in 2016 (conflict)</td>
<td>Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016 (conflict)</td>
<td>Year that the total number of IDPs was last updated</td>
<td>Primary source/type</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>296,000</td>
<td>258,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>IOM, IDMC and UNHCR</td>
<td>These estimates are based on data provided by IOM’s DTM and the Monthly Internal Displacement Updates (MIDU) and include people displaced as a result of the conflicts in 1991-1992, and 2008 in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Displaced people who have reportedly returned to their place of origin have been subtracted from the number of IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government and NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>UNHCR and NCO</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates are based on UNHCR data which include a projection of displacement in 2016. UNHCR’s projection is calculated using the average annual number of people displaced from 2004 to 2016, as reported in a study conducted by the Honduran Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of Persons Displaced by Violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Research and Academia</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates represent a conservative assessment, based mainly on media reports. Due to the lack of systematic monitoring of conflict-induced displacement in the country, and limited access to some affected areas, due to the nature of displacement in India, particularly along the border with Pakistan, it is believed many IDPs displaced in 2016 returned to their homes or place of origin by the end of the year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>448,000</td>
<td>796,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates are based on an analysis of cases reported by key informants, as well as on data from municipal government and non-government service providers. About the number of displaced people who have been forced to move out of their place of residence due to violence, disasters or climate change. It also includes decaying data related to displacements caused by the civil war which ended in the late 1990s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>659,000</td>
<td>3,035,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>IOM, OCHA and UNHCR</td>
<td>Displacement in Iraq in 2016 was driven by inter-communal violence or insurgency-related violence between 1998 and 2004 and have since been unable or unwilling to return and have failed to re-establish their lives through local integration or settlement elsewhere. IDMC’s estimate also includes a number of people who have since failed to return. Furthermore, people displaced by a long-running conflict in Papua between the Indonesian army and a separatist Papuan group have also been included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year the total number of IDPs was last updated</td>
<td>Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016</td>
<td>Type of DPC</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>158,000</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>NCHR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>311,000</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>NCHR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Kenya**

IDMC uses data provided by UNHCR, based on the assessment of several satellite images of DPC camps in Kenya. This measure is based on a survey of the past two years of DPC data collected and treated by these agencies at national level. The estimate is based on data provided by the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia regarding the number of theDAC's New IDPs Registry and local authorities.

**Kosovo**

IDMC bases its estimate on data provided by the Government of Kosovo concerning the number of people registered in the crisis.

**Lebanon**

IDMC bases its estimate on data provided by the Government of Lebanon concerning the number of people registered in the crisis.

**Libya**

IDMC bases its estimate on data provided by the Government of Libya concerning the number of people registered in the crisis.

**Vietnam**

IDMC bases its estimate on data provided by the Government of Vietnam concerning the number of people registered in the crisis.

**Mozambique**

IDMC bases its estimate on data provided by the Government of Mozambique concerning the number of people registered in the crisis.

**Mexico**

IDMC bases its estimate on data provided by the Government of Mexico concerning the number of people registered in the crisis.

**Macedonia**

IDMC bases its estimate on data provided by the Government of Macedonia concerning the number of people registered in the crisis.

**Global report on internal displacement 2017**

This report presents an overview of the magnitude of internal displacement globally, based on data collected and treated by various agencies and organizations at national and international level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>New displacements in 2016 (conflict)</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016 (conflict)</th>
<th>Year that the total number of IDPs was last updated</th>
<th>Primary source/type</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>644,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>NGO and OCHA</td>
<td>IDMC's Myanmar estimates draw upon several sources of data which relate to IDP caseloads in different parts of the country. These figures include significant displacement in the Southeast of the country based on data collected in 2012; these IDPs continue to be counted due to lack of evidence suggesting any change to their situation. There was significant new displacement in 2016 following the outbreak of violence in early October between armed forces, police and certain communities. The Rohingya minority has been particularly and systematically targeted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>IDMC's estimate relates to people who were displaced by conflict between 1996-2006 and remain unable or unwilling to return to their homes due to unresolved land and property issues, insecurity and lack of assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>166,000</td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>IDMC uses figures reported by the Government of Niger, obtained through surveys conducted by local authorities. This data covers the southeastern region of Diffa, which borders the Lake Chad and has been severely affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. IDMC’s end-of-year estimate includes some reported ‘returnees’ due to contextual analysis and evidence indicating that these people remain in a situation of displacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>501,000</td>
<td>1,955,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates are based on data reported by IOM, which accounts for the northeast and middle belt regions. The IOM data primarily concerns people displaced by conflicts linked to Boko Haram as well as incidents of intercommunal violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>464,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>IDMC bases its estimate on reports by UNHCR which track persons registered as IDPs and verified as such by Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority, covering the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>193,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>These estimates are based on data provided by OCHA and covers both new and protracted cases from the West Bank and Gaza.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimate is based on data collected by IOM in 2016. The national figures include two separate incidents of displacement caused by tribal conflict, one which occurred in January and the other in September.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates concern people displaced between 1980-2000 who have not yet found durable solutions. They also include a small caseload (90 people) who have been displaced and relocated due to terrorism since 2000 and who also have not found durable solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>OCHA, Protection Cluster</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates are based on reports produced by the Global Protection Cluster in the Philippines, which tracks conflict-induced displacement in the Mindanao province. These figures also include displacement caused by criminal violence and extrajudicial killings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>New displacements in 2016 (conflict)</td>
<td>Year that the total number of IDPs was last updated</td>
<td>Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016 (conflict)</td>
<td>Primary source/type</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,107,000</td>
<td>Protection and Return Monitoring Network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>281,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,854,000</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>97,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,107,000</td>
<td>Protection and Return Monitoring Network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>281,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,854,000</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>97,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>824,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>6,326,000</td>
<td>OCHA and UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>824,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>6,326,000</td>
<td>OCHA and UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>824,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>6,326,000</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Global report on internal displacement 2017
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>New displacements in 2016 (conflict)</th>
<th>Total number of IDPs as of 31 December 2016 (conflict)</th>
<th>Year that the total number of IDPs was last updated</th>
<th>Primary source/type</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Although IDMC has recently engaged with the Government of Togo, this estimate remains outdated and concerns persons displaced by political violence that erupted in the country in April 2005.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>204,000</td>
<td>1,108,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>NGO, Research and Academia</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates include several different caseloads, including one prior to 2016, reported by Hacettepe University in 2006. IDMC’s figures are also based on more up-to-date information obtained from the International Crisis Group and a Turkish NGO that covers the end of 2015 to 2016. This data covers three cities in southeastern Turkey where round-the-clock ‘curfews’ were put into place, forcing people to flee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>NGO, UNHCR and UNICEF</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates include 23,000 people newly displaced in 2016 and an old caseload of 30,000 IDPs who were displaced to Lamwo, Kitgum, Gulu, and Agago districts due to the Lord’s Resistance Army conflict in the 1990s and 2000s. The new displacements in 2016 primarily occurred in Bundibugyo district, where members of the Bakonzo and Bamba ethnic groups clashed following contested local elections and political infighting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>1,653,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Government and UNHCR</td>
<td>IDMC bases its estimate on data provided by the Ukrainian Ministry of Social Policy, which maintains a comprehensive database with support from UNHCR and reports at regular intervals on displacement triggered in particular by the conflict in the eastern regions of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>478,000</td>
<td>1,974,000</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Task Force on Population Movements (TFPM)</td>
<td>IDMC’s estimates are based on data compiled by Yemen’s Task Force on Population Movement (TFPM), which is supported jointly by IOM and UNHCR and which conducted its first full assessment in early 2016. The new displacement figure is very conservative, and the true magnitude of displacement may be as high as 753,000, but this upper estimate could not be verified by partners on the ground.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is the leading source of information and analysis on internal displacement worldwide. Since 1998, our role has been recognised and endorsed by United Nations General Assembly resolutions. IDMC is part of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), an independent, non-governmental humanitarian organisation.